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(1)
THE THREAT OF AND PLANNING FOR
PANDEMIC FLU
THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2005
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nathan Deal
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Deal, Hall, Shadegg, Pitts,
Bono, Ferguson, Burgess, Barton (ex officio), Brown, Waxman,
Eshoo, Green, DeGette, Allen, and Baldwin.
Staff present: Chuck Clapton, chief health counsel; Ryan Long,
professional staff; Nandan Kenkermath, majority counsel; Eugenia
Edwards, legislative clerk; Brandon Clark, health policy coordi-
nator; John Ford, minority counsel; and Jessica McNiece, research
assistant.
Mr. DEAL. Call to order. Please close the doors in the back and
we will get started. The Chair recognizes himself for an opening
statement.
I certainly want to welcome everyone to this hearing today and
our distinguished panel members. We have two panels that you are
going to hear from, and they will give various perspectives on this
issue of pandemic flu. And certainly it is an issue that everybody,
I suppose, has their own point of view on. And we will hear several
points of view, I am sure, during the course of this hearing today.
Our first panel of witnesses contain some faces and names that
are familiar to many of the members of this subcommittee. First
of all, Dr. Julie Gerberding, who is now a fellow North Georgian,
and I was going to brag about that until I heard from Mr. Brown
as to where you graduated from medical school, so he is going to
claim some credit for you as well. But being from the CDC in At-
lanta and the director of that facility, I am certainly pleased to
have you here today. Dr. Bruce Gellin, who is the director of the
National Vaccine Program Office within the Department of Health
and Human Services, pleased to have you, Dr. Gellin. And Dr. An-
thony Fauci, who is the director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases within NIH. We are certainly pleased to
have all three of you here today.
I am going to go ahead and introduce at this point the second
panel, and I have to extend an apology probably that I won’t be
here for all of the second panel’s testimony, but I might if I don’t
have too many long-winded opening statements here. I do have an
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2engagement that is going to take me out for a while, but our vice-
chairman will be presiding at that time.
Dr. Marcia Crosse, who is the director of Health Care Issues for
the U.S. Government Accountability Office; Dr. Ralph Tripp, who
is the director for the Center for Disease Intervention at the Uni-
versity of Georgia College of Veterinary Medicine and the Georgia
Research Alliance Chair of the Animal Health Vaccine Develop-
ment, and the second Georgian who is in the panel group today;
Dr. Andrew Pavia, who is chair of the Taskforce on Pandemic In-
fluenza at the Infectious Diseases Society of America; and professor
and chief of the Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases at Univer-
sity of Utah Health Services Center and Primary Children’s Hos-
pital; Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, close I am sure, medical director of the
Hoffmann-La Roche, Incorporated; Mr. Phillip Hosbach, who is vice
president of the Immunization Policy and Government Relations
for sanofi pasteur, which is the world’s largest influenza vaccine
manufacturers.
So as you can see from the titles and the positions of the mem-
bers of these two panels, we certainly represent, I think, a cross-
section of the experts on this issue that we are facing today.
All of us, I think, can attest to the fact that the fear of a global
influenza epidemic or a flu pandemic is certainly one of the greater
health challenges and threats that our country faces and our world
faces. All of us have different perspectives on this. I have heard
people, as we have talked about having a hearing like this, saying
that they remembered the Asian Flu, they remembered the flu
epidemics when they were in college, and all of these things.
I have a resource that goes far beyond that, so I decided to ask
my 98-year-old mother and my soon-to-be 92-year-old father-in-law
what they remember about flu epidemics. And remarkably, my
mother, who was a young teenager in the 1918 flu epidemic, recalls
that she lost two aunts during that time. And those of you who
know the history of all this, this was a serious flu that affected our
country and affected the world.
My father-in-law went back even further than that. He remem-
bered a flu epidemic of the late 1800’s and recalled that there is
a cemetery in our area where it is practically filled with the victims
of a flu from the late 1800’s. So the idea that this is something that
is new is certainly not appropriate because it is a threat that has
hit our country and the world in the past and is certainly a threat
that we want to be sure that we are as prepared as we possibly
can be.
You might ask why the linkage with the veterinary testimony.
Part of it is the fact that my hometown calls itself the poultry cap-
ital of the world, and we have for many, many years, of course,
been concerned with Avian Flu and the effects on the poultry in-
dustry here and across the world. But there is a direct linkage, as
you will hear, in the threat and trying to eliminate the threat with-
in the poultry and fowl of the world so that there is no trans-
mission. So there is a linkage and we certainly want to hear about
that today.
With that, again, I welcome all of you and we look forward to
your testimony. And I will recognize my good friend, Mr. Brown.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Nathan Deal follows:]
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3PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NATHAN DEAL, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEALTH
The Committee will come to order, and the Chair recognizes himself for an open-
ing statement.
I am proud to say that we have two expert panels of witnesses appearing before
us today that I believe will fairly represent the different perspectives on this com-
plex issue. We look forward to hearing your testimony, and we are grateful for your
cooperation and attendance at today’s hearing.
Our first panel of witnesses contains a few familiar faces to this Committee:
• Dr. Julie Gerberding, fellow North Georgia resident and Director of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
• Dr. Bruce Gellin, Director of the National Vaccine Program Office within the De-
partment of Health and Human Services
• Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases within National Institutes of Health
Our second panel comes to us largely from outside of the federal government and
contains five experts witnesses:
• Dr. Marcia Crosse, Director of Health Care Issues for the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office
• Dr. Ralph Tripp, Director of the Center for Disease Intervention at the University
of Georgia College of Veterinary Medicine and Georgia Research Alliance Chair
of Animal Health Vaccine Development and our second witness hailing from
North Georgia.
• Dr. Andrew Pavia, Chair of the Task Force on Pandemic Influenza at the Infec-
tious Diseases Society of America and professor and chief of the Division of Pe-
diatric Infectious Diseases at the University of Utah Health Sciences Center
and Primary Children’s Hospital
• Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, Medical Director for Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.
• Mr. Phillip Hosbach, Vice President of Immunization Policy and Government Re-
lations for Sanofi Pasteur, which is the world’s largest influenza vaccine manu-
facturer
As all of our witnesses today will attest, the threat of a global influenza epidemic,
or ‘‘flu pandemic,’’ is one of the greatest public health threats we face today. From
speaking to the experts in this field, I truly believe that it is not a matter of ‘‘if’’
a flu pandemic hits but ‘‘when,’’ and I believe that is our responsibility as Members
of Congress to ensure that the public is as protected from this threat as possible.
This, of course, is no simple matter and there is no silver-bullet solution to this
problem.
Protecting the public from the threat of a global flu pandemic takes awareness
of the potential threat as well as dedication and cooperation from all of the involved
organizations in both the public and private sectors. Unfortunately, I believe we
have ignored the lessons of history and science and that we remain under prepared
for the emergence of a global flu pandemic that could potentially kill millions of peo-
ple over a short period of time and have irreparable harm to our economy.
As most of you know, I live in Gainesville, Georgia, which is considered to be the
‘‘Poultry Capital of the World,’’ and each year my Congressional district produces
over $915 million in farmgate value from the poultry industry. If we were struck
by a virulent strain of the avian influenza virus, this entire industry would be com-
pletely wiped out in matter of weeks.
Clearly, we have too much at stake to continue to largely ignore this serious
threat facing our society, and that is why I am excited about the opportunity we
have before us today to further explore the potential threat of a pandemic flu and
how we can better prepare to ourselves to face this problem.
I am a great believer in the potential of science and human determination and
I firmly believe that if we dedicate ourselves and our resources to solving this prob-
lem that we can overcome this significant threat looming on our horizon.
Again, I welcome our witnesses and thank them for their participation. I now rec-
ognize my friend from Ohio, Mr. Brown, for five minutes for his opening statement.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all three
witnesses, frankly, three of the most important people in our gov-
ernment and our country. We welcome you to share your wisdom
with us and to thank you for your public service and the terrific
work you do for our healthcare system and especially for our public
health infrastructure.
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4In March, during a hearing on the National Institutes of Health,
the director showed the committee a slide charting the increase
and life expectancy in the United States over the last century. That
slide illustrated a number of things, including the progress our
country made in developing our public health infrastructure and
expanding healthcare coverage and access, especially for seniors,
and in fostering breakthroughs in biomedical research.
Perhaps the most notable thing on the chart—other than the 30-
year growth in life expectancy brought on mostly by public health,
secondarily by major high-tech medical breakthroughs—but per-
haps the most notable thing on the chart was the downward spike
in the year 1918. The last major pandemic flu infected 28 percent
of Americans, caused the deaths of nearly 700,000 people, as we
know; worldwide killed in excess of 25 million people; some esti-
mate as high as 50 million, more than the first World War that
ended that same year. Life expectancy in our country dropped 12
years in 12 months. The example of the early 20th century remains
relevant today as a warning to public health experts, to govern-
ment officials, including Members of this Congress who have abso-
lutely inadequately funded public health.
1918 shows how the spread of a flu strain that evades available
treatment lurks as one of the most serious risks to our Nation’s
health. Our Nation and the international community of which we
remain vulnerable to flu strains that evade available treatment
and, as I said, can potentially wreak havoc on the Nation’s public
health, obviously there are important differences between 1918 and
2005. Many of those differences are reflected in the makeup of our
two panels today because of the coordination and research led by
CDC and NIH, our ability to identify, prevent, and fight potentially
harmful infection is far superior to where we were early last cen-
tury.
But along with this progress we face new challenges—a world
with seamless and constant global travel makes an outbreak in the
remotest corner of the world a threat to every corner. When infec-
tion travels to Hong Kong to Hartford in a matter of hours, it be-
comes significantly harder, obviously, to contain.
Manmade treatments save millions but inadequate and mis-
applied therapies have fostered new drug-resistant strains of infec-
tion, especially a disease like tuberculosis. We have seen a number
of potential vaccine suppliers dwindle into the single digits, and
without adequate funding at the Federal, State, and local level in
large part because of decisions on tax cuts and spending priorities
made in this Congress, our public health infrastructure is woefully
unprepared to fight a major outbreak and to deal with daily prob-
lems in public health, in the deaths and the illnesses of people who
most of us on this panel, frankly, don’t know—people in the inner
city, people afflicted by rural poverty.
These challenges resonated loudly last fall when it was an-
nounced the U.S. would short nearly half of our expected flu vac-
cine. I admire the word done by HHS and CDC to inform the public
and develop guidelines in the face of that shortage, but we must
apply the lessons learned last year and do it now. We don’t know
whether we will face a pandemic, but we do know that countless
lives could be loss of a pandemic takes hold.
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5Epidemiologists and other public health experts are currently
tracking several potential flu pandemics, the Avian Influenza, or
Bird Flu, appears to pose the most lethal threat. As of March,
Avian Flu had killed 74 people in Asian and tens of millions of
birds. The global threat is a potential for the virus to mutate and
spread from human to human. The World Health Organization has
said that because of that possibility the world is ‘‘closer to an influ-
enza pandemic than in any time since 1968.’’ WHO further points
out similarities that suggest Avian Flu could follow the same pat-
terns as the strain that caused the 1918 pandemic. The threat
posed by Avian Flu is great, but with the right investment and col-
laboration from industry, academia, and government, a pandemic
can be averted. This committee should consider how best to ensure
the development, stockpile, and distribution of vaccine and
antiviral treatments. It must examine the avenues government can
take to bring competition and diversity back into the vaccine mar-
ket, ideally before a pandemic strain could hit our shores. We
should continue to work with partners like WHO to fight infection
where it exists and prevent worldwide transmission. We should ex-
amine our Nation’s investment in basic research and better under-
stand how that commitment translates into more effective remedies
for potential pandemic. We should go beyond a discussion of pan-
demic flu and talk about how and how much and how we should
fund our public health infrastructure, not just for major outbreaks
that will affect everyone, but the kind of day-to-day public health
that, frankly, the public health problems that our Congress and our
government, frankly, have so far been unwilling to address. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEAL. We are pleased to have the chairman of our full com-
mittee, Mr. Barton from Texas, and I recognize him at this time
for an opening statement.
Chairman BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to com-
mend you for holding this hearing. I want to commend both of our
panels of witnesses, the first panel and the second panel, for being
here on this important subject.
There are experts that say another killer flu epidemic is inevi-
table. We don’t know when or where it will begin or exactly how
many million that it will kill; we only know that a pandemic flu
has happened before, and we think that it almost surely will hap-
pen again. Historically, influenza pandemics have been deadly.
With a world population of six-and-a-half billion, even a relatively
mild pandemic could kill millions of people. In the United States
the risk varies from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.
Put it like this: a bad flu outbreak could kill more Americans than
either or both of the last two World Wars. It is probably fair to ex-
pect that some of us in this room today would be sick and possibly
a handful of the people in this room would even die.
Right now we are monitoring some serious developments in Asia
concerning the recent Avian Flu strain. Both the World Health Or-
ganization and the Department of Health and Human Services has
expressed serious concerns over these strains developing into a
global pandemic. Organizations around the world and Health and
Human Services in our country have taken significant steps to
mitigate the potential effects of influenza pandemic.
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6That is the purpose of the hearing today is to do oversight on
those steps. I want to applaud the efforts in this country in both
the private sector and the public sector. I also want to applaud the
Secretary of Health and Human Services for his emphasis on plan-
ning and preparedness for a pandemic flu and his cooperation with
international organizations.
In many other ways we do remain vulnerable. The global vaccine
industry is fragile. The capacity to gear up and produce the nec-
essary vaccines in the event of a pandemic is limited. Liability con-
cerns may hinder production and distribution of any new vaccine.
With ordinary flu vaccine production already so low, the amounts
that we can produce in the face of a global pandemic are probably
insufficient. Moreover, the timeframes for development, production,
and approvals leave millions and millions of people vulnerable.
Antivirals may also be a countermeasure. We can place such coun-
termeasures in the national strategic stockpile, and I am glad that
we have done so with over two millions courses of treatment so far.
But one question that we need to try to get an answer for today
is whether this is sufficient in the face of the apparent threat. The
amount in relation to population would appear to be much less
than what other countries are doing. I would also note that many
similar planning and preparedness activities will be relevant in the
face of bioterrorism and other emerging threats. We need to work
aggressively and cooperatively on all of these issues.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses today. And with that I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for holding this hearing on this impor-
tant public health issue.
Experts say another killer flu is inevitable. We don’t know when or where it will
begin, or exactly how many millions it may kill. We only know that a pandemic flu
has happened before and it must surely come again. Historically, influenza
pandemics have been deadly. With a world population of 6.5 billion, even a rel-
atively mild pandemic could kill many millions of people. In the United States the
risk varies from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. Think of it like this—
a bad flu outbreak could kill more Americans than either or both of the last cen-
tury’s world wars. It is probably fair to expect that some of us in this room today
would be sick, and a handful of us would die.
Right now we are monitoring some serious developments in Asia concerning a re-
cent avian flu strain. Both the World Health Organization and the Department of
Health and Human Services has expressed serious concern over these strains devel-
oping into a global pandemic.
Organizations around the world and HHS have taken significant steps to mitigate
the potential effects of influenza pandemic. I applaud the efforts that both the pri-
vate sector and public sector are making to address the potential need for different
means of vaccine production. I also applaud the Secretary of HHS for the emphasis
on planning and preparedness for pandemic flu and cooperation with international
organizations.
In many other ways, however, we remain very vulnerable. The global vaccine in-
dustry is fragile and sparse. The capacity to gear up and produce necessary vaccines
in the event of a pandemic is limited. Liability concerns may hinder production and
distribution of any new vaccine. With ordinary flu vaccine production so low, the
amounts we can produce in the face of a global pandemic are insufficient. Moreover,
the time frames for development, production, and approvals leave millions vulner-
able.
Antivirals may also be a useful countermeasure. We can place such counter-
measures in the National Strategic Stockpile. I am glad we have done so for over
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72 million courses of treatment, but I want to ask whether this is sufficient in the
face of the threat. The amount in relation to the population appears to be much less
than what other countries are doing.
I note that many similar planning and preparedness activities will be relevant in
the face of bioterrorism and other emerging threats. We will need to aggressively
work on these issues. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on this timely
and important topic.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to recognize
the gentlelady from California, Ms. Eshoo, for an opening state-
ment.
Ms. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to you
and welcome to our very distinguished panel. It is always a pleas-
ure when you come to the committee to testify and I salute you for
your work on behalf of the American people. I think you always
distinguish yourselves.
The World Health Organization has warned that a pandemic flu
could occur at any time, which could cause deaths—as has been
stated by some of my colleagues already—in a range of two to
seven million people. Those are staggering numbers. I can’t help
but think of—I don’t know whether it was in the 1970’s or 1980’s—
we saw something very common on people’s desks, and it said
‘‘plan’’—and then ‘‘ahead’’ kind of just fell off the edge. So I think
that today we are trying to plan ahead and be wise, be prudent,
and understand the factors that really didn’t come into play with
the flu epidemic that we had in our own country, the shortcomings
that occurred, the lurch that people found themselves in. And the
best question that people asked from senior centers and medical
centers across the country was why were we not prepared for this?
Why hasn’t this worked?
The Avian Flu, known as the Bird Flu, is the latest strain of con-
cern. Should it adapt fully to humans and be capable of easy per-
son-to-person transmission, it would probably spread worldwide in
3 to 6 months.
Right now only about a dozen companies in the world make flu
vaccines. Many of these manufacturers are based overseas. This is
a serious problem for the United States if and when a pandemic
hits. In a pandemic, overseas manufacturers may be reluctant to
provide the United States with their stockpile, and if they do agree
to provide us with the vaccines, the FDA will need the ability to
rapidly evaluate the vaccine or agree to let them in automatically
once they are approved.
We also know that it is financially risky for manufacturers to in-
vest in research and development because the pandemic strain that
emerges may be substantially different from any vaccine in devel-
opment. There could likely be an investment without any return.
So the Congress has to take steps to ensure that there is a ro-
bust infrastructure for developing and providing vaccines and
treatments. We have to address the barriers that manufacturers
face. Today, I hope HHS will explain why their draft pandemic flu
plan is still not final, and I hope that the CDC can explain why
there has been a delay in stockpiling antivirals, which, if taken
within 2 days of getting sick, can reduce the symptoms of the flu
and shorten the time that one is sick by 1 or 2 days. Antivirals can
make one less contagious to others.
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8So I look forward to the testimony from our expert panels on this
issue, and I hope that this committee will act quickly and appro-
priately to prepare for pandemic flu. The American people are
counting on us to do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. I recognize the vice-chairman of the sub-
committee, Mr. Ferguson, for an opening statement.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for hold-
ing this hearing and I thank our two panels of distinguished guests
today. I am looking forward to hearing their testimony.
Mr. Chairman, we are staring down the barrel of a loaded gun,
and that gun is ready to fire. Expert after expert, including the es-
teemed witnesses that we will hear from today, have said that we
must not ask if but when. When will we face the strain of influenza
virus that will cause a pandemic? And when that happens, will we
be ready?
We have heard these figures before but they are important to re-
peat. In 1918 an influenza pandemic claimed the lives of almost
600,000 Americans and more than 20 million people worldwide. A
little known fact to most people is that in a regular flu season
today kills about 36,000 Americans. Today, public health experts at
HHS and CDC estimate that an influenza pandemic could cause
90,000 to 300,000 or more deaths in the U.S. and tens of millions
of people worldwide. Pandemic influenza is nature’s weapon of
mass destruction. Even the Homeland Security Department has
weighed in on a flu pandemic’s effects, pegging the cost of a pan-
demic influenza outbreak in just four cities in the United States at
$70 billion to $160 billion.
Dr. Michael Osterholm, head of University of Minnesota’s Center
for Infectious Disease Research and Police stated in the ‘‘Wall
Street Journal’’ just this week that a pandemic flu could trigger an
economic crisis. Dr. Osterholm noted that the 2003 outbreak of
SARS paralyzed cities and cost billions of dollars even though its
toll, 8,000 sick and 800 dead, was relatively light. Pandemic flu
could change the world overnight, Dr. Osterholm stated, reducing
or even ending foreign travel and trade.
This problem demands our full attention and the full commit-
ment of our resources to counter a looming catastrophe. Last No-
vember this Health Subcommittee held hearings as last year’s flu
season was underway. Just a few weeks ago the Oversight and In-
vestigations Subcommittee held a perspective hearing on the up-
coming flu season and what we are doing to ramp up vaccine pro-
duction. But this hearing will be looking at the threat of pandemic
flu and our vital surveillance efforts of Avian Flu strains in Asia,
what is being done to ramp up vaccine capacity once a pandemic
strain is identified, and what the response plan is while a pan-
demic is occurring, specifically preparedness through stockpiling
antivirals.
In each of the hearings we have had on the flu I have stressed
the importance of stockpiling antivirals to treat those who are in-
fected with the flu. Antivirals are a potent way to combat a flu out-
break and are unique compared to vaccines because they can be
stockpiled for between 5 to 7 years, or perhaps more.
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look forward to hearing their insight on how we can be best pre-
pared when the feared pandemic does in fact strike. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Pleased to recognize gentlelady from Colo-
rado, Ms. DeGette, for an opening statement.
Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Simply to say how
much I appreciate you having this important hearing. I will submit
my opening statement for the record and reserve my time for ques-
tions.
Mr. DEAL. I thank the gentlelady. Chair recognizes Dr. Burgess
for an opening statement.
Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to
thank you for calling this hearing and thank the full committee
chairman and the ranking member for holding this hearing.
Looking at the historical significance of pandemic flu, it is almost
overwhelming to think about the challenges of preventing a dev-
astating outbreak of influenza and dealing with the aftermath. The
numbers are significant. In the last century it is estimated that
over 53 million people died from periodic outbreaks of pandemic flu
strains. Considering the world’s population is much more mobile
today than at any time in our history, I think the public health of-
ficials are right in making the fight against communicable disease
one of their highest priorities. If we factor in the adaptability of the
influenza virus and the fact that an airplane makes a pretty good
way to communicate an illness like the flu, it is understandable to
see why we cannot consign the pandemic flu outbreaks of the last
century to the will-not-recur file.
There are tools available to us to confront a possible outbreak,
but the coordination, the surveillance, and the prevention of a con-
tainment strategy are going to affect us at the State, Federal, and,
yes, at the global levels. The severity of the next pandemic cannot
be predicted, but even a medium-level pandemic could cause be-
tween 100,000 and 200,000 deaths, almost three-quarters of a mil-
lion hospitalizations, and millions and millions of people in doctors’
offices, outpatient visits, and missing work. An estimated economic
impact would be well over $150 billion for a medium outbreak.
Not too long ago we were concerned about another communicable
disease, SARS virus. The SARS outbreak of 2003 exposed the capa-
bility of global surveillance and the containment infrastructure as
to how an outbreak of an unknown disease can impact human
interaction and commerce. And, Dr. Gerberding, I thank you for
tolerating my many phone calls over that period. But even though
the severity of the outbreak was largely isolated to East and South
Asian countries, it did impact my district, which at the time was
the home to the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. At the local level at
least, the SARS outbreak brought into sharp focus how fear can
drive a containment response to an illness in the absence of a
workable containment strategy.
The chairman brought up about the issue of liability and the
ranking member brought up about how we can assure the develop-
ment and availability of vaccines, and I too believe that somehow
controlling liability in the manufacture and production of vaccines
is going to be critical in our ability to provide this on a larger scale.
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But I look forward to hearing our panel today, and I understand
that our current capabilities of our public health institutions and
the vaccine industry will help improve our response to any further
pandemic outbreaks. Mr. Chairman, thank you again, and I will
yield back my time.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Recognize the gentleman from Maine, Mr.
Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your calling
this hearing to examine the level of U.S. preparedness for a pos-
sible flu pandemic. I look forward to hearing from our expert wit-
nesses on our current level of preparedness.
Unlike past flu pandemics, the relatively gradual emergence of
the Avian Bird Flu has given us time to ensure that we have ade-
quate resources to fight this deadly virus. At this point we don’t
know when or if the current strain of Avian Bird Flu will reach the
U.S., but we do know that the epidemiology of the H5N1 virus is
more virulent and has already passed directly from human to
human. We know that this particular flu strain has infected at
least 92 adults in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia killing 52 peo-
ple. We also know that there is currently no vaccine for Avian Flu
and no known cure.
I am concerned about our country’s ability to develop, approve,
and secure adequate vaccine supplies. Today the U.S. has one do-
mestic source of flu vaccine. America has been a world leader in
developing life-saving medicines and spearheading countless global
health efforts. April 12, 2005 marked the 50th anniversary of the
first polio vaccine. Polio was eliminated in the U.S. because pro-
tecting the public’s health was perceived as a simple necessity, and
every effort was made to see that the vaccine would be freely dis-
tributed and polio would be eradicated. Without diligent efforts to
maintain immunization programs here and strengthen them world-
wide, we would not be able to keep such deadly diseases at bay.
The spread of the H5N1 virus poses a new challenge to the U.S.
scientific community and vaccine manufacturers. Many experts
have stated that we need a more reliable and flexible vaccine pro-
duction system, as well as improved surveillance and public com-
munication. Last year the license suspension of the Chiron Com-
pany’s vaccine manufacturing plant in the U.K. served as a wake-
up call. In addition to a shortage of supply, we were faced with try-
ing to educate the public about appropriate distribution and who
should be vaccinated first.
It is my understanding that countries such as Canada, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand are stockpiling antiviral treatments
against pandemic flu for up to one-quarter of their nation’s popu-
lation. The U.S. stockpile is currently maintained for only 1 percent
of our population, and I believe this strategy needs to be reexam-
ined.
I hope the witnesses will help us understand what went wrong
last year and what we can do to strengthen our domestic vaccine
supply, speed research and development, and establish better dis-
tribution channels. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I yield
back.
Mr. DEAL. I thank the gentleman. Chair recognizes Mr. Shadegg
for an opening statement.
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Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing on this topic. As my colleagues have
already noted, a pandemic flu could pose a very serious health
threat to not only our country but to the world. But it should also
be noted that it could also lead to an economic crisis. Just yester-
day a ‘‘Wall Street Journal’’ article noted that ‘‘A pandemic flu
could sicken more than a billion people and single-handedly stop
travel and trade throughout the world, resulting in untold eco-
nomic losses.’’ We have spent considerable time and resources over
the past few years preparing for an attack of bioterrorism. Now,
the lessons learned from that experience should be used to address
pandemic flu.
The first and foremost of these lessons is that our best defense
is a strong offense. Preventing outbreaks through vaccine develop-
ment will ensure that a flu eruption fails to reach pandemic status.
I want to thank our witnesses for their work and for their efforts
to ensure that vaccines prevent pandemic flu outbreaks, as well as
for their testimony on what we can do to meet the goals that we
have set.
We also must be prepared, however, for an outbreak that cannot
be addressed through vaccination. In such an instance we must
have adequate surveillance systems to ensure early recognition,
sufficient communication tools, and networks to enable response,
and antiviral providers able to respond.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for sponsoring this hearing
and for your efforts in this regard. And I thank our witnesses for
their testimony and their work in this area.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Recognize Ms. Baldwin for an opening
statement.
Ms. BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend
you for holding this hearing today. I was wondering last night as
I began to read through the materials whether I would be kept up
all night by the dire threats. And as many of my colleagues have
noted, pandemic flu poses a serious threat to our Nation and the
world. A recent article in the science publication ‘‘Nature’’ notes
that a flu pandemic could cause 20 percent of the world’s popu-
lation to become sick, almost 30 million may need to be hospital-
ized, and a quarter of those infected would die. And perhaps the
most shocking aspect of that article was that experts cited consid-
ered those numbers optimistic.
Many experts are now saying that a pandemic flu occurring in
the United States is not a question of if but when. And in our day
of globalization when it takes mere hours to cross continents, the
old ways of containing an infectious disease are no longer applica-
ble.
While I am glad that the Department of Health and Human
Services has produced a draft of the Pandemic Influenza Prepared-
ness and Response Plan, I remain concerned about the lack of
progress on finalizing the report, and particularly, in light of our
crisis last fall when the delivery of vaccine for seasonal flu was se-
verely curtailed and only guidelines and voluntary opting out by
more healthy individuals helped us address that crisis. It is imper-
ative, I think, that we move quickly and decisively, and we have
some catching up to do.
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I also note that experts stress again and again that our planning
efforts must be international in scope and look forward to hearing
from witnesses today on that aspect of our planning efforts. There
are several other aspects of our preparedness that I hope to hear
you address through your testimony this morning. For example, I
think we need to start educating Americans, not just healthcare
providers, but American citizens need to know what to do in the
case of an outbreak, what their treatment and prevent options are,
which authorities to go to for information and what medications
could be available to them should an outbreak occur.
I also hope to hear your thoughts on the importance of seamless
communication, information sharing, and access to resources
among our healthcare professionals. The chain will be only as
strong as our weakest length and a public health nurse in a rural
county in Wisconsin must have the same access to resources as a
public health nurse in midtown Manhattan. Groups and regions
ought not to be place in competition with each other.
If a pandemic flu should occur in the U.S., there will be a terrific
strain on our ability to provide medications as well as treatments
in our clinics and hospitals. If high numbers of people get sick, who
will decide who gets care in a hospital when all the beds are full?
Who gets placed in the ICU? Who gets the last dose of an antiviral
medication?
I look forward to hearing the witnesses today tackle some of
these very challenging questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. I too share the lady’s concern. These are
rather frightening statistics. And from this point forward nobody in
the audience is allowed to cough, and if you do, the hypochondriacs
in our midst are going to leave the room. So I am pleased to recog-
nize Mr. Hall for an opening statement.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And you would never get
Howard Hughes to shake hands with any of us here today, would
you? I thank you and I join the accolades of the other members
here to the Chair for holding this hearing and for other hearings
that he is very capable of holding and has held for this committee
and for this Congress.
You know, listening to the opening statements, and I will be very
brief because I don’t have that much to say about it, my children
think I remember that 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, but I do re-
member and was affected by it because I knew people that had lost
children during that time. And when you lose three-quarters of a
million people in this country at a day and time when we didn’t
have that many people in this country, that was quite a loss and
quite a huge percentage of people that were affected by it.
I have said here and as I hear this I thought of a hearing I held
in the Science Committee some 4, 5, or 6 years ago on asteroids.
And we were all surprised to find out that an asteroid had just
missed the United States by about 15 minutes in 1988, one the size
of maybe Delaware or one of the other States. We were a little sur-
prised at that. We might also have some surprises when we hear
your testimony, because we don’t know by how much we have
missed epidemics and what has been done about it.
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But I think we are very fortunate to have learned people like you
with your years of study and your research on vaccines and for
things to do for it, that you have prepared yourself for prevention,
and if not prevention, control. I thank you for giving your time and
I think that it is a timely thing that we need to hear and need to
know more about. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having it. I yield
back my time.
Mr. DEAL. I thank the gentleman. Recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Waxman, for an opening statement.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing
today and drawing attention to this very important issue. Many
leading scientists believe that it is not a matter of if but when the
next flu pandemic will hit. It has been estimated that even a me-
dium-level pandemic could cause up to 200,000 deaths in the
United States and 734,000 hospitalizations at a cost of up to $166
billion. Pandemic flu is a grave public health threat, and we must
do all we can to get ready for it.
There are many unknowns surrounding the pandemic flu. It is
unknown which strain of the flu virus would cause the pandemic,
so production of an effective vaccine must wait until the pandemic
begins. It is unknown how long it will take to produce a vaccine.
It is also an unknown whether or how well antiviral medications
will work. With so many unknowns it is easy to become very anx-
ious about this topic. Fortunately, there are some things we do
know, and these are some steps we can take now to be prepared
no matter what the strain of the pandemic virus, no matter how
long it takes to make a vaccine, no matter how well antiviral medi-
cations work, our core public health system must be strong. We
must have a way to deliver vaccines to those most at risk quickly
and efficiently.
This year’s flu shortage illustrated how far away we are from
this capability. Many chronically ill and elderly Americans were
forced to wait for hours just to get their vaccines. We must do bet-
ter than this. We also must have the ability to maintain core public
health functions in the event of a pandemic. One major vaccine
manufacturer has told us that in order to produce the necessary
vaccines to combat a flu pandemic, the company would have to dra-
matically curtail production of its childhood vaccines. This would
be a particularly dangerous situation given that stockpiles of many
childhood vaccines do not exist. It would be a disaster if our prepa-
ration for flu pandemic led to outbreak of childhood diseases. But
that could happen.
That is why today we must do more than ask our expert wit-
nesses to speculate about uncertainties. We must also ask some
tough questions about the administration’s response to the chal-
lenges as plain as day. We also must ask why the administration
has proposed major cuts in funding for key programs in State and
local preparedness. These are the very programs that allow our
communities to prepare for bioterrorism, natural disasters, and a
flu pandemic. We must also ask why the administration has yet
again failed to provide adequate funding for States for vaccines
against preventable diseases. If we cannot even stop bacterial men-
ingitis from spreading in our communities even when we have vac-
cines, how will we stop the flu virus? And we must ask why it has
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
14
taken so long to get senior administration officials to focus their at-
tention on lack of stockpiles for routine pediatric illness. These
stockpiles were promised 3 years ago, and yet a letter asking about
the holdup was sent to vaccine manufacturers just 2 days ago.
After we ask these tough questions it will be time to get back to
work, and I hope we can join together across party lines to support
major improvements in our public health system. I thank the wit-
nesses for attending and look forward to their testimony.
Mr. DEAL. Recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Bono,
for opening statement.
Ms. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will waive my opening
statement.
Mr. DEAL. Recognize Mr. Green from Texas for an opening state-
ment.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you and the
ranking member for holding the hearing on the threat of pandemic
flu and the steps we are taking to protect Americans from the out-
break. Hopefully, we will get ahead of the curve. I also want to
thank our panelists this morning who—as a lot of us feel like—lis-
ten to us give our statements, but oftentimes it is the only time
members on the committee can do anything except vote.
I have a personal interest in this issue because my daughter has
been accepted in a medical fellowship on infectious diseases, and
so I am particularly thankful that I can gain some knowledge in
one of the issues that she certainly is working with now in the fore-
front of her medical work. I tell her I don’t want to be treated for
anything she studies.
The 20th century was a witness to three flu pandemics, so we
know what kind of destruction these outbreaks can cause. And re-
cent press reports suggest we are dangerously close to witnessing
another. According to the World Health Organization, the next
pandemic flu would likely result in 1 to 2.3 million hospitalizations
and 300 to 650,000 deaths in developed countries alone. We can
only imagine the kind of havoc that a pandemic flu would wreak
on developing nations which do not have the healthcare infrastruc-
ture surveillance capabilities to protect their citizens from infec-
tious disease.
Where I ought to know this is to be the case is poor countries
facing the threat of the Bird Flu since the current outbreak in 2003
have been unable to successfully detect and respond to individual
cases of Bird Flu. The influenza strain that most concerns infec-
tious disease specialists is the H5N1 strain has jumped from ani-
mals to human and to date has killed 36 people in Vietnam, 12 in
Thailand, and four in Cambodia. And while the Bird Flu has thus
far been contained in Asia, the WHO influenza specialists recognize
this can’t last that long with the amount of contact we have lit-
erally in our very small world now.
We know that human flu pandemic will consist of three elements
in tandem. The Bird Flu has already presented us with a virus to
which humans have little or no immunity. The deaths in Asia have
proven that this virus can replicate itself in humans causing seri-
ous illness, if not death. The virus may also be transmittable from
human to human. Since this current outbreak in 2003, the third
element has not been met. However, Dr. Fauci’s testimony today
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indicates a high probability where they not have witnessed at least
once case of human-to-human transmission in H5N1 virus. Given
this news, the hearing is particularly timely. The subcommittee
has held hearings in the past about our supply of flu vaccine in
this country and the challenges that face both the government and
the vaccine manufacturers. This hearing, I hope, will build on pre-
vious knowledge we gained from our subcommittee’s activities and
shed light on steps we must take to ensure an adequate and effec-
tive vaccine supply to protect Americans from the deadly flu pan-
demic.
And, again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here
and for what you do every day to protect our constituents. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEAL. I thank the gentleman. We are ready now for our first
panel and—well, I have another member. Mr. Pitts, do you wish to
make an opening statement? All right. You have already heard ev-
erything that we know about this issue. Now we are looking for-
ward to hearing what you know about it. I would remind you we
have your written testimony, which is a part of the record. And,
Dr. Gerberding, we will start with you.
STATEMENTS OF JULIE L. GERBERDING, DIRECTOR, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; ANTHONY S. FAUCI, DI-
RECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; AND BRUCE
G. GELLIN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL VACCINE PROGRAM OF-
FICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Ms. GERBERDING. Thank you. I am absolutely grateful to the
committee for having this hearing. I think the more we shine a
bright light on this problem, the more we will be able to be pre-
pared to handle it. Your eloquence in describing both the severity
of the threat as well as the impact is heartening. And I think I
speak for all of us in the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices and Secretary Leavitt, we know this is a high priority for the
agency. Secretary Leavitt has been meeting with us almost every
day on flu since he took office. And at the World Health Assembly
last week where all of the leaders of the health community around
the globe assembled in Geneva, the secretary convened several dis-
cussions on influenza pandemic planning and how we could assist.
What I am going to try to do today is two things in my brief re-
marks: one is just give a capsule situation report on the flu in Asia,
and second, describe in brief some of the important steps that we
are already taking. We are not waiting for that final preparedness
plan to get approved. We are acting now to get the show on the
road.
Just as a reminder for those who aren’t familiar with influenza,
you will be hearing us talking about H5N1 or H3N2. Flu is a sim-
ple little virus with just a few genes. One of them codes for some-
thing called ‘‘H’’ or hemagglutinin and the other codes for ‘‘N’’,
neuraminidase. But despite its simplicity, this is a very sinister
virus, and it changes all the time. When the changes in H and N
are little or small in genetic context, it is called a drift, and that
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is what happens every year and why we need to get a new flu shot
every year. Sometimes we see a shift, which is a major change.
Usually the virus exchanges genes with some other strain of flu
and you see a big jump in the composition in the H or the N, and
that is the change that is usually associated with pandemics.
[Chart]
Ms. GERBERDING. This is a map of the prior influenza pandemics
that have occurred throughout the last 100 years, and you can see
that each time there is a big shift in the H gene from H1 to H2;
the Asian Flu appeared when H2 came on the horizon. When H3
appeared we saw the Hong Kong Flu pandemic.
And what you are seeing in upper corner here are H7, H5, and
H9, which are Avian isolates not yet transmitted in broad scale to
people in pandemics, but certainly on the horizon and very ominous
because we, of course, have no population immunity to any of those
H’s. And so because we are seeing right now H5 and 1 in Asia, we
are particularly concerned about the emergence of the virus in a
world that has absolutely no immunity.
How do these big jumps occur? Well, it is a complicated story,
but often what happens is that a virus from a bird host—in this
case an asymptomatic duck, or in Asia right now, the poultry that
are infected—can commingle in a pig usually with a human virus
and exchange those big genes resulting in a completely new virus
that then gets transmitted to people. But in this context in Asia
today, we are also concerned about the direct transfer of the poul-
try virus to humans. And this, we know, has occurred a number
of times.
The reason this is so critical and why we are focusing so much
on Asia is that in China alone there are 1.3 billion people, but
there are 13 billion chickens and about 508 million pigs. So in that
area of the world if you multiply that by the incredible density of
population, we are sitting on the cauldron of flu virus incubation,
and the threat is certainly one that we are taking very seriously.
These are the numbers of people so far who have been reported
to the World Health Organization with this H5N1 Avian Flu: 97
people in total with a fatality rate of 55 percent. This may be the
tip of the iceberg; we don’t know. But it certainly is a cause of con-
cern. And recently there has been some suggestion of more clus-
tering in at least one region of Vietnam and perhaps the suggestion
that the virus is slowly becoming more adaptable to humans. Of
course, that remains to be seen.
This map shows some of the indicators of poultry virus activity
in this region. I have occluded status: unknown here as China be-
cause just this week we learned about the migratory bird die-off in
Western China, which was related to a species of geese called the
Bar-headed Goose that migrates up from India and the Tibetan
Plateau, and a reliable laboratory in China has indicated that that
indeed was H5N1 virus.
So we are seeing mass populations of poultry throughout Asia in-
fected. And all of the activities that we are doing right now at HHS
are targeting, first and foremost, preparedness in that region. We
are very pleased with the recent supplemental appropriation from
Congress for CDC and USAID to receive $25 million to step up ac-
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tivities in Asia and another $58 million to augment our supplies in
preparation for the stockpile.
But we are doing a lot of other things at CDC and HHS as well.
We are utilizing all of our laboratory networks, we are developing
rapid diagnostic tests, we are working on expanding our capacity
for vaccine seed development, our virus genomic activities to char-
acterize these strains and their drug susceptibility, and certainly
Dr. Fauci will talk about how all that feeds into vaccine develop-
ment.
Last, just let me mention that this map of the various teams of
people at CDC is just a microcosm of what is gong on throughout
HHS and the entire public health system. We are working with all
sectors, including public health, healthcare, business, and commu-
nications experts, but we are also taking advantage of the $287
million in appropriation that we did receive this year to support flu
activities in our agency. Those appropriations are being used to
purchase influenza vaccine, to purchase antivirals for influenza
from the department, to support improvements in the vaccine man-
ufacturing and science, as well as many other investments to help
speed and accelerate our preparedness for this very uncertain
virus.
So we look forward to answering specific questions about the
steps that we are taking, the preparedness, but I wanted to assure
that, again, we are not waiting for a written plan; we are acting
now to do everything we can with the resources that we do have.
And we are particularly focusing those resources on Asia where we
feel the imminence of the situation is probably deserving of our
greatest attention. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Julie L. Gerberding follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JULIE L. GERBERDING, DIRECTOR, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today
to describe planning and preparedness for an influenza pandemic, including the po-
tential threat posed by the H5N1 avian influenza virus currently in Asia. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt has made influenza
pandemic planning and preparedness one of his top priorities; and each agency
within the Department is working together to prepare the United States for a poten-
tial threat to the health of our nation.
I will discuss steps the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is tak-
ing with many partners both domestically and globally. The strength and flexibility
of CDC and other components of the public health system are vital assets as the
United States sharpens its readiness for an influenza pandemic. Although we have
made significant progress, more work is needed, particularly in the areas of surveil-
lance capacity and response, and the development of potential vaccines. Increased
public awareness and understanding about infection control, containment, and other
actions also are important in preparation for an influenza pandemic.
PANDEMICS IN PERSPECTIVE
Seasonal influenza causes an average of 36,000 deaths each year in the United
States, mostly among the elderly and nearly 200,000 hospitalizations. In contrast,
the actual severity and impact of the next pandemic, whether from H5N1 or another
influenza virus, cannot be predicted. However, modeling studies suggest that, in the
absence of any control measures, such as vaccination, a ‘‘medium-level’’ pandemic
in the United States could result in 89,000 to 207,000 deaths, between 314,000 and
734,000 hospitalizations, 18 to 42 million outpatient visits, and another 20 to 47
million people being sick. Between 15 percent and 35 percent of the United States
population could be affected by an influenza pandemic, and the economic impact in
our country alone could range between $71.3 and $166.5 billion.
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A public health response to a disease of this magnitude involves numerous chal-
lenges.
• A pandemic can occur any time during the year and can last much longer than
seasonal influenza.
• In more advanced pandemic phases, the capacity to prevent or control trans-
mission of the virus can become extremely difficult.
• Although the primary concern at present is the H5N1 avian influenza strain in
Asia, an outbreak leading to a pandemic can occur anywhere in the world and
may derive from viral strains of influenza other than H5N1.
• Comparing the onset and spread of the next pandemic to those of the 20th cen-
tury is problematic for many reasons, including changes in population and so-
cial structures, medical and technological advances, and the increase in inter-
national travel.
• With zoonotic diseases such as avian influenza, there is a need for coordination
with the animal health community.
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ASIA
For an influenza virus to cause a pandemic, it must meet three major criteria:
(1) possess a new surface protein to which there is little or no pre-existing immunity
in the human population; (2) be able to cause illness in humans; and (3) have the
ability for sustained transmission from person to person. So far, the H5N1 virus has
met two of these three criteria, but it has not yet shown the capability for sustained
transmission from person to person.
Concerning this third point, it is important to keep in mind the close relationship
of viral infections in animal hosts and those in humans. Ongoing dialogue between
agricultural and public health officials is extremely important for the careful, con-
sistent surveillance necessary in both animal and human populations. Although the
present avian influenza H5N1 strain in Asia does not yet have the capability of sus-
tained person-to-person transmission, chicken-to-human transmission has occurred,
and in at least one cluster, limited person-to-person transmission has been identi-
fied. As of May 19, 2005 the World Health Organization (WHO) had confirmed 97
cases of H5N1 influenza in humans since January 28, 2004, with a case fatality rate
of 55 percent. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) confirmed, as of
May 13, 2005, that H5N1 had been found in animals from nine Asian countries in
2004 and 2005, with especially large outbreaks among animals in Vietnam and
Thailand. Millions of domestic birds have been culled in attempts to stop the spread
of the virus among animal populations.
Although human case fatality rates seem to have gone down somewhat since Feb-
ruary 2005, CDC, WHO, and other partners are still quite concerned for several rea-
sons. The H5N1 strain now appears to be endemic in poultry and other birds in a
number of Asian countries, signaling a potential long-term threat of mutation and
reassortment with other viral strains. Recent studies have found that ducks carry
the H5N1 strain asymptomatically, making it difficult to monitor the magnitude of
transmission from ducks to other species. Confirmation that H5N1 also has been
transmitted to mammals is a particular concern, because of the increased potential
of the strain to reassort with other strains already common to humans and other
mammals. Studies have documented highly pathogenic H5N1 in pigs, tigers, and
leopards in Asia. Difficulties in implementing effective in-country surveillance, in-
cluding enhancing the training of laboratorians, epidemiologists, veterinarians, and
other professionals, inhibit the type of comprehensive reporting that is essential to
monitor H5N1 and other strains of highly pathogenic avian influenza. Finally,
changes in the epidemiology of the infections, such as decreasing mortality rates,
could indicate changes that make the viruses better adapted to humans. Additional
studies and research are needed to better understand the current situation and how
the viruses may be changing.
RESPONDING TO A PANDEMIC
An effective response to an influenza pandemic requires highly collaborative plan-
ning, implementation, and flexibility in resolving issues at many levels. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is leading the coordination of pre-
paredness efforts through its Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan,
which was released in draft form in August 2004 for public comment and is under
revision. In addition, states are either developing pandemic influenza plans or revis-
ing existing plans to reflect new information and data. Key elements of these plans
include surveillance, infection control, use of antiviral medications, community con-
tainment measures, vaccination procedures, communications, and ability to sustain
essential services in times of widespread illness. Similar elements inform a plan
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that CDC is developing, that will provide detailed guidance and materials to states
and localities and will complement the DHHS plan. CDC also will take the lead in
working with the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and the National
Vaccine Advisory Committee to prioritize recommended target groups for use of
antiviral medications and vaccines during a pandemic when supplies are limited.
Once a pandemic strain starts circulating in the United States, isolation pre-
cautions for persons who are ill and quarantine for persons exposed may need to
be considered to limit the early spread of pandemic influenza, particularly before a
vaccine becomes available. Measures such as these will require a multi-level, multi-
faceted, staged process, such as evaluating all ill travelers arriving from affected
areas. On April 1, 2005 the President amended Executive Order 13295, adding in-
fluenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have
the potential to cause, a pandemic to the list of quarantinable diseases. CDC has
implemented a series of travel notices to minimize the potential for outbreaks to ex-
tend to wider geographic areas. CDC also has expanded the number and capacity
of its quarantine stations at major ports of entry into the United States. As with
any quarantine, such activities need to be undertaken judiciously to minimize ad-
verse impacts on civil liberties.
Vaccination is the best long-term strategy for influenza prevention and control,
both during annual outbreaks and a pandemic; antiviral medications provide an ear-
lier, secondary line of defense. Other measures may help control the spread of influ-
enza in a pandemic situation, such as isolation of ill persons and quarantine of
healthy exposed persons. Comprehensive preparedness for annual influenza out-
breaks is a vital component of an effective response to pandemic influenza, although
pandemic planning will require additional preparation activities.
SURVEILLANCE
The United States, working domestically and with global partners, needs to ex-
pand the scope of early-warning surveillance activities used to detect the next pan-
demic. We cannot estimate the amount of time from first detection in another coun-
try to peak disease in the United States, but it could be a matter of months or less.
Time will be of the essence in making sure we can produce, test, and administer
vaccine as quickly as possible. It will take several months for the first dose of pan-
demic vaccine to be ready and longer to manufacture enough to vaccinate the entire
U.S. population. Therefore, vaccine will be in short supply at the start of the pan-
demic. Under the most favorable conditions, by the time the first dose of vaccine
would be given to the first person, many others will have already become ill or died.
For this reason, surveillance to monitor ongoing changes in the H5N1 strain of
avian influenza currently causing human infections and to monitor for other viruses
with pandemic potential is needed to develop prototype vaccine candidates as quick-
ly as possible. Further, because such a pandemic strain can arise anywhere, at any
time, expanded global surveillance capacity is needed.
The outbreaks of avian influenza in Asia have highlighted several gaps in disease
surveillance globally that the United States must help address to improve our abil-
ity to prepare for an influenza pandemic. These challenges include: (1) lack of infra-
structure in many countries for in-country surveillance networks; (2) need for in-
creased training of laboratory, epidemiologic, and veterinary staff; and (3) resolution
of longstanding obstacles to rapid and open sharing of surveillance information,
specimens, and viruses among agriculture and human health authorities in affected
countries and the international community. CDC and HHS have made significant
progress in the past year toward enhancing surveillance in Southeast Asia. This ini-
tiative needs to continue at both national and international levels if we are to ex-
pand geographic coverage and develop an adequate capacity to conduct effective sur-
veillance. These efforts, in turn, will increase our ability to detect new variants ear-
lier, make more informed vaccine decisions for yearly epidemics, and build an ‘‘early
warning system’’ for new viruses that may cause a pandemic. With the ever-present
threat of the emergence of a new pandemic strain, we need to know what is hap-
pening in the backyards of Southeast Asia, as well as elsewhere throughout the
world. Year-round, world-wide surveillance for infections of humans with new
strains of influenza is essential for us to prepare for the next pandemic, as well as
for next year’s epidemic. Recently, the Congress passed and the President signed an
FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, which included $25 million in international assist-
ance funds to prevent and control the spread of avian influenza in Southeast Asia.
These funds will support human surveillance, laboratory capacity, and enhanced
knowledge of state-of-the-art avian influenza laboratory and field techniques in
Southeast Asia.
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In the past year, CDC has considerably improved domestic surveillance, adding
two new major components to our surveillance system. We worked with the Council
for State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) to make confirmed pediatric deaths
from influenza nationally notifiable, and we implemented hospital-based surveil-
lance for influenza in children at selected sites. To further improve our under-
standing of the impact of influenza on severe outcomes, such as hospitalization, we
are working with the CSTE to make all laboratory confirmed influenza hospitaliza-
tions notifiable. We have issued interim guidelines to states and hospitals to en-
hance surveillance for potential cases of people infected by avian influenza on sev-
eral occasions and these enhancements continue. CDC also set up special laboratory
training courses for identification of avian influenza using rapid molecular tech-
niques. So far, professionals from 48 states and Washington D.C. have been trained.
However, to be as prepared as possible for a pandemic, we are working to do
much more in the domestic surveillance arena. The United States is working to: (1)
ensure that states have sufficient epidemiologic and laboratory capacity both to
identify novel viruses throughout the year and to sustain surveillance during a pan-
demic; (2) improve reporting systems so that information needed to make public
health decisions is available quickly; (3) enhance systems for identifying and report-
ing severe cases of influenza; (4) develop population-based surveillance among
adults hospitalized with influenza and (5) enhance monitoring of resistance to cur-
rent antiviral drugs, to guide policy for use of scarce antiviral drugs.
MANAGING THE VACCINE SUPPLY
During an influenza pandemic, the presence of U.S.-based manufacturing facilities
will be critically important. The pandemic influenza vaccines produced in other
countries will likely not be available to the US market as those governments may
prohibit export of the vaccines produced in their countries until their domestic needs
are met. However, the vaccine manufacturing system in the United States is fragile.
Currently, there are only three influenza vaccine manufacturers producing vaccines
for the US market, and only one produces its vaccine entirely in the United States.
During the past several years, CDC and other DHHS agencies have developed
several new strategies to address annual influenza outbreaks, including the support
of enhanced vaccine production, and have worked to ensure a better match of vac-
cine distribution to the populations in greatest need. Public demand for influenza
vaccine on a yearly basis needs to be both stabilized and increased, so that compa-
nies will have a growing market to provide an incentive to increase production.
These strategies include $40 million for purchasing influenza vaccine for the pedi-
atric stockpile to protect against annual outbreaks of influenza, and $30 million will
be used for contracts to expand the production of bulk single-strain influenza vac-
cine for use if needed during annual influenza season or possibly in a pandemic situ-
ation. In addition, the President is requesting $120—million in fiscal year 2006, an
increase of $21 million, to encourage greater production capacity that will enhance
the U.S.-based vaccine manufacturing surge capacity to help prepare for a pandemic
and further guard against annual shortages.
The Department also appreciates the inclusion of $58 million in the FY 2005
Emergency Supplemental to procure additional influenza countermeasures for the
CDC Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in FY 2005. Currently, the SNS has enough
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) capsules to treat approximately 2.26 million adults and
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) suspension to treat more than 100,000 children. In addition,
SNS contains enough rimantadine tablets to treat up to 4.25 million people and
enough rimantadine suspension to treat up to 750,000. It should be noted, however,
that oseltamivir is the only antiviral at this time shown to be effective against the
H5N1 avian influenza virus in Asia. In addition, SNS funds have been used to pur-
chase approximately 2 million bulk doses of unfinished, unfilled H5N1 vaccine, al-
though it is not yet formulated into vials nor is the vaccine licensed. Clinical testing
to determine dosage and schedule for this vaccine began in April 2005 with funding
from the National Institutes of Health.
DHHS also is supporting the development and testing of potential dose-sparing
strategies to extend a given quantity of vaccine stock.
Regarding annual influenza vaccination, there is an emerging consensus that it
is desirable to expand vaccine coverage beyond the high priority groups for whom
routine vaccination is already recommended. Discussions are under way to review
the data that would be needed to consider broadening recommendations for influ-
enza vaccination. CDC is developing strategies to increase informed demand for, and
access to, influenza vaccine for persons who are currently recommended to be vac-
cinated each year. For example, according to a 2003 Institute of Medicine report,
an estimated 8.2 million additional high-risk uninsured adults 18-64 years old war-
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
21
rant annual vaccination. We recognize that these at-risk persons need better access
to vaccine during a pandemic as well as for seasonal influenza.
Additionally, CDC, in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices, is developing an internal set of possible influenza vaccine supply scenarios
that may occur in future influenza seasons and during a pandemic. These scenarios
range from worst-case to best-case situations and are an important part of CDC
planning efforts. We are preparing recommendations, plans, and communication
messages for any of the possible situations.
CONCLUSION
Although the present avian influenza H5N1 strain in Southeast Asia does not yet
have the capability of sustained person-to-person transmission, we are concerned
that it could. CDC is closely monitoring the situation in collaboration with the
World Health Organization. CDC is using its extensive network of partnerships with
other federal agencies, provider groups, non-profit organizations, vaccine and
antiviral manufacturers, and state and local health departments to enhance pan-
demic influenza planning. Our responses to the annual domestic influenza seasons
also will inform the nation’s planning and preparedness for pandemic influenza. The
same laboratories, health care providers, surveillance systems, and health depart-
ment plans and personnel guide both responses. These actions, in conjunction with
increased public understanding about influenza, will help us all prepare for an influ-
enza pandemic.
Thank you for this opportunity to share this information with you. I am happy
to answer any questions.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Dr. Fauci.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY S. FAUCI
Mr. FAUCI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for giving me the opportunity to address this committee on the re-
search component of the department’s effort in preparedness
against pandemic flu.
[Slide]
Mr. FAUCI. I would like to put this into perspective by showing
you first this initial slide, which shows the complimentary roles of
the sister agencies within HHS regarding how we approach pan-
demic flu preparedness. Dr. Gerberding has explained to you the
CDC’s role. The FDA plays an important regulatory role, particu-
larly with regard to the countermeasure that are used, both thera-
peutics and vaccines. I am going to spend my couple of minutes de-
scribing for you some of the research endeavors that range from
fundamental basic science up through and including the develop-
ment of countermeasures. All of this, of course, is coordinated
under the office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness at the
department.
This slide illustrates the multifaceted component of the research
endeavor. You see on the lower-left we refer to a surveillance and
epidemiology, which is really fundamentally the CDC’s role. We
play a very small role in that, and that is at the molecular level
to try and characterize the evolving, changing viruses, particularly
those that occur in animal species, as just described by Dr.
Gerberding.
In addition, we train and provide both physical and intellectual
capacity and, importantly, the basic research understanding of the
virus and how it works helps us in our endeavor to make vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics.
I am going to spend just a moment describing two examples of
some of the basic approaches toward influenza which have helped
us in the development of vaccines. Some of you may have heard of
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the terminology ‘‘reverse genetics.’’ What that is is a molecular so-
phisticated way to take away some of the uncertainty of providing
that seed virus that you need to make a vaccine. What it does is
deliberately take the genes from a virus that we know grows very
well in our egg cultures and then ultimately, hopefully, some day
in cell-based cultures, as well as the important genes from the
index virus in question—in this case it is an H5N1—and delib-
erately put them together to predictably get the seed virus that will
be used for the vaccine. And in fact this is just what we did with
the H5N1 that is currently in clinical trials, as I will describe to
you in a moment.
Another research endeavor is that which we are doing in collabo-
ration with the CDC and industry is to provide a consistent way
to get cell-based cultures to ultimately transition and replace the
egg-based cultures. And the reason for that is that the surge capac-
ity of having the ability to grow cells in culture all year round so
that if you either have to change direction or surge up in numbers,
that system is much more adaptable than the egg-based system,
which has its very good, positive points.
Having said all of this, and I hope we get into the discussion,
that despite the effort, despite the research, the capacity globally
to make vaccines for H5N1, as several of the members have alluded
to, is really one of the great limiting issues that we have to face,
and I hope we get back to that.
Let me just spend a moment talking about the influenza vaccine
trials. Dr. Gerberding mentioned and I want to underscore that we
are not waiting for anything to move ahead to address this prob-
lem. We have an H5N1 from Vietnam and we have a trial that has
already yielded data. There are two major trials. The inactivated
vaccine trial began on April 4, 2005 in three medical centers in the
United States. It is in multiple stages involving four doses, a prime
initial vaccine, followed by a boost. The reason we have to do that
when we don’t generally have to do that with the seasonal vaccine
that we change a bit every year is that our population, or the popu-
lation of the world, has never experienced an H5N1. So we don’t
really know what the proper dose is or whether or not we are going
to need, and we likely will need, a prime and a boost. So we have
divided the trial into stages. We fully enrolled the first 118 adults
in Stage 1; we fully enrolled the second stage for a total of 450. By
early to mid-summer we will have safety data and data about how
to use that, what is the right dose, and then we will move onto the
elderly—greater than 65—and then we will go to children.
There is also an H9N2 trial going as well as attenuated vaccine
trials. So there are multiple things going ahead, and we are clearly
ahead of any other country in the trial of the relevant H5N1 right
now.
Again, just a word on antiviral therapy. We know that H5N1 is
sensitive to oseltamivir and relatively resistant to the other class
of drugs. We are doing research both in understanding how best to
use the existing drugs alone or in combination in adults and in
children, as well as targeting other targets of the influenza replica-
tion cycle so that we will have a pipeline of drugs should resistance
emerge.
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And finally, just to recapitulate and underscore that the NIH re-
search effort is fundamentally based on basic research but is rap-
idly applying that to the development of countermeasures, particu-
larly in the form of vaccines and therapeutics that will be part of
the broad Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic
Preparedness Plan. I would be happy to answer your questions
later. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Anthony S. Fauci follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY S. FAUCI, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss with you the role of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in preparing
the Nation for the next influenza pandemic. The Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) Draft Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan out-
lines a coordinated national strategy to prepare for and respond to an influenza pan-
demic, and assigns specific roles to various Federal agencies; the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) holds the primary responsibility for car-
rying out those duties assigned to NIH.
In this capacity, NIAID provides the scientific input required to facilitate the de-
velopment of both new influenza vaccine technologies and novel antiviral drugs
against influenza viruses. Under this Administration, we have made extraordinary
progress. DHHS began investing in new technologies, securing more vaccines and
medicines, and preparing stronger response plans. Total NIH funding for influenza
research has grown more than five-fold in recent years, from $20.6 million in FY
2001 to an estimated $119 million in FY 2005. This is part of the largest investment
ever made by the Federal government in protecting against influenza.
Influenza epidemics typically occur during the winter months in the United States
and other temperate regions of the world and cause significant morbidity and mor-
tality. On average, 36,000 people in this country die each year and 200,000 are hos-
pitalized due to influenza and influenza-related complications. Each year, influenza
viruses undergo small changes in their surface proteins as they circulate through
the human population. As these small changes accumulate, the influenza virus
gains the ability to overcome immunity created by prior exposure to older circu-
lating influenza viruses or by vaccination. This phenomenon, called ‘‘antigenic drift,’’
is the basis for the well-recognized patterns of influenza disease that occur every
year, and is the reason that influenza vaccines must be updated each year.
Influenza viruses can also change more dramatically; viruses may emerge that
can jump species from natural reservoirs such as wild ducks to infect domestic poul-
try, farm animals, or humans. This type of significant change in the antigenic make-
up of the virus that infects humans is referred to as ‘‘antigenic shift.’’
In most instances when influenza virus jumps species from an animal such as a
chicken to infect a human, the result is a ‘‘dead end’’ infection that cannot readily
be transmitted further from human to human. Mutations in the virus, however,
could increase the efficiency of human-to-human transmission. Furthermore, if an
avian influenza virus and another human influenza virus were to simultaneously co-
infect a person, the genes of the two viruses might reassort, resulting in a virus that
is readily transmissible between humans and against which the population would
have no natural immunity. In addition, the reassortant virus could reflect the
virulence of the avian virus. Such a virus could potentially cause an influenza pan-
demic.
Historically, pandemic influenza is a proven threat. Three influenza pandemics
have occurred in the 20th century: in 1918, 1957, and 1968. The 1918-1919 pan-
demic was by far the most severe, killing approximately 500,000 people in the
United States and 20-40 million people worldwide—almost two percent of the global
population at that time. Worldwide, the pandemics that began in 1957 and 1968
killed approximately 2 million and 700,000 people, respectively.
H9N2 and H5N1 influenza are two avian viruses that have jumped directly from
birds to humans and have significant pandemic potential. In 1999 and 2003, H9N2
influenza caused illness in three people in Hong Kong and in five individuals else-
where in China, but the virus did not spread from human to human. H5N1 influ-
enza, often referred to as ‘‘bird flu,’’ appears to be a significantly greater threat than
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H9N2. This virus was first detected in humans in Hong Kong in 1997. Since Janu-
ary 2004, it has spread widely among wild and domestic birds and has infected at
least 97 people in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia; 53 of these people have died
of the disease. Ominously, H5N1 viruses are evolving in ways that increasingly
favor the start of a pandemic, including becoming more stable in the environment
and expanding their host species range. Moreover, there has been at least one high-
ly probable case of human-to-human transmission of the H5N1 virus, and it is pos-
sible that other such transmissions have occurred recently.
The deadly experience with past influenza pandemics explains our current high
level of concern about the appearance of virulent H5N1 avian influenza viruses in
Asia, which by a variety of mechanisms could adapt themselves to efficiently spread
from human to human and result in the next pandemic. Given the poor condition
of public health systems in many underdeveloped regions and the speed of modern
air travel, the consequences of such an event, should it result in an influenza pan-
demic, would be severe.
NIH INFLUENZA RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
Between influenza pandemics, when influenza activity occurs regularly on a sea-
sonal basis, the role of NIAID is to conduct basic research into the viral biology,
pathogenesis, and epidemiology of influenza viruses and to study host immune re-
sponses to these agents. Concomitant with these basic research studies, NIAID con-
ducts applied research to develop new or improved influenza vaccines and produc-
tion methods; to identify new anti-influenza drugs; and to support surveillance for
previously unknown influenza viruses in animals and characterize any that are
found. When a new influenza virus begins to infect humans (and thereby gains the
potential to cause a pandemic), NIAID’s role is to develop and clinically evaluate
specific candidate vaccines against the emergent strain, test the activity of antiviral
drugs, and, in some cases, supply vaccine manufacturers and the research commu-
nity with viral reference strains and other reagents to speed vaccine development.
BASIC RESEARCH
NIAID supports many basic research projects intended to increase our under-
standing of how influenza viruses replicate, interact with their hosts, stimulate im-
mune responses, and evolve into new strains. Results from these studies lay the
foundation for the design of new antiviral drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines, and are
applicable to seasonal epidemic and pandemic strains alike.
NIAID also supports two special research programs to better understand the di-
versity of influenza viruses. The Influenza Genome Sequencing Project, launched in
the fall of 2004, is a collaboration between NIAID, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and several other organizations to determine the complete ge-
netic sequences of thousands of influenza virus isolates and to rapidly provide these
sequence data to the scientific community. This program will enable scientists to
better understand the emergence of influenza epidemics and pandemics by observ-
ing how influenza viruses evolve as they spread through the population and by
matching viral genetic characteristics with virulence, ease of transmissibility, and
other properties. As of May 24, 2005, 182 genomic sequences of influenza viruses
had been made available through this program to researchers via the NIH website,
and many more are in the pipeline.
NIAID also supports a long-standing program based in Hong Kong to detect the
emergence of influenza viruses with pandemic potential. This program, led by Dr.
Robert Webster of St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee,
conducts extensive surveillance of influenza viruses in animals in Hong Kong, ana-
lyzes new influenza viruses when they are found, and helps to generate candidate
vaccines against them. In January, the scope of this surveillance program was ex-
panded to include Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Vaccines
Vaccines are essential tools for the control of influenza. NIAID supports numerous
research projects and other initiatives to foster the development of new influenza
vaccine candidates and manufacturing methods that are simpler, more reliable,
yield more broadly cross-protective products, and provide alternatives to the egg-
based technology currently used to grow the vaccine viruses.
In the Fiscal Year 2006 budget request, DHHS has requested $120 million to sup-
port pandemic influenza preparedness activities. These activities build on previous
initiatives that include making chicken eggs available year round to provide for a
secure supply and surge capacity for vaccine production and supporting efforts to
shift vaccine manufacture to new cell-culture technologies. Moreover, a technique
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developed by NIAID-supported scientists called reverse genetics allows scientists to
manipulate the genomes of influenza viruses and to transfer genes between viral
strains. This technique allows the rapid generation of vaccine candidate strains that
precisely match a selected epidemic strain. By removing or modifying certain
virulence genes, reverse genetics also can be used to convert highly pathogenic influ-
enza viruses into vaccine candidates that are safer for vaccine manufacturers to
handle. Other vaccine strategies for influenza, including protein subunit and gene-
based vaccines, are also being actively pursued. On the NIH campus in Bethesda,
the NIAID Vaccine Research Center (VRC) has initiated a program to develop gene-
based vaccines against influenza. Should proof-of-concept studies prove successful,
the VRC expects to expand and accelerate the development of gene-based and re-
combinant influenza vaccines.
In addition to supporting the development of new vaccine strategies, NIAID main-
tains an extensive capacity for evaluating candidate vaccines in clinical trials. For
example, NIAID’s Vaccine and Treatment Evaluation Units (VTEUs) comprise a
network of university-based research medical centers across the United States that
conduct clinical trials to test candidate vaccines for many infectious diseases. These
units support both academic and industrial vaccine evaluation, including safety,
immunogenicity, and ultimately, efficacy of candidate vaccines.
Although a pandemic alert has not yet been declared, NIAID has taken a number
of steps to develop and clinically test vaccines against H5N1 and H9N2 influenza,
two specific avian viruses that have significant pandemic potential. For example, in
August 2004, NIAID contracted with Chiron Corporation for the production of
40,000 doses of an inactivated H9N2 vaccine. A Phase I clinical trial of this vaccine
began on March 31, 2005, and is fully enrolled.
In January 2004, researchers at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital obtained
a clinical isolate of the highly virulent H5N1 virus that was fatal to humans in Viet-
nam in late 2003 and early 2004 and used reverse genetics to create an H5N1 can-
didate vaccine from this strain. Immediately after NIAID received this vaccine last
June, it was sent to two companies, Sanofi-Pasteur (formerly Aventis-Pasteur) and
Chiron, which have NIAID contracts to manufacture pilot lots of eight and ten thou-
sand vaccine doses, respectively. The vaccines will be tested in Phase I and II clin-
ical trials that will assess safety and the appropriate dose to optimize
immunogenicity, as well as provide information about how the immune system re-
sponds to this vaccine. The Sanofi-Pasteur trial, which began on April 4, 2004, will
test the vaccine in approximately 450 healthy adults between the ages of 18 and
64. This trial is already fully enrolled and the safety data are being analyzed. If
data from this study indicate the vaccine is safe and able to stimulate a certain im-
mune response, NIAID expects to test the vaccine in other populations, such as the
elderly and children, in late summer 2005. Trials of the Chiron-produced vaccines
are expected to begin later this year.
In addition to these relatively small pilot lots, DHHS contracted with Sanofi-Pas-
teur to produce two million doses of its H5N1 vaccine, in order to ensure that the
manufacturing techniques, procedures, and conditions that would be used for large-
scale production will yield a satisfactory product. Moving to large-scale production
of the vaccine in parallel with clinical testing of pilot lots is an indication of the
urgency with which we have determined that H5N1 vaccine development must be
addressed. Waiting for the results of the initial clinical trials, which would be the
normal procedure, would delay our ability to make large quantities of vaccine by at
least six months. These doses, which have now been delivered, could be used to vac-
cinate health workers, researchers, and, if indicated, the public in affected areas.
From the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, researchers in the NIAID Laboratory of
Infectious Diseases developed a cold-adapted, live attenuated influenza vaccine
strain that later became the FDA-licensed influenza vaccine marketed as FluMist.
Building on their experience with attenuated influenza vaccines, researchers from
the same laboratory recently made three candidate attenuated H5N1 vaccine strains
and an attenuated H9N2 vaccine strain that are now in advanced development.
NIAID plans to start the clinical trial of the attenuated H9N2 candidate vaccine
this summer. These researchers also hope to test one of the candidate attenuated
H5N1 vaccines in a Phase I study this year.
Antiviral Therapies
Antiviral medications are an important counterpart to vaccines as a means of con-
trolling influenza outbreaks, both to prevent illness after exposure and to treat in-
fection after it occurs. Four drugs are currently available for the treatment of influ-
enza, three of which are also licensed for prevention of illness. NIAID actively sup-
ports identification of new anti-influenza drugs through the screening of new drug
candidates in cell culture systems and in animal models. In the past year, seven
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
26
promising candidates have been identified. Efforts to design drugs that precisely
target viral proteins and inhibit their functions also are under way. In addition,
NIAID is developing novel, broad-spectrum therapeutics that might work against
many influenza virus strains. Some of these target viral entry into human cells,
while others specifically attack and degrade the viral genome.
Efforts also are underway to test and improve antiviral drugs to prevent or treat
H5N1 influenza. Last year, researchers determined that although H5N1 viruses are
resistant to two older drugs—rimantadine and amantadine—they are sensitive to a
newer class of drugs called neuraminidase inhibitors, including oseltamivir, which
is marketed as Tamiflu. DHHS has stockpiled approximately 2.3 million treatment
courses of oseltamivir, which is approved for use in individuals older than one year.
Scientists are planning to conduct studies to further characterize the safety profile
of oseltamivir in infants; and studies are also in progress to evaluate novel drug tar-
gets, as well as long-acting next-generation neuraminidase inhibitors. In addition,
development and testing in animals of a combination antiviral regimen against
H5N1 and other potential pandemic influenza strains are under way.
CONCLUSION
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that although we cannot be
certain exactly when the next influenza pandemic will occur, we can be virtually
certain that one will occur and that the resulting morbidity, mortality, and economic
disruption will present extraordinary challenges to public health authorities around
the world. We are working diligently in close coordination with our colleagues at
CDC, FDA, other federal agencies, and in industry to ensure that we can meet these
challenges in the most successful manner possible.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today, and I would be pleased
to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Gellin.
Mr. GELLIN. Thank you. I want to join my colleagues in thanking
you for having this hearing.
Mr. DEAL. Can you pull that one a little closer?
STATEMENT OF BRUCE G. GELLIN
Mr. GELLIN. I want to thank you for holding this hearing because
it is something that you and we and all the Americans really need
to know about, as Ms. Baldwin mentioned. I am the Director of the
National Vaccine Program Office, which sits in the Office of the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. And
I want to join my colleagues here to thank you for this.
As we have heard and you have been aware, the ecology of the
disease and the behavior of the virus changing now offers multiple
opportunities that could provide fertile ground for a pandemic virus
to emerge. And while we are all keeping a watchful eye on the cur-
rent situation in Asia, we recognize that there are other strains of
the influenza virus that could perform similar tricks. And there-
fore, in addition to our focus on this virus, we acknowledge that a
pandemic could be triggered by another influenza virus subtype
and could originate in any country.
Secretary Leavitt has made pandemic influenza preparedness a
priority area, and it is a critical component of his 500-day plan for
the department. As Dr. Gerberding mentioned, just last week at
the World Health Assembly in Geneva, the annual meeting of the
ministers of health from around the world, he emphasized his con-
cern about the situation in Asia and our department’s and our gov-
ernment’s commitment to preparedness. He encouraged global
transparency, expanded surveillance, and timely sharing of infor-
mation and clinical specimens, the importance that all nations
have pandemic preparedness plans. He also urged international
collaboration among developed and developing countries to control
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the spread of this virus and recognize the important role of the
human-animal interface.
On the home front last summer, as we have heard and will dis-
cuss later, we released our draft plan last summer. The plan de-
scribed a coordinated strategy to prepare for and respond to an in-
fluenza pandemic. It also provides guidance to State and local
health departments and the healthcare system to enhance planning
and preparedness at levels where the primary response activities
in the U.S. will be implemented.
When we posted our plan, we sought public input before devel-
oping final guidance, and therefore allow the 60-day comment pe-
riod for that. In addition, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee
and CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices are cur-
rently discussing with a number of stakeholders to provide the de-
partment with recommendations on some key policy issues that are
outstanding.
As a complement to the plant, CDC is also finalizing a series of
specific guidance documents for State and local health depart-
ments, communities, and the healthcare system. We expect the up-
dated plan and the related implementation guidance documents
will be available in the coming months, but also recognize that
plans like these will continue to evolve as we learn more. There-
fore, we expect that we will regularly and continually review and
revise the plan that incorporates new research, changing influenza
strains, the changing epidemiology, lessons learned from the influ-
enza season, and other infections disease threats.
In addition, we also recognize the importance that all Americans
become aware of the threat of a pandemic and have begun to en-
gage a number of public engagement and education projects be-
cause we seek the public’s input into some of these decisions that
we are making as well.
Moving ahead with our preparedness isn’t waiting for the final
drafting of the plan, as we have heard from both Dr. Fauci and Dr.
Gerberding. And given the central role that vaccines play in pre-
venting influenza, one of the critical elements of our plan is to de-
velop a strategy for sufficient domestic surge capacity for vaccine
production.
Our planning assumptions acknowledge that in a pandemic
emergency, there is likely to be worldwide demand for vaccine, and
vaccine produced outside the United States might not be available
for our use. One of the base assumptions that we have in our plan-
ning is that the population has never be exposed to a virus or any-
thing like this, and therefore, all may be susceptible, and therefore,
all may need to be vaccinated.
And perhaps most importantly from a preparedness perspective,
because it is the nature of the virus to evolve and re-assort with
other influenza viruses, the perfect vaccine cannot be prepared far
in advance and stockpiled since that vaccine is one that needs to
be tailored to match the circulating strain.
As Dr. Fauci has mentioned with his discussion of the NIH clin-
ical trials, HHS has developed a number of influenza vaccine sup-
ply initiatives to address pandemic preparedness needs, but will
also be critical to achieving our annual influenza prevention goal.
The objectives of these initiatives are to secure and expand U.S. in-
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fluenza vaccine supply, diversify our production methodology, and
establish emergency surge capacity. To support these activities
HHS received $50 million in fiscal year 2004 and $99 million in fis-
cal year 2005. The 2006 budget includes an additional $120 million
to further strengthen this component of our overall pandemic pre-
paredness efforts.
To assure that vaccines can be produced at full manufacturing
capacity at any time of the year, we also need to assure that we
had an egg supply that could be available at any time of the year.
And last year HHS issued a contract with sanofi pasteur that
assures that they can manufacture influenza vaccine at their full
capacity all year long.
But diversifying influenza vaccine production methods will also
strengthen our system. As Dr. Fauci has mentioned, the cell-cul-
ture technology is a well-established vaccine production method for
other vaccines and one that we hope can be applied effectively to
influenza vaccine production. This technology does not require eggs
as a substrate for growth and therefore avoids some of the
vulnerabilities that are associated with that. And it also may be
more amenable to surge production for emergency vaccine produc-
tion.
Because of this the secretary announced last month that the De-
partment of Health had issued a 5-year contract with sanofi pas-
teur for $97.1 million to develop a cell culture vaccine. The goal is
to accelerate the efforts to bring such a vaccine to the United
States, that have the vaccine licensed by the FDA, and to have it
produced within the borders of the United States.
These important steps to strengthen our influenza vaccine sup-
ply, for assuring the egg supply, and diversifying our expanding
production capacity are to be followed this year by additional meas-
ures to increase influenza vaccine capacity and expand the number
of vaccine doses and the number of manufacturers that could sup-
ply vaccine to the United States.
Supported by the influenza vaccine initiative in the fiscal year
2006 budget in our request for $120 million, our goals are to build
on our cell culture efforts and encourage additional manufacturers
to accelerate the development of cell culture vaccines, to develop
new vaccines such as recombinant vaccines, to improve the effi-
ciency of the existing manufacturing processes, which could in-
crease the overall yield of vaccines and the amount produced, and
to support research and development of strategies that will stretch
the number of doses produced by decreasing the amount of virus
antigen in each dose, therefore making more vaccine from the same
amount of antigen.
Finally, I need to mention that coupled with the effort that Dr.
Fauci mentioned, last year we went ahead and had two million
doses of H5N1 vaccine produced, and we did in a time in the fall
that wouldn’t interfere with seasonal production. We wanted to
make sure that a company was familiar with making such a vac-
cine in full-scale facilities, and it was the first project like this in
the world. We are awaiting the results of the clinical trials to know
best how to use and formulate such a vaccine.
We also recognize the important role of antiviral drugs in stem-
ming a pandemic. We have ordered and have already received de-
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livery of over two million doses of Tamiflu, and we are currently
in discussions with the manufacturer, Roche, who you will hear
from later today, to increase our national reserve of this antiviral
drug.
Stemming the spread of an epidemic will require close coordina-
tion between agriculture and health sectors and among effected
countries, donor nations, and international organizations. To that
end we have a planning effort underway to develop a plan for the
$25 million that was included in the fiscal year 2005 emergency
supplemental to the Department of State with the HHS focusing on
health projects, and USAID, our partner, focusing on projects on
animal health.
Last week Dr. Gerberding and I were part of the U.S. delegation
accompanying Secretary Leavitt to the World Health Assembly. Of
the many discussions there, the one that best captures the concern
and common purpose that we all have is summarized in Mr.
Leavitt’s remarks to his fellow ministers of health: ‘‘There is a time
in the life of every problem when it is big enough to see and small
enough to solve. For pandemic influenza preparedness, that time is
now.’’ Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Bruce G. Gellin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE G. GELLIN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL VACCINE PRO-
GRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SCIENCE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss pandemic influenza and the measures the Department of
Health and Human Service is taking to prepare for the next pandemic. As you may
have heard from reports from last week’s World Health Assembly, many public
health experts believe the threat of a pandemic is now greater than it has been in
decades. A report issued by the World Health Organization warns that the virus
may be evolving in ways that increasingly favor the start of a pandemic. In addition
the ecology of the disease and behavior of the virus have changed and are creating
multiple opportunities for a pandemic virus to emerge. This is in large part because
of the bird flu that is established and now endemic in many different species of
birds across Asia. As these bird viruses continue to evolve and spread in animals,
the possibility increases that an avian virus will mix with a human virus to cause
a novel and easily transmitted influenza strain in humans. Since 1997, the avian
flu has continued to evolve and has become increasingly lethal for an expanding
number of species, including mammals, not just birds. Over the past year and a
half, there have been 97 confirmed human cases of influenza in Asia (Vietnam,
Thailand and Cambodia) cause by the H5N1 virus and over half of these people
have died from their infection.
Secretary Leavitt has made pandemic influenza a priority area. Just last week,
at the World Health Assembly—the annual meeting of Ministers of Health from
around the world—he emphasized his concern about the situation in Asia and the
Department’s commitment to preparedness. He encouraged global transparency, ex-
panded surveillance, and timely sharing of information and clinical specimens as
part of our global preparedness. Secretary Leavitt also urged international collabo-
ration among developed and developing countries to control the spread of this virus
among humans and animals. Further, the Assembly considered a resolution on pan-
demic preparedness that was offered by the U.S. as a blueprint for action.
In addition, on the national front, the Department has been actively developing
and formulating a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan. This Plan
describes a coordinated strategy to prepare for and respond to an influenza pan-
demic. It also provides guidance to state and local health departments and the
health care system to enhance planning and preparedness at the levels where the
primary response activities in the U.S. will be implemented.
This Plan was released for public comment last summer and, as with all pre-
paredness planning, the specifics of this plan will continue to evolve. HHS will con-
tinually be revising and reworking the plan to respond to events such as new re-
search, changing influenza virus strains, and discussions with the many stake-
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holders—state and local health departments, the health care system, industry and
the public.
Given the central role that vaccines play in preventing influenza, one of the crit-
ical elements of this Plan is to develop a strategy for sufficient domestic surge ca-
pacity for influenza vaccine production. This will require an ongoing and sustained
commitment by HHS.
Because a pandemic is by definition the introduction and spread of an influenza
virus to which humans have not previously been exposed, this has major implica-
tions for vaccine development and supply. In the setting of a pandemic, it is as-
sumed that the pandemic virus will be a novel strain. First, the majority of the pop-
ulation is likely to be susceptible; immunologic naivety with the pandemic strain is
likely to result in the need for a two-dose regimen for effective immunity. Unlike
seasonal influenza epidemics, a pandemic could come at any time during the year,
and may last longer than a single season such that booster dose(s) may be required
to sustain immunity. Perhaps most importantly from a preparedness perspective,
the perfect vaccine cannot be prepared far in advance and stockpiled, since the ideal
vaccine is one that should be tailored to match the circulating virus
Further, as highlighted by the SARS experience, modern transportation and trade
are likely to rapidly accelerate the global spread of influenza. As a consequence, our
planning assumptions acknowledge that in a pandemic emergency, there will be
worldwide demand for vaccine and vaccine produced outside of the United States
may not be available for our use.
We are all keeping a watchful eye on the current situation in Asia while at the
same time recognizing that, in recent years, there have also been outbreaks of avian
influenza infections in Europe and in Canada associated with human infections
cases caused by other influenza subtypes. Therefore, in addition to our concerns
about the H5N1 virus in Asia, we acknowledge that a pandemic could be caused by
another influenza virus subtype could originate in any country.
Though scientists in 1918 had very little idea of what was happening until it was
too late, we have time—and still have time—to prepare for the next global pan-
demic, and we should consider ourselves warned. As Secretary Leavitt stated at the
World Health Assembly, ‘‘We are working on pandemic preparedness on borrowed
time. When this event occurs, our response has got to be immediate, comprehensive
and effective.’’
I want to assure you that the Department has made this one of its highest prior-
ities and it is a critical component of the Secretary’s 500-day plan. Ensuring the
ability to meet current annual demand for influenza vaccine, to improve the preven-
tion of influenza disease, and to prepare for an influenza pandemic all require
strengthening the influenza vaccine supply in the U.S. Building on the response to
the influenza vaccine shortage in the 2004-05 season NIH and FDA have worked
to facilitate the clinical evaluation in U.S. populations of an influenza vaccine pro-
duced by GSK, and efforts are underway to expeditiously consider a licensure appli-
cation such that this influenza vaccine may be licensed in the U.S. for the upcoming
season.
Several HHS influenza vaccine supply initiatives have a longer timeline and were
developed to address pandemic preparedness needs but which also will be critical
to achieving annual influenza prevention goals. The objectives of these initiatives
are to secure and expand U.S. influenza vaccine supply, diversify production meth-
ods, and establish emergency surge capacity. To support these activities, HHS re-
ceived $50 million in FY2004 and $99 million in FY2005. The President’s Budget
for FY2006 includes an additional $120 million to further strengthen this compo-
nent of the overall pandemic influenza preparedness efforts.
Because influenza vaccine is produced to meet the seasonal demand in the fall,
production also is seasonal and embryonated eggs have not been available to manu-
facturers year-round. Moreover, although some excess supply of eggs may be avail-
able to support additional influenza vaccine production or provide security if the
flocks that produce eggs for vaccine production are affected by avian influenza or
other illness, this excess is limited creating vulnerability to supply disruption. To
enhance influenza vaccine supply security, HHS issued a five-year contract to
Sanofi-Pasteur of Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, on September 30, 2004 for $40.1 mil-
lion. Under this contract, Sanofi-Pasteur has begun to change its flock management
strategy to provide a secure, year-round supply of eggs suitable for influenza vaccine
production at full manufacturing capacity. It also will increase the number of egg-
laying flocks by 25% to provide contingency flocks in case of an emergency. These
eggs may be used to support additional production of annual influenza vaccine in
the event of a vaccine shortage. Additionally, this contract provides for production
of annual investigational lots of prototype pandemic influenza vaccines, e.g., this
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summer, Sanofi-Pasteur will manufacture an H7N7 virus vaccine for clinical evalua-
tion.
Diversification of influenza vaccine production methods also will help strengthen
the system. Cell culture technology is a well-established vaccine production method
for other vaccines such as the inactivated poliovirus vaccine and two companies
have registered their cell-culture based influenza vaccine technology in Europe. This
production technology does not require eggs as a substrate for growth of vaccine
virus, thereby avoiding the vulnerabilities associated with an egg-based production
system. It also may be more amenable to surge capacity production when influenza
vaccine supply needs to be expanded rapidly such as at the time of a pandemic. Fi-
nally, influenza vaccines produced in cell cultures rather than eggs will provide an
option for people who are allergic to eggs and therefore unable to receive the cur-
rently licensed vaccines.
Secretary Leavitt announced last month that the Department of Health and
Human Services issued a five-year contract on March 31, 2005 to Sanofi-Pasteur for
$97.1 million to develop cell culture influenza vaccine technology and conduct clin-
ical trials, with the goal of obtaining an FDA license for this vaccine. Under this
advanced development contract, the company has also committed to manufacturing
this vaccine at a U.S.-based facility with a capacity to manufacture 300 million
doses of monovalent pandemic vaccine over a one-year period. However, given
timelines for vaccine development and clinical trials, and for construction and vali-
dation of manufacturing facilities, additional influenza vaccine supply from this
source is unlikely to be available for at least five years.
These important steps to strengthen our national influenza vaccine supply
through assuring the egg-supply and diversifying and expanding production capacity
will be followed this year by additional measures to increase influenza vaccine pro-
duction capacity and expand the number of influenza vaccine doses made using that
capacity. Supported by the pandemic influenza vaccine initiative in the FY 2006
budget request for $120 M, we posted synopses of three additional areas where we
believe strategic investments move us toward achieving annual and pandemic influ-
enza vaccine supply goals in the March 17, 2005 edition of FedBizOpps. On April
29, 2005, the first of these requests for proposals was posted, providing support for
the development of cell-culture based and recombinant pandemic influenza vaccines.
Whereas building new influenza vaccine production facilities is one approach to
expand the influenza vaccine supply, other strategies also can increase the number
of influenza vaccine doses produced. Influenza vaccine is manufactured in a series
of steps—developing an influenza virus master seed for vaccine production,
inoculating the virus into eggs, growing, harvesting, purifying, splitting, formu-
lating, and filling it into vials or syringes. Improving efficiency at any step in this
process can increase the eventual yield and number of vaccine doses produced.
Thus, a second area of emphasis will be to support improvements of the manufac-
turing process to increase overall influenza vaccine production at current manufac-
turing facilities.
The third area of emphasis will provide support for research and development,
leading to licensure of strategies that will stretch the number of vaccine doses pro-
duced by decreasing the amount of influenza virus antigen that is needed in each
dose. The concept underlying these ‘‘dose-stretching’’ strategies is that by changing
either the influenza vaccine or the way its administered, one can improve the im-
mune response to vaccination and provide protection while using less of the vaccine
antigen. By using less antigen in each vaccine dose, the number of doses that can
be made at any level of production capacity can be multiplied. The two most prom-
ising antigen-sparing approaches are either to add an adjuvant—a substance that
stimulates the immune response to a vaccine formulation, or administering the vac-
cine into the skin (similar to the approach used in a skin test for Tb) where large
numbers of potent immune cells are located. Both strategies have been evaluated
in several clinical trials and have the potential to expand influenza vaccine supply
several-fold if they prove effective in further clinical trials and are approved for li-
censure.
The increases in the FY 2006 President’s Budget request will support ongoing ac-
tivities to ensure that the Nation will have an adequate influenza vaccine supply
to respond better to yearly epidemics and to influenza pandemics. While issuing the
requests for proposals and completing the contracts is only the first step toward the
development of an expanded, diversified, and strengthened influenza vaccine supply,
the U.S. is leading the global effort to develop vaccines and vaccine technologies to
meet this challenge.
We also recognize the important role of antiviral drugs in stemming a pandemic
and for treating patients. The United States has ordered and received delivery of
2.3 million treatment courses of Tamiflu. We are in discussions with Roche, the
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maker of Tamiflu , to increase our national reserve of this antiviral. Unfortunately,
the H5N1 virus is resistant to the adamantine drugs, the only other class of anti-
influenza drugs.
Stemming the spread of the epidemic will require close coordination between the
agriculture and health sectors and among affected countries, donor nations and
international organizations dedicated to promoting the health of humans, livestock
and wildlife. Detailed joint planning is already underway to develop the proposed
budget plan for the $25 million that was included in the FY 2005 emergency supple-
mental with the Department of State with HHS focusing on human health projects
and USAID focusing on projects on animal health and related issues. In this way,
the two agencies’ plans will be complementary, not duplicative.
I was part of the U.S. delegation that attended last week’s World Health Assem-
bly and want you to know that this administration and the global health community
are working together on this public health threat in anticipation of the next pan-
demic, be it tomorrow or ten years from now. As Secretary Leavitt told the assem-
bled in Geneva, ‘‘There is a time in the life of every problem when it is big enough
to see and small enough to solve. For pandemic influenza preparedness, that time
is now.’’
Thank you for your attention to my remarks this morning—and more importantly
to the attention that you are paying to this important global public health issue.
I would be happy to answer any questions from the Committee.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. I recognize myself for some opening ques-
tions. It appears that we are now sort of focusing on the H5N1 as
the flu that we think might be the one most likely to occur in pan-
demic form. Suppose we are wrong and it is the H9. Will vaccines
that are developed for the H5 be effective for H9? Let me go ahead
and ask a few series of questions and then I will let whoever wants
to respond. That is the first question I have.
Second, are there antivirals that are being developed for this
H5N1 or are antivirals somewhat generic in nature? Can they be
used for any variation of strains or must they likewise be specific
to the strain that we are facing?
The last two questions are is HHS contemplating stockpiling in-
jection devices that would be needed in the event of a pandemic?
And last, I understand that there were some conditions in trying
to trace the SARS issue that CDC faced in terms of being able to
obtain passenger contact information. Have we overcome those ad-
ministrative difficulties so that HHS or any other Federal agency
would be able to provide the information necessary to trace some-
one who potentially has the H5 or any other variation of that virus
coming into our country? I know that is a lot of questions and I
will let you start.
Mr. GELLIN. Well, actually, you have a question for each of us.
Mr. DEAL. Okay.
Mr. GELLIN. Let me attack the vaccine and antiviral development
one. You ask a very good question. The short answer to the ques-
tion if you have an H5N1 vaccine, and, for example, an H9N2 virus
circulating, the degree of protection would be minimal if none at
all. So that is a clear answer to that question. I would point out
in relationship to that question that for that very reason we are not
just doing the trial with an H5N1. We have already started an
H9N2 trial in much the same philosophy of looking at safety and
proper doses of the H9N2.
Having said all that, if it is something else that is not H9N2 or
not H5N1, the very fact of getting more experience with how the
body responds to an antigen like an H5 or an H9 to which there
have not been previous exposure will give us a lot of important in-
formation to more rapidly respond to whatever evolving Bird Flu,
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whatever the subtype is. So that is the answer to the question, but
it also—the two million doses of the H5N1 allowed us to be able
to make this kind of a vaccine in scale-up quality. So even though
we are doing things now that might not be precisely matched to the
ultimate pandemic flu virus, everything we are doing is going to
helpful for that.
With regard to the antivirals, Tamiflu is the antiviral to which
H5N1 is sensitive. The issue of developing antiviruses that have a
broad range of capability is part of the research plan, as is devel-
oping vaccines that have broader capability, not to be only effective
against one but against another. That is something that is difficult
scientifically to do, but it is very high on our research agenda to
do that.
And finally, with regard to the antiviral ability to block the influ-
enza, we have to be very careful that there is not a perception that
this is like an antibiotic that you treat pneumonia. You give it and
the pneumonia is gone. This will maybe decrease some of the days
of illness and be very, very useful, but we don’t want you to get
the impression that this is a knockout drop for the virus. It is not.
And we have other questions that Dr. Gerberding will be able——
Ms. GERBERDING. The question about syringes is one that is easy
to answer. We have a supply of a lot of medical equipment in the
stockpile, and we are not concerned about shortages of syringes
limiting immunization. The exact contents of the entire medical
stockpile is something that we consider sensitive, so we would be
happy to discuss with you in chambers the very specific contents
of the stockpile.
And with respect to the issues around contacting passengers, our
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine has been working
with leaders at HHS and the administration to come up with some
policies and procedures that would improve that process. Right now
we are engaged in a pilot project with one major international air-
line to see if the data systems protect the confidentiality of the pas-
sengers but do allow this kind of reconnection. And we have al-
ready had one, I think, small event where it has been tested. It
looks very promising. So we are taking an evidence-based approach
to this. Find out a) does it work, b) is it acceptable to passengers,
and c) can we do it at a cost that makes it a worthwhile invest-
ment. And we will know more about that probably later this year.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gerberding, GO tes-
tified that insufficient hospital and health workforce capacity is a
substantial area of concern. If you would, share with us your char-
acterization of the adequacy of our hospital and health workforce
capacity to deal with a potential pandemic, and if you think there
are gaps, would you point us to specific provisions in the fiscal
2006 budget that are aimed at addressing these gaps?
Ms. GERBERDING. I will do my best to address that, and I may
have to call upon Dr. Gellin to add perspective from the other agen-
cy that is involved in that, which is HRSA. I think we appreciate
that our entire healthcare system lacks surge capacity for any kind
of a major health issue. Workforce retention, development, recruit-
ment, and training are issues that we all have a generic concern
about. Since the terrorism preparedness investments have been
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made by HHS, we have been able to target some specific prepared-
ness activities to support surge capacity, and this year proposed in
the stockpile funding is money for portable hospital facilities of a
variety of levels of care so that we could bring portable facilities
to a site of a major event. And I will ask Mr. Gellin to add any
information from the HRSA perspective.
Mr. GELLIN. I think I will defer that and provide you that infor-
mation in writing from HRSA so we are precise about it.
Mr. BROWN. Okay. Could you fill us in on your discussions with
the administration and their responses when you talk about the
gaps or the inadequacies of public health structure’s ability to deal
with a pandemic outbreak?
Ms. GERBERDING. I can summarize all of this by saying I think
Secretary Leavitt represents the administrative position very well
and the high priority he has put on this, as well as the investments
that are proposed in the President’s 2006 budget to increase the
Vaccines for Children Program, increase the purchase of vaccines
in the 317 Program to allow CDC to buy a backfill—sort of an in-
surance policy by buying bulk monovalent and vaccine in worst-
case scenario, to increase the ability of the States to purchase vac-
cine, as well as to change the Vaccines for Children Program to in-
crease access for underinsured children to receive vaccines. So all
of these are plus ups in the budget.
I just mention that this year CDC’s influenza budget is $197 mil-
lion, and that is about a log larger than it was just a few years
ago. So we are seeing proposed investments that I think augment
and buildupon the investments that we are making for terrorism
preparedness in the States. The capacities, as you know, are part
and parcel of the same—detection, surveillance, investigation, com-
munication, informatics, and alerting. So it is my experience that
the entire department, as well as the rest of the administration, is
engaged in influenza and working very hard to come up with a co-
gent approach that would serve as well and to do it as fast as we
can.
Mr. BROWN. You argue or suggest that support from our govern-
ment is adequate—from Congress, appropriations are adequate,
perhaps, for what you do specifically at CDC on that level. What
do you see when you look at hospitals and hospital infrastructure
and its abilities? Do you see funding gaps there and funding prob-
lems there? Or do you see an adequate amount of resources that
they are getting from State and local and Federal Governments?
Ms. GERBERDING. I am concerned, but I don’t have data to an-
swer your question. Again, this is a part of HRSA responsibility
that we can provide you a factual representation of the degree of
support and where the gaps might lie.
Mr. BROWN. Do the other two of you want to comment on that
or just simply something written? Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. Mr. Ferguson.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gerberding, I am
interested that in your statement or just your comments this morn-
ing that you didn’t talk about antivirals really. You were talking
about vaccines. But can you talk a little about the role that
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antivirals will play in an Avian Flu outbreak and in any kind of
a pandemic flu outbreak?
Ms. GERBERDING. I think it is important to distinguish the H5N1
situation that we are looking at right now in Asia with the realm
of possible influenza outbreaks that may occur. This particular
virus strain happens to be resistant to the inexpensive, easily pro-
duced drugs. So if our only goal was to protect against this specific
strain, stockpiling the other drugs doesn’t make sense. But there
are many other strains of flu that are susceptible to the inexpen-
sive drugs. So we have made the decision to stockpile both cat-
egories of drugs. We are emphasizing oseltamivir right now be-
cause it is the drug most likely to be useful if this particular strain
breaks. But we also have a stockpile of about four million treat-
ment courses of rimantadine, which could be used for seasonal flu
of a susceptible nature, or even an Avian strain that proved to be
susceptible.
The problem with this antiviral stockpiling and capability can be
summarized in the phrase ‘‘lack of evidence.’’ We know that
antiviral drugs, as Dr. Fauci said, can reduce the severity of illness
as characterized by days of hospitalization and can benefit people
if they are taken within 2 days of the onset of illness, which is
very, very hard to do. You know, when you start getting the flu it
is hard to distinguish it from any other upper respiratory infection,
so most people don’t realize they have flu until it is past the 48-
hour window.
But in addition, we do not have evidence that even oseltamivir
actually reduces mortality from influenza. The studies simply
haven’t been done. We are concerned at some of the things we are
seeing in Vietnam where some patients who apparently were start-
ed early on the drug have not done well and have gone on to die
despite treatment. So we need the scientific evidence to tell us how
should the drug be used? Does it actually reduce mortality? What
is its role in a pandemic? We are working with WHO and others
in the department, including the FDA. We have been having reg-
ular conversations on how we might be able to conduct such trials
in a situation where cases right now are still sporadic.
But until we actually know how to use the drugs, making enor-
mous purchases in stockpiling may be a premature decision. And
that is why we are scaling up our purchase as we feel we can de-
fine an effective role, but we have more work to do to really look
at all the information and make the best possible long-term deci-
sion.
One other point I should make is that this right now is an oral
drug. It is taken by mouth. And some of the patients with severe
influenza in Asia have an illness that is not just respiratory in na-
ture. It involves the GI tract and all other organs, and so we have
to be concerned could this drug even get absorbed from the intes-
tinal tract if people are ill with influenza. So we have a lot of work
to do to be able to define the appropriate role for saving lives dur-
ing flu and that work needs to be a high priority.
Mr. FERGUSON. But clearly our government is placing some new
importance on the role of antiviral. We are going to hear more
about antivirals in our next——
Ms. GERBERDING. Absolutely.
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Mr. FERGUSON. [continuing] panel.
Ms. GERBERDING. Absolutely.
Mr. FERGUSON. And we are beginning to order millions and mil-
lions of doses I am told by some of the companies. To me it high-
lights that there is an increased awareness and appreciation for
the role that antivirals can play.
Ms. GERBERDING. Yes, we have a stockpile right now of more
than two million treatment courses of the oseltamivir, and with the
supplemental appropriation we just received through the defense
funding, the $58 million will be looking at what we might do with
that resource to augment our stockpile also.
Mr. FERGUSON. I am sure you would agree with me that two mil-
lion doses is a pittance. I mean that is nothing compared to what
we would need were we to have some sort of a pandemic flu out-
break. But let me just—because my time is running short. I mean
I think last year’s vaccine shortage highlighted the question of the
distribution—partnership that is going to be necessary, and even if
we are stockpiling vaccines, stockpiling antivirals, what kind of a
plan is in place and who is ultimately responsible for making sure
the plan works to make sure that—I mean it could be because you
are talking—I think the necessity of a 2-day window for someone
to take an antiviral if they are showing signs of a flu, that I think
highlights to me the necessity of having a distribution plan in place
where these products are available and around the country. They
are not all kind of sitting in one storehouse somewhere in one city
or one part of the country that that—I mean it highlights to me
that we need to have a real distribution plan in place. Can you
shed some light on that?
Ms. GERBERDING. Any doctor can prescribe oseltamivir today,
and it is available. We inventoried during last flu season. It is
available in most pharmacies and could be readily available up to
the amount that the manufacturer produces. So right now the com-
mercial distribution system does a very good job of covering the
United States. If we have stockpile drug and we need to allocate
it in a setting of a flu pandemic, we would have some time to do
that. We wouldn’t expect instantaneously everyone in the country
to be ill at the same time. So we would be able to distribute drugs
in collaboration with the State health departments and others who
have that primary responsibility depending on where the need was
the greatest.
But that is part of the reason why we would like to have a larger
stockpile, because the more pre-deployment we have in the system,
the easier it is to handle that when people are frightened and
upset.
I should also say that we are evaluating a number of options to
support or augment distribution, including options that have been
explored for terrorism events where countermeasures have to be
delivered very quickly. One of those mechanisms involves working
with the U.S. Postal Service to deliver products to people’s homes.
Another option might even include the idea of having the drugs for-
ward-deployed at the community level or even the household level.
So these are all things that are on the table right now, and we are
working with experts inside and outside of government to come up
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with some evidence and some protocols to see which really will be
the best approach.
Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but just
for me to close, I think it is important that we not underestimate
the importance of antivirals in this process. And some of your com-
ments suggest that perhaps you don’t have the same appreciation
that I might have or some folks at the World Health Organization.
Their recommendation has been that, you know, countries have the
ability to treat 25 to 50 percent of their population with antivirals.
If we are talking about two million—even if we were talking about
50 million doses, that would not be enough. That would not be
meeting the World Health Organization’s recommendation so——
Ms. GERBERDING. But let——
Mr. FERGUSON. [continuing] I would urge you to look closer at
some of those recommendations and perhaps take them to heart.
Ms. GERBERDING. Let me just be very clear. We do support stock-
piling antivirals; we do think they have a role. We have defined the
role of antivirals right now as one for treating affected people, and
in certain situations, as a preventative for mission-critical per-
sonnel. We know the drug is effective at preventing seasonal flu,
but obviously no one can treat the entire world with oseltamivir
during the many, many months of a pandemic. So prophylaxis for
the population is not sensible.
But I also wanted to emphasize, even those who are making pro-
jections about the proportion of population that should be covered
are not doing that from a data base perspective or for—in some
cases even credible models of how the drug would be used and dis-
tributed. So we have a lot of work to do to create a frame and a
plan that includes antivirals in the context of other measures that
must play a role, including isolation of cases and quarantine of ex-
posed people.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. As you know from the bells, we have a
vote that is going on on the floor, and I want to commend the audi-
ence; I don’t think I have heard a cough yet. We will resume as
soon as these votes are concluded, and there are a series of votes,
so we will be gone—yes.
Ms. ESHOO. If I could just ask my question, and I think I am
next because I have another hearing of——
Mr. DEAL. Can you do it quickly?
Ms. ESHOO. I can do it very quickly.
Mr. DEAL. Okay.
Ms. ESHOO. To Dr. Gerberding, the GAO requested a plan, as I
understand it, in 2000. And what I heard you say in your opening
statement is that even though there has been a temporary report
that has been issues, that you are just going to move ahead with-
out doing a final report? I mean, I think that there is a little bit
of a—I sense a conflict between what we need, what has been re-
quested, a temporary report, all the needs that have been stated
today, and how these conflicts or the differences or the gaps be-
tween a temporary report and a final report to the Congress, I am
concerned about that because it really comes under the umbrella
of a plan for our country. So you can either respond now or respond
in writing.
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And, Dr. Fauci, your testimony today, again, represents a great
deal of hope, very exciting research and I think that it is good news
for our country and that we are moving ahead. So if you——
Ms. GERBERDING. I would like to answer——
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] address yourself——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] your question quickly——
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] to this because I am concerned about
the, you know, the stated commitment but the lack of a plan and
a timeframe for it.
Ms. GERBERDING. I think it is very important to understand how
preparedness works. A plan would not necessarily be a good idea
because look at all of the things that have happened in the last——
Ms. ESHOO. Well, why——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] year——
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] wasn’t that stated when the GAO re-
quested one?
Ms. GERBERDING. Well, I am not sure what the GAO is thinking,
but we are intent on having a framework so that we can continu-
ously update and improve. And I will ask Dr. Gellin because this
plan right now is in his hands. And we are very intent on getting
the stakeholders who have to execute the plan——
Ms. ESHOO. So there is a——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] to have a voice in that process.
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] temporary plan now and you are moving
toward a final plan? And is that——
Ms. GERBERDING. There are elements of the plan that we already
all agree on, and we are acting on those elements. There——
Ms. ESHOO. Will there be——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] are some elements——
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] a final plan?
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] that still have to be worked out.
One of them——
Ms. ESHOO. Will there be a final plan——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] was mentioned——
Ms. ESHOO. —Dr. Gellin, which will then be brought back and
reported to the Congress, and if so, when?
Mr. GELLIN. Well, there will be a final plan in the sense that
these plans are evergreen and that we know that they will con-
tinue to be revised. That said, I think the distinction between the
moving ahead versus the final plan is more of how we are address-
ing the pandemic threats. You have heard from Dr. Gerberding and
Dr. Fauci many of the specifics going into things that we are doing
now because we are so concerned about the threat of the H5N1
virus and the bubbling up of other viruses around the world.
But the plan itself, as I mentioned, was lacking a few key policy
decisions, but we put it out for public comment and we were seek-
ing the input from others because we felt this was so important
and it could affect every American, we wanted everyone potentially
engaged in that. So while a large part of that framework is com-
pleted, some of those components, the distribution and control of
vaccines, as we were just talking about——
Ms. ESHOO. But do you have a plan for a final plan? When do
you anticipate——
Mr. GELLIN. Plan for——
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Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] bringing back——
Mr. GELLIN. This summer.
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] something that is——
Mr. GELLIN. This summer.
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] rounded out——
Mr. GELLIN. As I mentioned there are a number——
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] but perhaps to this committee——
Mr. GELLIN. Sure.
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] which has jurisdiction.
Mr. GELLIN. Well, we would be happy—we will post it for the
world on our website and we will share with the World Health Or-
ganization when it is available. We would be glad to come and talk
to you about it as well. We expect it will be completed——
Ms. ESHOO. Do you anticipate approximately——
Mr. GELLIN. This summer.
Ms. ESHOO. [continuing] when?
Mr. GELLIN. This summer.
Ms. ESHOO. I mean is it 2 years from now or a year——
Mr. GELLIN. This summer.
Ms. ESHOO. This summer?
Mr. GELLIN. This summer. As I said, there are a number of mov-
ing parts that are going to funnel into it, and we are hopeful that
they are all going to be completed. The CDC is working on some,
various advisory committees are working on them, and they are all
anticipated to funnel in to fill the few gaps that were in the plan
from last year this summer.
Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEAL. Thank you. The committee stands in recess.
[Brief recess]
Mr. DEAL. The subcommittee will come back to order. I recognize
Dr. Burgess for questions.
Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gellin, on the issue
of liability that inevitably comes up in a discussion like this, have
you got any thoughts on the issue of liability and protection from
liability that may enter into this discussion?
Mr. GELLIN. Well, specifically for this discussion, I think it is
worth highlighting that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program that added the influenza vaccine to their compensation
table this year added a trivalent vaccine, the current annual vac-
cine of three strains. And I believe that probably gives us some in-
dication that a pandemic vaccine, which we all believe would likely
be a monovalent strain of the pandemic strain wouldn’t be covered
by the compensation program. In my reading of the history of the
Swine Flu epidemic in 1976, the manufacturers—I believe, and
they will probably tell you about that—but produced vaccine but
wouldn’t release it until the liability question was solved. I think
among the pieces of the preparedness plan, at least that have been
highlighted as one that needs to be solved, is the one that is being
worked on, but clearly needs to be solved before we can move for-
ward. And a large response is that issue.
Mr. BURGESS. Thank you. And, Dr. Gellin, the vaccine shortage
from last year, the utilization of information, lessons learned from
that vaccine shortage, has that in any way helped us nationally
plan for the pandemic flu response?
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Mr. GELLIN. Absolutely. And I think that what your question
really highlights is really the inseparable link between our annual
influenza program and our preparedness for a pandemic. And that
speaks probably to every component of that from communications
to vaccine distribution to vaccine availability. So we learned many
lessons last year. And I think that one of the other questions that
needs to be addressed and is one of those key policy decisions that
was intentionally left out of the plan because we wanted a larger
discussion was the procurement and distribution and essentially
the control of vaccine in a pandemic.
It is worth highlighting that while we all think about flu shots
and public health and therefore you think that this must be a pub-
lic commodity, 85 percent, I believe, of the flu shots that are dis-
tributed annually are in the private sector. And I think that what
we saw some last year is that the control of vaccine was really an
impairment to the distribution of vaccine. Therefore, I think we
need a vigorous discussion that goes into our policy decisions about
procurement and control of a pandemic vaccine.
Mr. BURGESS. Thank you. Dr. Gerberding, Dr. Fauci talked about
fast science and how good we are now at identifying things. The
concept of syndromic surveillances is something that comes up from
time to time. Are we making any effort to tie into any of the large
drugstore chains to see when the sales of Kleenex and aspirin spike
so that we could even be a little bit faster about trying to identify
these outbreaks?
Ms. GERBERDING. Thank you. During this past flu season we did
test out our system called BioSense, which allows us to import in-
formation from pharmacies as well as clinical visits in the VA and
the Department of Defense sites across the country, of course,
anonymously without revealing patient identifiers and a number of
other related, surrogate health data short of actual patient visits
to the hospital or clinician for influenza. And what we found was
that our inputted information from over-the-counter purchases of
flu-type medications in conjunction with clinic visits in the Depart-
ment of Defense and VA medical facilities allowed us in some juris-
dictions to see the arrival of flu earlier than our conventional sur-
veillance and with more precision at the local level than our con-
ventional surveillance. For seasonal flu that is probably not par-
ticularly helpful to the public health and the doctors making the
decisions, but in the case of something like exotic Avian Influenza
or pandemic strain or SARS, the sooner we know that at the most
local level, the sooner we can initiate isolation, quarantine, and
other control measures. So we think this is definitely an invest-
ment that has proved its use, and we continue to evaluate it and
improve it over the next year. So we actually appreciate the sup-
port that Congress has given us for the BioSense initiative.
Mr. BURGESS. Well, and also, of course, most of the agents that
are discussed as far as Homeland Security, the bioterrorism agents
would present with the same symptoms as an influenza outbreak?
Ms. GERBERDING. That is correct. There is always a dual pur-
pose. Everything we do with flu helps us with terrorism prepared-
ness and vice versa.
Mr. BURGESS. I guess, Dr. Gellin, Mr. Brown asked you about
surge capacity in the provider market, and has there been any
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thought given to—you know, there are physicians out there who
are licensed and capable but no longer insured because they might
be retired, serving in Congress, any number of other occupations.
And has there been any thought given to a limited liability protec-
tion during a crisis that would provide some of that surge capacity
that you say we lack?
Mr. GELLIN. Well, I can’t speak to that, but specifically for a pan-
demic response I don’t know if that has been addressed in bioter-
rorism, but clearly we recognize that the kinds of numbers that you
all have been aware of and have discussed with us, it would rapidly
overwhelm the healthcare system and need to try to think of alter-
native levels of care and what it would take to allow that to hap-
pen.
Mr. BURGESS. Thank you. This has been a fascinating discussion
this morning. I hope I can get continuing education hours. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEAL. The gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. WAXMAN. My colleague wants not only continuing education
but a legal liability protection if he is called into service. Not un-
reasonable. Not unreasonable at all. Dr. Gerberding, we are going
to hear on the next panel from sanofi-aventis, the only company
with a plant licensed to produce flu vaccine in the United States,
and they also make several childhood vaccines, including vaccines
to prevent polio, tetanus, and whooping cough. And the company
is going to tell us that in the event of a pandemic, virtually all of
their efforts would be directed toward a flu vaccine and production
of other vaccines would plummet. Now, that might not be a prob-
lem if we have a stockpile of all the pediatric vaccines. Three years
ago CDC pledged to fill this stockpile, but as the ‘‘Washington
Post’’ recently reported, very little progress has been made. Over
2 years ago sanofi-aventis raised the concern with CDC that an ob-
scure accounting rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission
was an obstacle to participation. The SEC issue has since been dis-
cussed in advisory committee meetings and CDC presentations and
scholarly publications, yet for all this talk, very little action. And
I just learned that 2 days ago, the SEC sent its first letter to the
vaccine companies asking for more information. The SEC is hoping
the companies will call by June 7 in order to schedule a conference
call or a meeting.
Now, if CDC was aware of the problem 2 years ago, why does it
seem to be stuck at square one in May 2005, and what are you
doing to express the urgency of this situation to Secretary Leavitt
at HHS and Chairman Donaldson at SEC? When do you foresee
this problem will be resolved? When can we expect the stockpile to
be filled? This is not a complicated problem. We need vaccines for
a stockpile so that we can protect children’s lives. But the stockpile
is now virtually empty and children are at risk, and if a high
enough priority is placed on children’s health by this administra-
tion, this problem should be able to be resolved I would think im-
mediately. I know it is not your problem alone, but it is others’
within the administration. When are we going to see action on
this?
Ms. GERBERDING. This is a frustrating situation. For 20 years we
have been purchasing drugs for the pediatric supply using a meth-
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od that served us very well, and suddenly a couple of years ago,
as you mentioned, the accounting rule was noticed or interpreted
differently than it had in the past, and some companies are con-
cerned enough to no longer want to stockpile drugs and vaccines
using the old methodology.
We had a very difficult time getting an accountant with objec-
tivity to help us because most of the accountants that we ap-
proached for contractual relationships have conflicts of interest be-
cause they also do work for PhRMA. So the process of getting the
external advice and help that we needed took longer than you can
imagine. It was a very frustrating situation, but the accountant is
on board. We do have an objective accountant that I think we
would all agree does not have a conflict of interest in how to arbi-
trate and negotiate a decision.
I will be frank with you; I am not an expert in Securities and
Exchange law, but I know that Secretary Leavitt and the depart-
ment have been working hard to try to find some alternative strat-
egy. The reason that we have managed the stockpile in this way
is because we don’t want to purchase vaccine and have it expire
and not use it——
Mr. WAXMAN. No, I understand that and——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] so it is——
Mr. WAXMAN. [continuing] it must be——
Ms. GERBERDING. The solution is expensive——
Mr. WAXMAN. Yes.
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] and we are looking——
Mr. WAXMAN. Well, it must be——
Ms. GERBERDING. Isn’t there some——
Mr. WAXMAN. [continuing] frustrating to you——
Ms. GERBERDING. [continuing] third way——
Mr. WAXMAN. [continuing] and it is frustrating to everybody in-
volved. One person suggesting putting people in the room and not
letting them out until they have resolved it. I want to express to
you on my behalf, and maybe I speak for other members as well,
if you need a special exemption in the law on this one issue in
order to give comfort to the companies to produce the stockpile, if
that is what it comes to, I would certainly support such an effort.
So I just want to encourage you to push the secretary, who has so
many other things on his mind, to not forget this one because it
could blow up in our face.
The key Federal program that supports State immunization ac-
tivities is the 317 Program. It supports basic childhood immuniza-
tion as well as resources and training directly related to pandemic
flu preparedness, and for years States have raised concerns about
Federal support. They say 317 is inadequate. Spending for vaccine
planning staff has remained flat even though costs have risen.
More than 15 States say they don’t have the resources to provide
routinely recommended vaccines such as a vaccine against the most
common cause of meningitis to all children who need it.
Last year Congress provided an extra $6 million for the 317 Pro-
gram, but then that money had to be diverted when we had the
flu crisis. States have said they are not seeing the increase in fund-
ing even though they were told they would get it. Is this extra
funding going for vaccine purchase, and if not, where it is going?
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I assume that is where it is going. Last fall CDC took money from
the 317 Program to purchase flu vaccine. Has all the funding been
restored to the 317 Program? Can you pledge that it will be fully
restored?
Ms. GERBERDING. No, let me first say that use of 317 money for
the IND vaccine has been fully restored, so we did not borrow from
317 on a permanent basis to pay for the vaccine. We reprogrammed
through Congressional action to pay for those expenses through
non-317 dollars. And overall there is a net increase in 317 support.
I would also mention that we have record high immunization
records of children across our Nation. So whatever difficulties the
States are having, they have been able to get the best-ever vaccina-
tion rates in very difficult times, which I think is a testament to
their incredible innovation and creativity under some pretty high
pressure circumstances.
Mr. WAXMAN. So it is your position that there really has not been
a decline in 317 funds? The money has been restored and it is
available?
Ms. GERBERDING. There is an actual, absolute increase in the
funding for 317. But the other part of this that hasn’t been resolved
yet is the change in the Vaccine for Children Program that would
allow a population of children that right now experience a coverage
gap. Uninsured children in the country cannot get vaccine through
the 317 Program in the locations where we would like them to be
able to access it. And we are supporting a change in vaccines for
children that would cover those children under the mandatory vac-
cination program so they would no longer be relying on 317 funds.
That should help improve coverage.
Mr. WAXMAN. Thanks. Well, it is an important program, and I
just want to urge you to make sure that we have enough funds in
there for the States to do their job.
Ms. GERBERDING. Thank you.
Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FERGUSON [presiding]. As we are waiting for members of the
majority side to come back we will go to Mr. Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a question for the
whole panel really. I am just wondering what your estimate is of
the time it would take between identification of a pandemic strain
and full-scale production of a vaccine against that strain? I know
some assumption is built in there, but I wondered if you could give
us your thoughts on that question.
Ms. GERBERDING. We face a similar situation every year because
we see season flu emerge at the end of the regular flu season, and
we have got to scale everything up to be able to produce the next
vaccine for the fall. So 6 months is the best we can do right now
under our current manufacturing processes. And part of the reason
that the vaccine, the H5 vaccine, the two million doses is so impor-
tant is because some of the regulatory steps to allow for good man-
ufacturing practice approval, those hurdles have already been
solved. And if we have to suddenly use the slightly different H5
strain or scale up the production of this one, we have cutoff a little
bit of the regulatory barrier to the time. But egg production takes
time. It takes time to get a seed virus and it takes time to grow
it in eggs; it takes time to harvest it; it takes time to package it
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and test it and then distribute it. So we would have to count on
a 6-month window before we would have full-scale global produc-
tion.
Mr. FAUCI. Yes, I agree completely with Dr. Gerberding’s esti-
mate of the timeframe, Mr. Allen, but I would like to take the op-
portunity just for a few seconds to emphasize something I men-
tioned early on. And that is we should not assume that if we have
a 6-month lead, if the virus evolves in a rather less-than-abrupt
but more gradual way, which is likely that it would, and we press
the button and say we are going to go full-scale now, even with
that, the capacity for the number of doses we would have is still
an important limiting factor. So it isn’t as if overnight we are going
to be able to get a vaccine for everyone who would need a vaccine.
That is very important. The reason I bring it up—that is the bad
news. The news that should spur us to do what we have spoken
certainly to members of this committee before is by linking our pre-
paredness for the regular, seasonal influenza with the prepared-
ness for pandemic flu so that gradually we increase the usage of,
the consistency of demand for, and the capacity for influenza vac-
cine such that we have a situation that on a regular year we are
making 150 million, 180 million. That would put us in much better
stead to be able to respond in a very quick way if we indeed have
to respond to a pandemic flu. That is extremely important.
Mr. ALLEN. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Gellin, any difference of opin-
ion?
Mr. GELLIN. No difference of opinion, but I want to sort of qualify
and add a few things to what Drs. Gerberding and Fauci said. I
think it is important to think about the entire timeframe. You sig-
naled when it starts and when we have something. I think that
really reinforces the importance of surveillance, to have the eyes,
ears, and hands, and labs out there that can find that virus soon.
And I think that we have gone ahead with this H5 projects, the
several H5 projects really are evidence of that.
The other piece is recognizing that when vaccine starts to come
off the line that it is going to take a while for it to come off, which
is again why a system other than eggs where you can have mul-
tiple things going on in parallel so the time to the first dose may
be the same, but the number of doses you get subsequently may
be greatly increased.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. Let me do a related question. Because of
concerns about how long it might take to develop a pandemic strain
vaccine, the U.K. and France among other countries have already
ordered sufficient supply of Tamiflu for about one-fourth of their
population. And according to press reports, the U.S. has only or-
dered for 1 percent of the population. Should we create a larger
stockpile of Tamiflu? What is the timetable for ordering more sup-
ply? And sort of what level of funding would be necessary to do
that?
Ms. GERBERDING. We have made the decision to increase our
stockpile. Again, part of the resources that came through the sup-
plement just recently, the last couple of weeks, may be used to do
that. And we also intend to purchase more stockpile materials to
combat flu and——
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Mr. ALLEN. Is there a number? About how much more do you
think?
Ms. GERBERDING. I am not ready to give you an exact number
today.
Mr. GELLIN. Let me make a distinction, which is important, be-
cause of what you have cited in the press. The difference between
orders and actual what you have in stock, we have been worried
about this for some period of time and went ahead and have se-
cured the over two million treatment courses, enough to treat over
two million people. And while other countries have signaled their
intent to purchase more, it is going to be several years until that
is delivered. I am sure the companies can fill you in on that. And
in the meantime few are going to have to have a strategy to be able
to prioritize those who would be first in line in a limited supply.
But I think that is where our—we have actually emphasized both
the antivirals and the vaccine, recognizing that these are the only
two medical countermeasures that we might have, neither of them
perfect, but we need to do what we could with both of them.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you all.
Mr. FERGUSON. Ms. Baldwin.
Ms. BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to further
pursue two of the questions that I raised in my opening statement.
First, regarding planning and preparedness on a global scale—and
I was pleased to hear in your testimony about Secretary Leavitt ad-
dressing the World Health Assembly and elevating this issue.
Some of the experts at home and abroad have even gone as far
as describing what a formalized global flu pandemic effort should
look like, including some sort of global taskforce, outbreak manage-
ment teams with some sort of centralized management. Is anything
happening to achieve these right now, and does anything like what
I have just described exist?
Ms. GERBERDING. Thank you. I attended the World Health As-
sembly with Dr. Gellin and Secretary Leavitt and others this year.
I also attended the assembly last year, and I can tell you that there
has been a sea change of interest and focus on influenza in the last
year. The meetings were incredibly well-attended and some very
specific actions, steps, and subsequent plans were laid out that I
think will lead to action.
But what we are doing, in addition to what the World Health Or-
ganization is doing, is to use the supplemental resources that we
were provided, $15 million this past week to CDC and another $10
million to USAID to specifically focus right now on Southeast Asia.
And we are in the process of developing very specific capabilities
that would include improving the local ability to identify cases and
to get the frontline lab test done, as well as augmenting the train-
ing of the many health aids and clinicians and public health offi-
cials that would need to engage to improve the infrastructure, par-
ticularly in the Mekong Delta countries.
So we haven’t finalized that plan; we are still working on it be-
cause we are working in collaboration with USAID and the Depart-
ment of Defense as well as the Ministers of Health and the World
Health Organization. But I think this is going to give us a giant
step forward in our ability to do something right now in the region
to really do exactly what you are suggesting needs to be done.
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Mr. GELLIN. And if I could, I will just speak to that in a different
way. The World Health Organization in 1999 put out the first Pan-
demic Influenza Preparedness Plan framework and asked that all
countries follow that. As you can imagine, that would ease commu-
nication when people would have a similar understanding of where
they were in a pandemic. They regionally revised that, and I think
it was last December or January, which again forces us to change
our plan, which speaks again to the fact that these plans will con-
tinue to evolve. But again the one that will come out this summer
will follow the WHO framework.
I think it does speak to what Dr. Gerberding mentioned and rein-
forced that people recognize the definition of a pandemic is a global
problem, and all the countries, those affected and those who might
be affected, are in this together.
Ms. GERBERDING. I got the International Health Regulations ap-
proved at the World Health Assembly so member nations voted ap-
proval of new requirements that would mandate countries to report
any condition that could pose an international health threat with
specific mention of influenza and SARS-like illness.
Ms. BALDWIN. Thank you. The other issue that I wanted to pur-
sue in greater depth—this question is for you, Dr. Gellin—is the
component of public education preparedness in that sense. And I
think back to how information was disseminated when we had the
anthrax attacks, what level of preparation there was for that in
terms of public awareness. And obviously there was certainly some
elements of panic, et cetera. Tell me if you will—and you alluded
to this in your testimony that there are elements in place and mov-
ing forward—what are they? What sort of strategies do you have
to educate the public and maybe also working with the media?
Mr. GELLIN. Well, I think there is a lot that has begun to be put
in place, and I guess I would actually put it in terms of a two-way
discussion. Education sounds like we are going to tell you what we
know, but we also want to have that as a discussion that goes both
ways. So there are a number of things that are now being devel-
oped. There are going to be some—I mean I don’t know if they are
precisely town hall meetings, but ways to go out and have discus-
sion with representatives of the public. I think part of the chal-
lenge is going to be the separation of pandemic influenza from reg-
ular influenza, recognizing the challenges of that every year.
And I think it was ironic that last year, when we put out our
draft plan on August 26, it was the day that Chiron first an-
nounced that they were having trouble. So our intention to put that
plan out away from the flu season specifically to try to separate
pandemic influenza from influenza changed. But I think that we
are probably all living with the fact that influenza and pandemic
influenza seem to be everyday discussions.
Ms. BALDWIN. Have these town hall meetings begun to happen
or are they in the pipeline? What——
Mr. GELLIN. In the pipeline. The——
Ms. GERBERDING. There are other things that have been going on
as well. We have ongoing focus groups, particularly in follow-up to
last year’s flu vaccine. One critical question we need to know is will
clinicians still want to offer flu vaccine. So we have been doing sur-
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veys to get answers to what will target audiences do under various
circumstances of supply or severity of flu.
We have also, through out preparedness investments in the
States, created a whole curriculum on risk communication, and all
States now have risk communicators in the State Health Depart-
ment or the Governor’s office who are experienced at explaining
things to the public in times of high stress and emotional conduct.
And we have exercised those.
Unfortunately, many times in the last several months through
the many non-flu-related outbreaks and tsunamis and hurricanes
that we have experienced, but we are finding that capacity has
grown dramatically since anthrax. We know from that kind of
formative research that although government leaders are very im-
portant in setting the stage for the communication, the person that
people most want to hear information from is their own doctor. And
so targeting the clinicians as a component of the educational—it is
absolutely critical at the local level.
Mr. FERGUSON. With that we will conclude our first panel. I want
to thank our witnesses, Dr. Gerberding, Dr. Fauci, Dr. Gellin,
thank you very much for being here today. Thank you for the work
that you do on behalf of the healthcare of the American people.
And I will invite the witnesses for our second panel to come to the
witness table. I know Chairman Deal had introduced our second
panel earlier in the hearing but very briefly by way of introduction,
our second panel includes Dr. Marcia Crosse, the Director of
Health Care Issues at GAO; Mr. Phillip Hosbach, Vice President of
Immunization Policy and Government Relations at sanofi pasteur;
Dr. Ralph Tripp, Professor and GRA Chair at the University of
Georgia College of Veterinary Medicine, Department of Infectious
Diseases; Dr. Andrew Pavia, Infectious Diseases Society of Amer-
ica; and Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, Medical Director at Hoffmann-La
Roche. Thank you all very much for being here. We appreciate your
presence. Dr. Crosse, we will begin with you. Just turn on your
microphone if you would. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF MARCIA CROSSE, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE
ISSUES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE; ANDREW T. PAVIA, CHAIRMAN, TASKFORCE ON PAN-
DEMIC INFLUENZA, INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOCIETY OF
AMERICA, AND PROFESSOR AND CHIEF, DIVISION OF PEDI-
ATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASES, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MED-
ICAL CENTER; PHILLIP HOSBACH, VICE PRESIDENT, IMMU-
NIZATION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, SANOFI-
PASTEUR; DOMINICK A. IACUZIO, MEDICAL DIRECTOR,
HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE; AND RALPH A. TRIPP, CHAIRMAN,
GEORGIA RESEARCH ALLIANCE, AND PROFESSOR, DEPART-
MENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA,
COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE
Ms. CROSSE. I am pleased to be here today as you discuss issues
regarding our preparedness to respond to an influenza pandemic.
We have heard today already about the threat posed by Avian In-
fluenza. As many members noted, while the extent of the next pan-
demic cannot be predicted, modeling studies suggest that its effects
in the United States could be severe.
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You asked us to provide our perspective on the Nation’s ability
to conduct disease surveillance for an influenza pandemic, as well
as preparedness for such a pandemic. In my testimony I will briefly
discuss surveillance systems and the challenges that remain in pre-
paredness and response.
There are a number of systems in place to identify influenza out-
breaks abroad, to alert us to a pandemic, and these systems gen-
erally appear to be working well. HHS has taken important steps
to enhance surveillance. Given the global nature of disease, a pan-
demic that begins abroad could quickly spread to this country. Pub-
lic health officials plan to rely on the Nation’s existing influenza
surveillance system and recent enhancements to identify an influ-
enza pandemic. CDC currently collaborates with multiple public
health partners, as we heard, including WHO to obtain data that
provide national and international pictures of influenza activity.
Public health officials and healthcare organizations have under-
taken several initiatives that may be expected to enhance influenza
surveillance. While some of these initiatives are focused more gen-
erally on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and emerging in-
fectious diseases, others have been undertaken specifically in prep-
aration for an influenza pandemic. For example, in response to con-
cerns over the past few years about Avian Influenza, CDC imple-
mented an initiative in cooperation with WHO to improve influenza
surveillance in Asia, which Dr. Gerberding discussed.
CDC has also implemented initiatives to improve public health
communications systems it uses to collect and disseminate surveil-
lance information for many diseases. In addition, CDC, FDA, and
the Department of Agriculture have made efforts to enhance their
coordination of surveillance efforts for animal diseases that can be
transferred to humans such as SARS and certain strains of influ-
enza.
While public health officials have undertaken several initiatives
to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities, challenges remain
with regard to other aspects of preparedness and response. The
steps HHS is taking to address these challenges may not be in
place in time to fill the current gaps in preparedness should an in-
fluenza pandemic occur in the next several years.
One area of concern is the supply of vaccine and antiviral drugs.
As we learned in the 2004-2005 influenza season, the vaccine sup-
ply is fragile. It takes many months to produce vaccine and prob-
lems with even a single manufacturer can result in vaccine short-
ages.
Further, as was extensively discussed in the first panel, our cur-
rent stockpile of antiviral drugs is insufficient to meet the likely
demand in a pandemic. HHS is working to expand vaccine produc-
tion capacity and to stockpile vaccine and antiviral drugs, but it
will be years before these preparations are in place.
Other challenges in preparedness and response exist across the
public and private sectors. Regulatory, privacy, and procedural
issues surrounding measures to control the spread of disease must
be addressed. And both the public and private sectors must resolve
issues related to an insufficient hospital capacity and health work-
force for responding to a large-scale outbreak such as an influenza
pandemic. A pandemic would have major impacts on the ability of
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1 An influenza pandemic is defined by the emergence of a novel influenza virus, to which much
or all of the population is susceptible, that is readily transmitted person-to-person and causes
outbreaks in multiple countries.
2 See GAO, SARS Outbreak: Improvements to Public Health Capacity Are Needed for Respond-
ing to Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases, GAO-03-769T (Washington, D.C.: May 7,
2003).
3 Influenza pandemics can have successive ‘‘waves’’ of disease and last for up to 3 years. Three
pandemics occurred in the 20th century: the ‘‘Spanish flu’’ of 1918, which killed 500,000 people
in the United States; the ‘‘Asian flu’’ of 1957, which caused 70,000 deaths in the United States;
and the ‘‘Hong Kong flu’’ of 1968, which caused 34,000 deaths in the United States.
4 See CDC, Fact Sheet, Information about Influenza Pandemics, 3, www.cdc.gov/flu,
downloaded May 12, 2005.
communities to respond, businesses to function, and public safety
to be maintained.
Finally, since 2000 we have been urging the department to com-
plete its pandemic plan. A draft plan was issued in August 2004,
but the plan has not been finalized. Our concern is not whether the
plan is modified and updated on the basis of experience or events,
but absent a completed Federal plan, key questions remain unan-
swered. Some decisions yet to be made include: determining the
Federal role and the public versus private sector role in the pur-
chase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and antiviral
drugs; how population groups will be prioritized for vaccination;
what quarantine authorities or travel restrictions may need to be
invoked; and how Federal resources should be deployed during a
pandemic. It is important for the Federal Government and the
States to work through these issues before we are in a time of cri-
sis.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions you or other members of the sub-
committee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Marcia Crosse follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARIA CROSSE, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE, UITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today
as you discuss issues regarding the nation’s preparedness to respond to a worldwide
influenza epidemic, or influenza pandemic.1 The emergence of new diseases such as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has raised concerns about our ability to
respond to other infectious disease outbreaks such as an influenza pandemic,2 which
many experts believe to be inevitable. Vaccine shortages and distribution problems
during the 2004-2005 influenza season add to these concerns.
Influenza pandemics arise periodically but unpredictably from a major genetic
change in the virus that results in a new strain.3 Some experts believe that the next
pandemic could be spawned by the recurring avian influenza in Asia. As of May 19,
2005, 97 people, mostly young and otherwise healthy, have been confirmed by the
World Health Organization (WHO) to have been infected with avian influenza since
2003, and 53 of them have died. Recent studies suggest that avian influenza strains
are increasingly capable of causing severe disease in humans and suggest that these
strains have become endemic in some wild birds. If these avian influenza strains
directly infect humans and acquire the ability to be readily transmitted between
people, a pandemic could occur.
While the severity of the next pandemic cannot be predicted, modeling studies
suggest that its effect in the United States could be severe. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that if a ‘‘medium-level’’ influenza pan-
demic were to occur in the United States, in the absence of any control measures
(e.g., vaccination and drugs), it could cause 89,000 to 207,000 deaths, 314,000 to
734,000 hospitalizations, 18 million to 42 million outpatient visits, and another 20
million to 47 million cases of the illness.4 From 15 percent to 35 percent of the U.S.
population could be affected by an influenza pandemic, with associated costs ranging
from $71 billion to $167 billion.
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5 Disease surveillance is the process of reporting, collecting, analyzing, and exchanging infor-
mation related to cases of infectious diseases.
6 See GAO, Emerging Infectious Diseases: Review of State and Federal Disease Surveillance Ef-
forts, GAO-04-877 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004).
7 See ‘‘Related GAO Products’’ at the end of this testimony for a list of our earlier work related
to emerging infectious diseases and influenza pandemic planning.
8 These states—California, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin—were selected based on their participation in
CDC’s Emerging Infections Program, each state’s most recent infectious disease outbreak, and
their geographic location.
You asked us to provide our perspective on the nation’s ability to conduct disease
surveillance 5 for an influenza pandemic, as well as the public health system’s pre-
paredness for an influenza pandemic. In this testimony, I will discuss (1) surveil-
lance systems in place to identify and monitor an influenza pandemic and (2) chal-
lenges in preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic.
My testimony today is based largely on our 2004 report on disease surveillance 6
as well as reports and testimony on influenza outbreaks, influenza vaccine supply,
pandemic planning, and the SARS outbreak that we have issued since October
2000 7 and work we have conducted to update key information. Our prior work on
disease surveillance and influenza pandemics included analysis of information pro-
vided by multiple federal departments and agencies, including the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)—specifically from CDC and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)—and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Home-
land Security, as well as interviews with officials of those departments and agencies.
We also interviewed public health department officials from 11 states,8 vaccine man-
ufacturers, and vaccine distributors and surveyed physician group practices. To
learn about pandemic planning efforts, we interviewed HHS officials in the National
Vaccine Program Office and reviewed HHS’s August 2004 draft ‘‘Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response Plan.’’ Our prior work on the SARS outbreak included
analysis of information provided by U.S. agencies, WHO, and Asian governments,
as well as interviews with officials from those entities. We also conducted fieldwork
on SARS in Beijing; Hong Kong; Guangdong Province, China; and Taipei, Taiwan.
In May 2005, we updated our information to include issues that arose during the
2004-2005 influenza season and to verify the current status of HHS efforts on sur-
veillance, planning, and preparedness activities. We conducted all of our work in ac-
cordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, federal public health officials plan to rely on the nation’s existing
influenza surveillance system and enhancements to identify an influenza pandemic.
CDC currently collaborates with multiple public health partners, including WHO,
to obtain data that provide national and international pictures of influenza activity.
Federal public health officials and health care organizations have undertaken sev-
eral initiatives that are intended to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities.
While some of these initiatives are focused more generally on increasing prepared-
ness for bioterrorism and other emerging infectious disease health threats, others
were undertaken in preparation for an influenza pandemic. For example, in re-
sponse to concerns over the past few years about the potential for avian influenza
to become the next influenza pandemic, CDC implemented an initiative in coopera-
tion with WHO to improve influenza surveillance in Asia. CDC has also imple-
mented initiatives to improve the communications systems it uses to collect and dis-
seminate surveillance information. In addition, CDC, USDA, and FDA have made
efforts to enhance their coordination of surveillance efforts for diseases that arise
in animals and can be transferred to humans, such as SARS and certain strains of
influenza with the potential to become pandemic.
While public health officials have undertaken several initiatives to enhance influ-
enza surveillance capabilities, challenges remain with regard to other aspects of pre-
paredness for and response to an influenza pandemic. In particular, HHS has not
finalized planning for an influenza pandemic. In 2000, we recommended that HHS
complete the national plan for responding to an influenza pandemic, but the plan
has been in draft format since August 2004. Absent a completed federal plan, key
questions about the federal role in the purchase, distribution, and administration
of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic remain unanswered. Other chal-
lenges with regard to preparedness for and response to an influenza pandemic exist
across the public and private sectors, including challenges in ensuring an adequate
and timely influenza vaccine and antiviral supply; addressing regulatory, privacy,
and procedural issues surrounding measures to control the spread of disease, for ex-
ample, across national borders; and resolving issues related to an insufficient hos-
pital and health workforce capacity for responding to a large-scale outbreak such as
an influenza pandemic.
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9 FDA decides which strains to include in the annual influenza vaccine based on the rec-
ommendations of its Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee.
10 Under the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FDA ensures compliance with good manu-
facturing practices and has limited authority to regulate the resale of prescription drugs, includ-
ing influenza vaccine, that have been purchased by health care entities, such as public or pri-
vate hospitals. The term ‘‘health care entity’’ does not include wholesale distributors. This au-
thority would not extend to resale of the vaccine for emergency medical reasons. CDC also has
a role in encouraging appropriate public health actions.
11 The requirement to report clinically anomalous symptoms is particularly important for the
detection of emerging infectious diseases, many of which may be unfamiliar to health care pro-
viders.
BACKGROUND
To be prepared for major public health threats such as an influenza pandemic,
public health agencies need several basic capabilities, including disease surveillance
systems. Specifically, to detect cases of pandemic influenza, especially before they
develop into widespread outbreaks, local, state, and federal public health officials as
well as international organizations collect, analyze, and share information related
to cases of the disease. When effective, surveillance can facilitate timely action to
control outbreaks and promote informed allocation of resources to meet changing
disease conditions.
Influenza
Influenza is more severe than some other viral respiratory infections, such as the
common cold. Most people who get influenza recover completely in 1 to 2 weeks, but
some develop serious and potentially life-threatening medical complications, such as
pneumonia. People aged 65 and older, people of any age with chronic medical condi-
tions, children younger than 2 years, and pregnant women are more likely than
other people to develop severe complications from influenza. Influenza and pneu-
monia rank as the fifth leading cause of death among persons aged 65 and older.
Influenza viruses undergo minor but continuous genetic changes from year to
year. Almost every year, an influenza virus causes acute respiratory disease in epi-
demic proportions somewhere in the world. Vaccination is the primary method for
preventing influenza and its more severe complications. Influenza vaccine is pro-
duced and administered annually to provide protection against particular influenza
strains expected to be prevalent that year. Influenza vaccine takes several months
to produce. Deciding which viral strains to include in the annual influenza vaccine
depends on data collected from domestic and international surveillance systems that
identify prevalent strains and characterize their effect on human health. FDA de-
cides which strains to include in the vaccine and also licenses and regulates the
manufacturers that produce the vaccine.9 HHS has limited authority, however, to
directly control influenza vaccine production and distribution.10
FDA has approved four antiviral medications (amantadine, rimantadine,
oseltamivir, and zanamivir) for prevention and treatment of influenza. However, in-
fluenza virus strains can become resistant to one or more of these drugs, and so
they may not always be effective.
Disease Surveillance and Response
In the United States, responsibility for disease surveillance is shared—involving
health care providers; more than 3,000 local health departments, including county,
city, and tribal health departments; 59 state and territorial health departments;
more than 180,000 public and private laboratories; and public health officials from
multiple federal departments and agencies.
States, through the use of their state and local health departments, have principal
responsibility for protecting the public’s health and therefore take the lead in con-
ducting disease surveillance and supporting response efforts. According to the Insti-
tute of Medicine (IOM), most states require health care providers to report any un-
usual illnesses or deaths—especially those for which a cause cannot be readily es-
tablished—to their local and/or state health department.11 Generally, local health
departments are responsible for conducting initial investigations into reports of in-
fectious diseases. Laboratory personnel test clinical and environmental samples for
possible exposures and identification of illnesses. Epidemiologists in health depart-
ments use disease surveillance systems to detect clusters of suspicious symptoms or
diseases in order to facilitate early detection and treatment. Local and state health
departments monitor disease trends. Local health departments are also responsible
for sharing information they obtain from providers or other sources with their state
departments of health. State health departments are responsible for collecting sur-
veillance information—which they share on a voluntary basis with CDC and oth-
ers—from across their state and for coordinating investigations and response efforts.
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12 Zoonotic diseases are those diseases that are transmitted from animals to humans.
13 Many syndromic surveillance systems currently in use in the United States were developed
in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and
to the anthrax outbreaks that occurred shortly afterwards. The fundamental objective of
syndromic surveillance is to identify illness clusters early, before diagnoses are confirmed and
reported to public health agencies.
Public health officials provide needed information to the clinical community and the
public.
At the federal level, several departments and agencies are involved in disease sur-
veillance and response. For example,
• HHS has primary responsibility for coordinating the nation’s response to public
health emergencies. As part of its mission, the department has a role in plan-
ning to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. One action the de-
partment has taken is the development of a draft national pandemic influenza
plan, titled ‘‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan.’’
• CDC is charged with protecting the nation’s public health by directing efforts to
prevent and control diseases and responding to public health emergencies. It
has primary responsibility for conducting national disease surveillance and de-
veloping epidemiological and laboratory tools to enhance disease surveillance.
CDC also provides an array of technical and financial support for state infec-
tious disease surveillance efforts. In addition, CDC participates in international
disease and laboratory surveillance sponsored by WHO.
• FDA is responsible for ensuring that new vaccines and drugs are safe and effec-
tive and for conducting research on diagnostic tools and treatment of disease
outbreaks. The agency also regulates and licenses vaccines and antiviral agents
through the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research and the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, respectively. FDA also develops influenza viral
reference strains and reagents and makes them available to manufacturers for
vaccine development and evaluation.
• The Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to global disease surveillance,
training, research, and response to emerging infectious disease threats. DOD
maintains the DOD Influenza Surveillance Program, a laboratory-based surveil-
lance program. DOD maintains multiple sites throughout the world that serve
as sentinels for disease outbreaks, where it collects and analyzes viral speci-
mens.
• The Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for protecting and improv-
ing the health and marketability of animals and animal products by preventing,
controlling, and eliminating animal diseases. USDA undertakes disease surveil-
lance and response activities to protect U.S. livestock, ensure the safety of inter-
national trade, and contribute to the national zoonotic disease 12 surveillance ef-
fort.
The United States is a member of WHO, which is responsible for coordinating
international disease surveillance and response efforts. An agency of the United Na-
tions, WHO administers the International Health Regulations, which outline WHO’s
role and the responsibility of member countries and regions in preventing the global
spread of infectious diseases. WHO also helps marshal resources from its members
to control outbreaks within individual countries or regions. In addition, WHO works
with national governments to improve their surveillance capacities through—for ex-
ample—assessing and redesigning national surveillance strategies, offering training
in epidemiologic and laboratory techniques, and emphasizing more efficient commu-
nication systems.
EXISTING INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCEMENTS WOULD BE USED TO
IDENTIFY AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
Surveillance is a key component in planning for an influenza pandemic, and fed-
eral public health officials plan to rely on the nation’s existing annual influenza sur-
veillance system and enhancements to identify an influenza pandemic. Federal pub-
lic health officials have undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance
influenza surveillance capabilities. These initiatives have been undertaken both
through programs specific to influenza as well as through programs focused more
generally on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and other emerging infectious
disease health threats. Federal officials have implemented and expanded syndromic
surveillance systems 13 in order to detect outbreaks more quickly, but there are con-
cerns that these systems are costly to run and still largely untested. Federal officials
have also implemented initiatives designed to improve public health communica-
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14 A WHO Collaborating Centre is a national institution designated by WHO to form part of
an international collaborative network that contributes to implementing WHO’s program prior-
ities and to strengthening institutional capacity in countries and regions. Collaborating Centre
activities include collection and dissemination of information, education and training, and par-
ticipation in collaborative research developed under WHO’s leadership. The four Collaborating
Centres that are part of WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network are located in the United
States, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
tions and have undertaken initiatives intended to improve the coordination of
zoonotic surveillance efforts.
Systems Are in Place to Routinely Monitor for Influenza
Current U.S. surveillance for identifying annual influenza outbreaks as well as an
influenza pandemic involves multiple public health partners at all levels of govern-
ment and relies on several data sources. At the federal level, CDC’s Influenza
Branch leads the national influenza surveillance effort, monitoring disease and viral
trends using data submitted each week from October through May. These surveil-
lance data are collected at the local and state levels and voluntarily submitted to
CDC. Data submitted on influenza activity in the United States include data from
more than 120 laboratories and 2,000 health care providers and mortality reports
from 122 cities. In addition, influenza data are collected from all 50 state health de-
partments and the health departments in the District of Columbia and New York
City. CDC also receives data that are specifically focused on influenza in pediatric
patients. When the data are used collectively, they provide a national picture of in-
fluenza activity. Specifically, they allow CDC to (1) identify when and where influ-
enza activity is occurring, (2) determine what strains of the influenza virus are in
circulation, (3) detect changes in the influenza virus, (4) monitor flu-related ill-
nesses, and (5) measure the impact influenza is having on deaths in the United
States.
DOD also plays a role in national and international influenza surveillance. Spe-
cifically, DOD’s Influenza Surveillance Program, under the direction of the Air
Force, collects viral specimens from its active duty personnel and their dependents
at military facilities around the world. DOD’s program also sends specimens to CDC
for further analysis and contributes to the determination of which viral strains FDA
includes in the nation’s annual influenza vaccine. Internationally, DOD provides
viral specimens to WHO and assists in identifying emerging influenza strains.
In countries throughout the world, infectious disease surveillance is a national re-
sponsibility, but WHO assists its members’ efforts through its Global Influenza Sur-
veillance Network. WHO’s Network is composed of 112 institutions, called National
Influenza Centres, from 83 countries. Collectively, these Centres monitor influenza
activity and annually gather more than 175,000 viral specimens for analysis from
patients with influenza-like illnesses throughout the world. Selected influenza iso-
lates—an estimated 2,000 viruses—may also be sent to one of four WHO Collabo-
rating Centres 14 for further, more specific genetic analysis. The additional analysis
conducted by the WHO Collaborating Centers is used for the annual WHO rec-
ommendations on which strains to include in the influenza vaccine for the northern
and southern hemispheres. In addition to making recommendations on the compo-
nents of the influenza vaccine, this Global Influenza Surveillance Network also
serves as a global alert mechanism for the emergence of influenza viruses with pan-
demic potential.
Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Initiatives to Enhance Influenza Surveillance
CDC has undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance influenza
surveillance capabilities in preparation for an influenza pandemic. CDC works with
its international partners to improve global surveillance for influenza. For example,
CDC participates in international disease and laboratory surveillance sponsored by
WHO. Also, when concerns were raised over recent influenza seasons that the avian
influenza A (H5N1) could become the next influenza pandemic, CDC led a variety
of efforts with its international partners to plan for and address threats of increased
influenza activity worldwide. For example, CDC worked collaboratively with WHO
to conduct investigations of avian influenza A in Vietnam and to provide laboratory
testing. CDC also provided training assistance and has implemented an initiative
to improve influenza surveillance in Asia.
CDC also supports several domestic initiatives to improve surveillance capabilities
for influenza. For example, CDC supports enhanced influenza surveillance activities
through its Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) Grants. Established in
1997, this program provides funding to state and local influenza programs. Grants
have steadily increased from the first awards in 1997, when less than $100,000 was
provided to five states through August 2004, with funding totaling more than $2
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15 The Health Alert Network (HAN) is an early-warning and response system operated by
CDC that is designed to ensure that state and local health departments as well as other federal
agencies and departments have timely access to emerging health information.
16 The Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) is a secure, Web-based communication system
operating in all 50 states. CDC uses this system primarily to share information relevant to dis-
ease outbreaks with state and local public health officials and with other federal officials. Epi-
X also serves as a forum for routine professional discussions and nonemergency inquiries.
17 In selected foreign locations, CDC operates international training programs, such as FETP.
Through FETP, each year CDC trains approximately 50 to 60 physicians and social scientists
in applied public health, integrating disease surveillance, applied research, prevention, and con-
trol activities. Graduates of the FETP program serve in their native country and provide links
between CDC and their respective ministries of health. CDC officials said that trainees from
its international programs have frequently provided important information on disease out-
breaks.
18 To strengthen the nation’s capacity to rapidly detect biological and chemical agents that
could be used as a terrorist weapon, CDC, in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion and the Association of Public Health Laboratories, created LRN in 1999. According to CDC,
LRN leverages the resources of 126 laboratories to maintain an integrated national and inter-
national network of laboratories that are fully equipped to respond quickly to acts of chemical
or biological terrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and other public health threats and emer-
gencies. The network includes federal, state and local public health, military, and international
laboratories, as well as laboratories that specialize in food, environmental, and veterinary test-
ing. LRN laboratories have been used in several public health emergencies. For example, in
2001, a Florida LRN laboratory discovered the presence of Bacillus anthracis, the pathogen that
causes anthrax, in a clinical specimen it tested.
million being given to about 47 states or major metropolitan areas. States and cities
receiving ELC-influenza funding are encouraged to achieve three highlighted influ-
enza epidemiology and laboratory surveillance capacities: sentinel physician surveil-
lance, viral isolation and subtyping, and year-round surveillance. Each state targets
funding to meet one or more of these three priorities and uses funding for support
of improvements that include the assignment or hiring of an influenza coordinator,
recruitment of sentinel physicians to collect influenza specimens and report influ-
enza-like illness to the state, laboratory infrastructure enhancements to increase in-
fluenza testing capabilities for viral isolation and subtyping, and expansion of influ-
enza surveillance activities to year-round.
In an effort to enhance the ability to detect infectious disease outbreaks, particu-
larly in their early stages, federal funding has supported state efforts to implement
numerous syndromic surveillance systems. These systems collect information on
syndromes from a variety of sources. For example, the National Retail Data Monitor
(NRDM) collects data from retail sources instead of hospitals. As of February
2004,—NRDM collected sales data from about 19,000 stores, including pharmacies,
in order to monitor sales patterns in such items as over-the-counter influenza medi-
cations for signs of a developing infectious disease outbreak.
CDC is taking steps to enhance its two public health communications systems, the
Health Alert Network (HAN) 15 and the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X),16
which are used in disease surveillance and response efforts. For example, CDC is
working to increase the number of HAN participants who receive assistance with
their communication capacities. In addition, following reports of human deaths from
avian influenza A in Vietnam in August 2004, CDC issued a HAN message reit-
erating criteria for domestic surveillance, diagnostic evaluation, and infection con-
trol precautions. CDC also issued detailed laboratory testing procedures for avian
influenza through HAN. Similarly, CDC has expanded Epi-X by giving officials at
other federal agencies and departments, such as DOD, the ability to use the system.
CDC is also adding users to Epi-X from local health departments, giving access to
CDC staff in other countries, and making the system available to Field Epidemi-
ology Training Programs (FETP) located in 21 countries.17 Finally, CDC is facili-
tating Epi-X’s interface with other data sources by allowing users to access the
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), the system that searches Web-
based media for information on infectious disease outbreaks worldwide.
In addition to the efforts to enhance communication systems, federal public health
officials also have enhanced federal coordination for zoonotic disease surveillance
and expanded training programs. According to CDC, nearly 70 percent of emerging
infectious disease episodes during the past 10 years have been zoonotic diseases.
Moreover, recent outbreaks of human disease caused by avian influenza strains in
Asia and Europe highlight the potential for new strains to be introduced into the
population. Surveillance for zoonotic diseases requires collaboration between animal
and human disease specialists. CDC, USDA, and FDA have made efforts to enhance
their coordination of zoonotic disease surveillance. For example, CDC and UDSA are
working with two national laboratory associations to add veterinary diagnostic lab-
oratories to the Laboratory Response Network (LRN).18 As of May 2004, 10 veteri-
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19 This working group was created in response to a congressional mandate that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, through FDA and CDC, and USDA, coordinate the surveillance
of zoonotic diseases. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 313, 116 Stat. 594, 674 (2002).
nary laboratories had been added to LRN, and CDC officials told us that they had
plans to add more veterinary laboratories in the future. In addition, CDC officials
told us the agency has appointed a staff person whose responsibility, in part, is to
assist in finding ways to enhance zoonotic disease coordination efforts among federal
agencies and departments and with other organizations. This person is helping CDC
develop a working group of officials from CDC, USDA, and FDA to coordinate
zoonotic disease surveillance.19 According to CDC officials, the goal of this working
group is to explore ways to link existing surveillance systems to better coordinate
and integrate surveillance for wildlife, domestic animal, and human diseases. CDC
officials also said that the agency is exploring the feasibility of a pilot project to
demonstrate this proposed integrated zoonotic disease surveillance system. In addi-
tion, USDA officials told us that they hired 23 wildlife biologists in fall 2003 to co-
ordinate disease surveillance, monitoring, and management activities among USDA,
CDC, states, and other federal agencies. While each of these initiatives is intended
to enhance the surveillance of zoonotic diseases, each is still in the planning stage
or the very early stages of implementation.
USDA also conducts influenza surveillance in domestic animals. Coordination
with USDA is important because a pandemic strain is likely to arise from genetic
mixing of animal and human influenza viruses. Recent outbreaks in domestic poul-
try in Asia and Europe associated with cases of human disease highlight the impor-
tance of coordinating surveillance activities. Surveillance for influenza viruses in
poultry in the United States has increased substantially since the outbreak of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Pennsylvania and surrounding states in 1983
and 1984. However, individual states are generally responsible for the development
and implementation of surveillance programs that are consistent with the size and
complexity of the resident poultry industry.
DESPITE EFFORTS BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS, CHALLENGES REMAIN REGARDING
PREPAREDNESS FOR AND RESPONSE TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
Challenges regarding the nation’s preparedness for and response to an influenza
pandemic remain. Specifically, our prior work has found that although CDC partici-
pated in an interagency working group that developed the U.S. plan for pandemic
preparedness that was posted for public comment in August 2004, as of May 23,
2005, the plan had not been finalized. Further, we found that the draft plan does
not address certain critical issues, including how vaccine for an influenza pandemic
will be purchased, distributed, and administered; how population groups will be
prioritized for vaccination; what quarantine authorities or travel restrictions may
need to be invoked; and how federal resources should be deployed. At the state level,
we found that most hospitals across the country lack the capacity to respond to
large-scale infectious disease outbreaks.
HHS’s Pandemic Influenza Plan Remains in Draft and Leaves Many Important
Issues Unresolved
In August 2004, HHS released its national pandemic influenza plan for comment.
The draft ‘‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan’’ describes HHS’s
role in coordinating a national response to an influenza pandemic and provides
guidance and tools to promote pandemic preparedness planning and coordination at
the federal, state, and local levels, including both the public and the private sectors.
However, as of May 23, 2005, this document remained in draft form. Further, al-
though the plan is comprehensive in scope, it leaves many important decisions unre-
solved about the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines. For exam-
ple, some decisions yet to be made include determining the public- versus private-
sector roles in the purchase and distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines; the di-
vision of responsibility between the federal government and the states for vaccine
distribution; and how population groups will be prioritized and targeted to receive
limited supplies of vaccines. Until these key decisions are made, public health offi-
cials at all levels may find it difficult to plan for an influenza pandemic, and the
timeliness and adequacy of response efforts may be compromised.
The draft plan does not establish a definitive federal role in the purchase and dis-
tribution of vaccines during an influenza pandemic. Instead, HHS provides options
for vaccine purchase and distribution that include public-sector purchase and dis-
tribution of all pandemic influenza vaccine; a mixed public-private system where
public-sector supply may be targeted to specific priority groups; and maintenance
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20 During the 2004-2005 influenza season, the license for a third manufacturer was suspended
by British regulatory authorities due to safety concerns with the vaccine.
of the current largely private system. In its draft plan, HHS does not recommend
a specific alternative.
Furthermore, the draft plan delegates to the states responsibility for distribution
of vaccine. The lack of a clearly defined federal role in distribution complicates pan-
demic planning for the states. Furthermore, among the current state pandemic in-
fluenza plans, there is no consistency in terms of their procurement and distribution
of vaccine and the relative role of the federal government. Approximately half of the
states handle procurement and distribution of the annual influenza vaccine through
the state health agency. The remainder either operate through a third-party con-
tractor for distribution to providers or use a combination of these two approaches.
Challenges Persist in Ensuring an Adequate and Timely Influenza Vaccine Supply
Challenges persist in ensuring an adequate and timely influenza vaccine supply.
The number of producers remains limited, and the potential for manufacturing prob-
lems such as those experienced during the 2004-2005 influenza season is still
present. When one manufacturer’s production is affected, providers who order vac-
cine from that manufacturer can experience shortages, while providers who receive
supplies from another manufacturer may have all the vaccine they need. The alloca-
tion plan CDC developed for this past season’s shortage was dependent upon vol-
untary compliance by the private sector and individuals to forgo vaccination. Most
annual influenza vaccine distribution and administration are accomplished within
the private sector, with relatively small amounts of vaccine purchased and distrib-
uted by CDC or by state and local health departments. In the United States, 85 per-
cent of vaccine doses are purchased by the private sector, such as private physicians
and pharmacies. HHS has not yet determined how influenza vaccine will be distrib-
uted and administered during an influenza pandemic.
There are many issues surrounding the production of influenza vaccine, which
will only become exacerbated during an influenza pandemic. Vaccines, which are
considered the first line of defense to prevent or reduce influenza-related illness and
death, may be unavailable or in short supply. Producing the vaccine is a complex
process that involves growing viruses in millions of fertilized chicken eggs. Experi-
ence has shown that the vaccine production cycle takes at least 6 to 8 months after
a virus strain has been identified, and vaccines for some influenza strains have been
difficult to mass-produce, causing further delay. The lengthy process for developing
a vaccine may mean that a vaccine would not be available during the initial stages
of a pandemic.
Vaccine shortages during the 2004-2005 influenza season have highlighted the
fragility of the influenza vaccine market and the need for its expansion and sta-
bilization. Currently only two manufacturers are licensed to sell their vaccine in the
United States.20 Maintaining an influenza vaccine supply is critically important for
protecting the public’s health and improving our preparedness for an influenza pan-
demic. As a result, according to CDC officials, the agency plans to alleviate the im-
pact of next year’s influenza season by taking aggressive steps to ensure an ex-
panded influenza supply to protect the nation. To this end, the agency’s fiscal year
2006 budget request includes an increase of $30 million for CDC to enter into guar-
anteed purchase contracts with vaccine manufacturers to ensure the production of
bulk monovalent influenza vaccine. If supplies fall short, this bulk product can be
turned into a finished trivalent influenza vaccine product for annual distribution.
If supplies are sufficient, the bulk vaccine can be held until the following year’s in-
fluenza season and developed into vaccines if the circulating strains remain the
same. In addition, according to CDC, this guarantee will help to expand the influ-
enza market by providing an incentive to manufacturers to expand capacity and
possibly encourage additional manufacturers to enter the market. In addition, the
fiscal year 2006 budget request includes an increase of $20 million to support influ-
enza vaccine purchase activities.
Even if sufficient quantities of the vaccine are produced in time, vaccines against
various strains differ in their ability to produce the immune response necessary to
provide effective protection against the disease. Studies show that it is uncertain
how effective a vaccine will be in preventing or controlling the spread of a pandemic
influenza virus.
Challenges Persist in Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Antiviral Drugs
Early in an influenza pandemic, especially before a vaccine is available or during
a period of limited vaccine supply, use of antiviral drugs may have a significant ef-
fect. Specifically, antiviral drugs can help prevent or mitigate the number of influ-
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21 In the United States, the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, a fed-
eral advisory committee made up of 14 infection control experts, develops recommendations and
guidelines regarding general infectious disease control measures for CDC. Expert recommenda-
tions include (1) case identification and contact tracing, which involves defining what symptoms,
laboratory results, and medical histories constitute a positive case in a patient and tracing and
tracking individuals who may have been exposed to these patients; (2) transmission control,
which involves controlling the transmission of disease-producing microorganisms through use of
proper hand hygiene and personal protective equipment, such as masks, gowns, and gloves; and
(3) exposure management, which involves separating infected and noninfected individuals.
22 Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 264.
23 See 42 C.F.R pts 70 and 71; 21 C.F.R. pts 1240 and 1250.
24 See GAO, Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving, but Much Remains to
be Accomplished, GAO-04-458T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
enza-related deaths until an influenza vaccine becomes available. They can be used
against all strains of pandemic influenza and have immediate availability as both
a prophylactic to prevent illness and as a treatment if administered within 48 hours
of the onset of symptoms. According to HHS, analysis is ongoing to define optimal
antiviral use strategies, potential health impacts, and cost-effectiveness of antiviral
drugs in the setting of a pandemic.
The United States has a limited supply of influenza antiviral medications stored
for an influenza pandemic. HHS officials expect the amount produced will be below
demand during a pandemic. This assumption, supported by drug manufacturers, is
based on the fact that current production levels of antiviral drugs are set in re-
sponse to current demand, whereas demand in a pandemic is expected to increase
significantly if vaccines are unavailable. In addition, the production of antiviral
medications cannot be rapidly expanded and involves a long production process—
at least 6 to 9 months. Moreover, sometimes influenza virus strains can become re-
sistant to one or more of the four approved influenza antiviral drugs, and thus the
drugs may not always work. For example, the influenza A (H5N1) viruses identified
in human patients in Asia in 2004 and 2005 have been resistant to two of the four
antiviral drugs, amantadine and rimantadine.
Implementation of Control Measures to Prevent Spread of Pandemic Influenza
Present Difficulties
Another challenge in responding to an influenza pandemic involves implementing
certain control measures to prevent the spread of the disease. These control meas-
ures—case identification and contact tracing, transmission control, and exposure
management—are well-established and have proved effective in both health care
and community settings.21 Federal attempts to limit the spread of SARS into the
United States by advising passengers who traveled to infected countries faced mul-
tiple obstacles. For example, due to airline concerns over authority and privacy, as
well as procedural constraints, CDC was unable to obtain passenger contact infor-
mation it needed to trace travelers. Although HHS has statutory authority to pre-
vent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from for-
eign countries into the United States,22 HHS regulations implementing the statute
do not specifically provide for HHS to obtain passenger manifests or other passenger
contact information from airlines and shipping companies for disease outbreak con-
trol purposes.23
Most Hospitals Lack the Capacity to Respond to Large-Scale Infectious Disease Out-
breaks
A challenge identified during the SARS outbreak that may also affect response
efforts during an influenza pandemic is lack of sufficient hospital and workforce ca-
pacity. This lack could be exacerbated during an influenza pandemic, compared to
other natural disasters, such as a tornado or hurricane, or an intentional release
of a bioterrorist agent, because it is likely that a pandemic would result in both
widespread and sustained effects.
Public health officials we spoke with said a large-scale outbreak, such as an influ-
enza pandemic, could strain the available capacity of hospitals by requiring the use
of entire hospital sections (along with their staff) to be used as isolation facilities.
As we have reported earlier, most states lack ‘‘surge capacity,’’ that is, the capacity
to respond to the large influx of patients that could occur during a large public
health emergency.24 For example, few states reported that they had the capacity to
evaluate, diagnose, and treat 500 or more patients involved in a single incident. In
addition, few states reported having the capacity to rapidly establish clinics to im-
munize or provide treatment to large numbers of patients. Moreover, a shortage in
workforce could increase during an influenza pandemic because higher disease rates
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could result in high rates of absenteeism among health care workers who are likely
to be at increased risk of exposure and illness.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There are a number of systems in place to identify influenza outbreaks abroad,
to alert us to a pandemic, and these systems generally appear to be working well.
HHS has taken important steps to enhance surveillance and to fund initiatives for
preparedness and response, including steps to increase the vaccine supply.
However, important challenges remain in our preparedness to respond, should an
influenza pandemic occur in the United States. The steps HHS is taking to address
vaccine production capacity and stockpiling of antiviral drugs may not be in place
in time to fill the current gaps in preparedness should an influenza pandemic occur
in the next several years. As we learned in the 2004-2005 influenza season, prob-
lems affecting even a single manufacturer can produce major shortages. Once a pan-
demic influenza strain is identified, a vaccine will take many months to produce,
and our current stockpile of antiviral drugs is insufficient to meet the likely de-
mand. Pandemic influenza would have major impacts on the ability of communities
to respond, businesses to function, and public safety to be maintained when commu-
nities across the country are simultaneously impacted and hospital capacity is over-
whelmed.
Since 2000, we have been urging the department to complete its pandemic plan.
A draft plan was issued in August 2004, with a 60-day period for public comment,
but as of this week, the plan had not been finalized. It is important for the federal
government and the states to work through issues such as how vaccine will be pur-
chased, distributed, and administered, how population groups will be prioritized for
vaccination, what quarantine authorities or travel restrictions may need to be in-
voked, and how federal resources should be deployed before we are in a time of cri-
sis.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to re-
spond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this
time.
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Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you very much. Dr. Pavia.
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STATEMENT OF ANDREW T. PAVIA
Mr. PAVIA. Yes. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for inviting the IDSA to make its opinion felt and
heard about pandemic influenza. I am Andrew Pavia. I am Chair
of the Infectious Diseases Society of America’s Taskforce on Pan-
demic Influenza and also professor of Pediatric Infectious Disease
and chief at the University of Utah.
IDSA, so that you know, represents over 8,000 infectious disease
experts, including all three of the members of the first panel and
soon to be Mr. Green’s daughter, who work in taking care of pa-
tients with the most severe infectious disease and conducting lab-
oratory research and in public health. And let me be very clear
that although this is a mixed panel, I am speaking on behalf of the
physicians, our patients, and the public health.
Like everyone else who has spoken today, IDSA believes that the
next pandemic is inevitable, but more importantly, we believe that
the evidence suggests that it may be imminent. We don’t know
whether H5N1, Avian Flu, will be the next pandemic strain. We
don’t know how severe the next pandemic will be. We do know,
however, that it will occur, and we know that the severity is going
to be somewhere between severe and catastrophic.
For all that you have heard it is hard to overemphasize or exag-
gerate the potential impact of a pandemic. You heard the figures
for CDC’s estimate of the mortality and impact of a moderate pan-
demic. Their same estimates suggest that if we have a pandemic
with a virus that has the severity equivalent to 1918, that it would
result in between .9 and 2.2 million deaths and four to ten million
hospitalizations. Now, imagine the economic impact of paying for
four to ten million hospitalizations. And I am going to come back
to the economics a little bit because some of the countermeasures
require sufficient funding.
As we think about the economic impact, these figures have not
been fully worked out, but as was pointed out in yesterday’s ‘‘Wall
Street Journal’’ editorial and by several analysts, it is likely that
even a mild pandemic would bring global economies to a halt, it
would devastate the agriculture, and it would probably pose a
grave threat to national security. If you think about the costs that
we have seen from relatively mild epidemics before, consider SARS.
Fewer than 8,000 people were sickened and about 800 died, and yet
the estimate is that for countries affected in Southeast Asia, the
cost ranged between .2 and 1.8 percent of their GDP. The city of
Toronto lost over $1 billion alone. These are the kind of figures
that you need to think about when you think about the cost of the
countermeasures.
Now, I want to be very clear that pandemic influenza has re-
ceived a great deal of attention from the government, from Con-
gress, and we are very grateful. And you have heard a great deal
about what is being done at the Federal Government level in the
earlier panel. And I want to point out that NVPO in particular has
taken a leadership position in this, and that is very, very impor-
tant. However, as of today, the IDSA believes that the United
States is woefully unprepared for a pandemic that might occur in
the next few years.
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We have many recommendations in our written testimony, and
I am going to focus my remaining comments on areas where sci-
entists alone can’t deal with the problem, and it requires activity
by policymakers. The first and foremost is adequate funding of our
public health efforts. And IDSA has recommended not only restor-
ing the cuts in the CDC budget, but appropriate increases. And I
think that that goes across the board for our public health infra-
structure.
Many have pointed out the fragility of our vaccine supply as
highlighted by the events of last fall. But I think what we haven’t
emphasized is that the capacity to produce vaccine is really the
critical issue. And the same holds true for antivirals. It is assumed
by most experts in the event of a crisis we are going to be totally
dependent on what can be produced domestically. And if we look
at the capacity to produce vaccine domestically, we can make be-
tween 60 and 70 million doses of trivalent vaccine. That means
that perhaps with a monovalent vaccine we could produce 180 mil-
lion doses after a lag time of about 6 months and a year to produce
that 180 million doses. The estimate is we would need two doses
for every man, woman, and child in the United States, or 600 mil-
lion doses. Clearly, we are either going to have to dramatically in-
crease the capacity to produce vaccine or the efficiency with which
it can be produced or the number of people we can immunize with
a given amount of vaccine.
To that end a great deal of progress has been made. You have
heard from HHS and from NIH about the beginnings of programs
to fund improvements in the efficacy of vaccine production and
ways to look at antigen-sparing techniques that would use less vac-
cine. I think that if we look at it objectively, when my question,
whether it is too little and whether it might be too late, but in
order to have a robust response we need more capacity to produce
vaccine domestically. That means we need a dramatically greater
use of vaccine year-in, year-out. And to that end I think that Con-
gress can have a role in increasing incentives for companies to
enter the vaccine market so that we have a more diverse produc-
tion and that we use more vaccine in every year.
Now, I think it is also worth pointing out that every dollar we
spend on countermeasures for pandemic flu—I promise this isn’t
Avian Influenza—no coughing—that every dollar we spend on pan-
demic flu will yield an annual benefit in preventing lives lost for
our yearly flu epidemics.
I want to turn our attention for a moment to stockpile. That has
come up before. And I have to respectfully disagree with what Dr.
Gerberding said earlier. An expert panel that is advising the Na-
tional Vaccine Advisory Committee that will go into the pandemic
plan feels that in the first 6 months of an epidemic the use of
antivirals will be a major tool that we have, if not the only tool,
to decrease morbidity and mortality and to allow the vital functions
of government and of the healthcare system to continue.
To that end we need to have an adequate stockpile. IDSA’s lead-
ership, perhaps as a strawman, has suggested that we purchase
enough antivirals to treat 50 percent of the United States popu-
lation. Now, we know that our allies in Europe have planned on
purchasing enough to treat between 20 and 25 percent. All of these
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numbers are crudely derived. There are more scientific efforts un-
derway to figure out what the actual need would be. But it will
likely range between 60 million and 150 million doses. The 2.3 mil-
lion doses we have in the U.S. stockpile currently are clearly inad-
equate.
The cost of purchasing antivirals for the stockpile is going to be
considerable. It can’t be redirected from existing health resources.
It can’t be redirected from within HHS. And it is going to require
considerable outside appropriation. But as I hope I have made
clear, the costs of not doing something will far exceed the cost of
developing a stockpile.
Another issue that is important is that the entire production of
oseltamivir or Tamiflu, as of today, is made in Switzerland. And as
I mentioned earlier, it may not be available to the United States
in a time of crisis.
A question was asked about indemnification earlier. We have
learned from past experiences that in 1976 that the manufacturers
were reluctant to release vaccine in the absence of liability produc-
tions. We learned 2 years ago in the attempts to provide small pox
immunization that hospitals and providers were reluctant to give
small pox vaccine without having some form of indemnification
against problems that arose.
And a third problem is how are we going to compensate people
who might be injured by an experimental vaccine? Clearly, we need
to have some sort of vaccine injury compensation coverage for a
pandemic vaccine.
Mr. FERGUSON. Dr. Pavia, I am just going to ask you to summa-
rize, please.
Mr. PAVIA. Very good. I am going to stop my comments there.
You can tell that I am a professor and used to having the floor.
Only slightly worse, I suppose, than being a member. But thank
you very much for having us and for the attention and the exper-
tise that you bring today.
[The prepared statement of Andrew T. Pavia follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDREW T. PAVIA, INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOCIETY OF
AMERICA
Chairman Deal, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the House Energy and
Commerce Health Subcommittee, thank you for inviting the Infectious Diseases So-
ciety of America (IDSA) to present our views on the U.S. preparedness for pandemic
influenza and to allow us to share with you our perspective on activities needed to
strengthen the nation’s current approach. I am Dr. Andrew T. Pavia, chair of IDSA’s
Task Force on Pandemic Influenza, and professor and chief of the Division of Pedi-
atric Infectious Diseases at the University of Utah Health Sciences Center and Pri-
mary Children’s Hospital.
IDSA represents nearly 8,000 infectious disease (ID) experts, many of whom ad-
minister the flu vaccine to patients, treat life-threatening complications of influenza,
conduct vaccine and antiviral research, and implement influenza surveillance activi-
ties and other important influenza public health programs at the local, state, and
federal levels. Let me be very clear from the onset: Although we are speaking on
the same panel as our industry colleagues, our testimony is provided strictly for the
good of public health and the patients whom we treat. IDSA is not here on behalf
of the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industries nor is our advocacy financed in
any way by industry.
IDSA IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEXT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
Like our colleagues in federal government, we believe that the next influenza pan-
demic is imminent. These predictions are primarily based upon the historic intervals
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between outbreaks as well as the increased spread and ominous behavior of the
H5N1 avian influenza virus, which now is endemic among birds in much of Asia.
We are very concerned that the H5N1 avian virus has shown the ability to mutate
and has become capable of infecting mammals, including pigs, tigers, cats, and hu-
mans as well as birds. At least 97 confirmed human cases of H5N1 infections have
been documented by the World Health Organization (WHO) since January 2004
with 53 deaths. A recent WHO consultants meeting found evidence of further muta-
tion and a suggestion that person-to-person transmission might be occurring in
Northern Vietnam. Should the virus become readily transmissible from human to
human, the disease could easily spread beyond Asia’s borders and initiate a global
pandemic. The U.S. population has no immunity and therefore no protection against
this deadly virus. Implications of Pandemic Influenza for the United States
The impact of a pandemic influenza outbreak cannot be overemphasized. During
the past century, influenza pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968, with sig-
nificant morbidity and mortality in both high-risk and healthy children and adults.
These outbreaks cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Historians
now estimate that between 50 million and 100 million people died as a result of the
1918 influenza pandemic alone. More than half a million Americans died, many of
them young adults in the prime of life. Although the 1956 and 1968 pandemics were
not as severe, the current mortality rate among patients with H5N1 influenza is
more than 50 percent compared with 2.5 to 5 percent for the disastrous 1918 pan-
demic virus. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has estimated
that a pandemic as severe as the 1918 pandemic would cause between 0.9 and 2.2
million deaths and 4 million to 10 million hospitalizations in the United States.
The next pandemic will cause much economic and social chaos. There will be a
dramatic impact on the U.S. and global economies, and potentially on civil order and
international security. Consider the billions of dollars of economic impact of the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic. SARS was trivial in size and
scope compared with even a modest flu pandemic.
UNITED STATES IS NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED
Congress and the Administration have begun to realize the real threat that influ-
enza poses to the United States as evident by the allocation of additional monies
for influenza activities in recent years. The Administration has proposed an addi-
tional $120 million for influenza preparedness activities in the fiscal year 2006
budget to further strengthen pandemic influenza preparedness efforts. While wel-
come, this is a small investment. Additionally, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) recently proposed a thoughtful and scientifically based draft
pandemic preparedness and response plan that lays out public health measures to
counter a sudden worldwide influenza epidemic. IDSA has provided extensive com-
ments on the plan and currently is participating on an HHS workgroup to develop
specific policies and improve preparedness. CDC has worked to strengthen its sci-
entific and epidemiologic capacity to respond. The National Institutes of Health
(NIH) has begun efforts to develop vaccine for avian influenza and has increased
support for other basic research.
IDSA recognizes and appreciates the increasing level of federal support for U.S.
preparedness efforts. However, IDSA agrees with the Institute of Medicine and vir-
tually all experts who have concluded that the United States is at present woefully
unprepared to respond to the next flu pandemic.
Two promising strategies can decrease the impact of a flu pandemic. Vaccination
is the primary strategy to prevent influenza during normal years and during a pan-
demic. The recent shortage of flu vaccine highlights the fragility of our nation’s vac-
cine supply. We clearly need a greater capacity to produce vaccine. This means we
must attract more vaccine manufacturers to produce influenza vaccine within our
borders. It has been estimated that vaccinating the U.S. population against a pan-
demic flu strain might require 600 million doses of vaccine (two doses for each per-
son might be needed). Even in a normal year, only 50 million to 60 million doses
of vaccine can be manufactured in the United States. Counting doses of vaccine im-
ported from abroad, about 90 million doses are used. In the best case, it will take
four to six months to begin to produce a pandemic influenza vaccine. Unfortunately,
only three influenza vaccine manufacturers currently produce flu vaccines for the
U.S. market; only one of them produces its vaccine within the United States.
Antiviral drugs would be the only available agents for treatment and prevention
in the early phase of a pandemic. However, adequate supplies will not be available
unless decisive action is taken. Global production of these agents is modest. If
antivirals are to be available in an emergency they would need to be stockpiled in
advance.
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Strengthening our pandemic influenza preparedness activities also will provide
significant benefits during the typical ‘‘interpandemic’’ flu season when 36,000
American lives are lost and 200,000 are hospitalized each year. The same cannot
be said for preparedness activities for intentional biological emergencies such as
smallpox, which does not exist in nature, or anthrax, which is an extremely rare
disease.
POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS
Considering the significance of the threat, IDSA has identified the following short
and long term strategies to strengthen the U.S. level of preparedness and response
to both interpandemic and pandemic influenza.
Secure vaccine and antiviral supplies.
Adequate supplies of antivirals and if possible vaccine, need to be in place before
a pandemic strikes, along with a plan to distribute them. More must be done to
bring additional manufacturers into the vaccine business, particularly to develop do-
mestic based companies so that the United States is not dependent on foreign sup-
pliers. Increased use of vaccine during interpandemic years is needed to increase the
manufacturing capacity. Without this strengthened capacity, we will be unable to
meet the high demand that will occur during an influenza pandemic.
Stockpiles of antiviral drugs are also essential. IDSA has proposed a stockpile of
antivirals sufficient to treat 50 percent of the U.S. population. This stockpile will
help to reduce mortality and allow vital services such as medical care and emer-
gency services to continue. Clearly, the current stockpile, which could treat less
than 2 percent of the U.S. population, is inadequate. The cost of developing an ade-
quate stockpile cannot be paid for by shifting funds within HHS agencies; it will
require a separate appropriation. Given the enormous burden of illness and death
anticipated in a pandemic, however, this investment promises an excellent return.
In addition, the entire production capacity for oseltamivir is located in Switzerland.
As with influenza vaccines, IDSA fully supports the development of antiviral pro-
duction capacities within the United States.
It is essential that we develop a specific strategy to distribute antiviral drugs and
vaccines to states, local health departments, and points-of-care. We support the ef-
fort currently underway by the Pandemic Influenza Working Group of the National
Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) to provide detailed estimates of the priorities
for use of antivirals and the amount of drug needed to reach different target groups.
This will provide more precise estimates of the size and cost of a stockpile needed
to provide a specific level of benefit.
Advance Research and Development of Antivirals and Vaccines.
Current manufacturing of influenza vaccine depends on egg-based technology that
is 60 years old. It imposes limits on the ability to ramp up production and to work
with strains that are lethal to eggs. Research and development of newer vaccines
is vital. NIH has recently outlined funding for work on cell-culture based vaccine
and for antigen-sparing approaches. These are vital efforts and should be acceler-
ated. Equal attention needs to be paid to our ability to rapidly and safely license
new technologies to produce new vaccines for widespread use. Truly innovative vac-
cines could be developed that do not need to be redesigned each year. Investment
in this research could be extremely important but will take many years to realize
a benefit.
Research also is needed to develop new antivirals with anti-influenza activity. We
are currently dependent on a single agent, oseltamavir (also known as Tamiflu, an
antiviral produced by Roche Pharmaceuticals). In the event H5N1 becomes a pan-
demic strain, this vulnerability will be dangerous.
Create tax incentives for U.S. vaccine and antiviral manufacturers.
The United States does not have the manufacturing capacity to produce enough
vaccine and antivirals to meet its needs in a pandemic. Tax credits should be offered
to encourage companies to build new manufacturing facilities in this country so that
the United States is not dependent on foreign suppliers. Tax incentives and patent
extensions should be available for companies that conduct research and develop new
anti-flu therapies.
Guarantee a market for influenza vaccines.
Most pharmaceutical companies have left the vaccine business because demand
is extremely unpredictable. Even last season, when there was a severe shortage of
vaccine, millions of doses of flu vaccine went unused. To secure vaccine supplies for
future influenza outbreaks, the government needs to guarantee it will buy a set
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
64
amount of vaccine each season, and buy back a percentage of unsold vaccine at the
end of each season.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) also has a critical role to
play. The recent increase in the Medicare reimbursement for administration of flu
vaccine, although long overdue, was a positive step. However, the current system
still places physicians at financial risk, which may have consequences for patient
access to vaccine. Physicians must purchase vaccine annually in advance of the flu
season. Unused vaccine is then discarded at the end of the flu season. Physicians
are not compensated for the unused product, which, of course, may make them less
inclined to purchase vaccine in advance in future years. As all Medicare bene-
ficiaries should receive annual influenza vaccine, CMS should consider how to pur-
chase enough vaccine for Medicare patients in a manner that does not place physi-
cians at risk.
Strengthen liability protection during emergency outbreak response.
In case of a declared influenza emergency, it will be vital to immunize and treat
large numbers of people. Even rare adverse reactions following vaccination and
treatment would become more common when hundreds of millions are treated, and
accelerated approval of new vaccines and treatments might not uncover all rare ad-
verse events. Health care workers and medical facilities administering vaccines or
treatments, as well as the companies that make them, should be protected from law-
suits stemming from adverse events so long as they follow standard medical and
manufacturing procedures. A compensation fund similar in structure to the Vaccine
Injury Compensation Fund should be established to cover the medical costs and lost
earnings of anyone who develops complications due to vaccination or treatment.
Improve coordination, communication, and planning.
Many federal, state, and local agencies have vital roles in preparedness, planning,
and response. HHS should develop a detailed plan to coordinate pandemic response
at all levels, from local to national to international, including links between federal
authorities and clinicians throughout the country. HHS should also define CDC as
the coordinating authority within the department. Moreover, there needs to be a
clear ability to coordinate efforts between departments, including not only HHS, but
also Defense, Agriculture (USDA), Homeland Security, and State.
Require health care workers to be vaccinated.
Unfortunately, health care workers caring for sick people often spread patients’
infections. In 2002, only 36 percent of U.S. health care workers received influenza
vaccine. To improve patient safety, prevent unnecessary deaths and disease, and
provide an example to patients, we believe that annual flu vaccination should be re-
quired for all health care workers who have contact with patients, with options to
waive vaccination after signing an appropriate waiver.
Strengthen education.
Health care workers and the public need to better understand the seriousness and
potential impact of an influenza pandemic, as well as how to prevent and treat it.
Commit to international pandemic preparedness.
A coordinated international effort is vital. The United States should work with
other countries, particularly those most vulnerable, on plans to ensure that they
have sufficient antiviral and vaccine supplies to protect their populations.
Strengthen the response of federal agencies.
The Food and Drug Administration should ‘‘fast-track’’ vaccine and antiviral re-
view, and streamline regulation of the manufacturing process. Congress should in-
crease the CDC’s budget for global surveillance to detect influenza strains with pan-
demic potential. The NIH budget also should be increased for research to identify
and evaluate new methods to accelerate vaccine research and development. USDA
should develop a plan for culling poultry or other livestock and compensating farm-
ers in the event of a pandemic, if necessary.
CONCLUSION
The United States remains unprepared for pandemic influenza that could kill mil-
lions of Americans over a short period of time with little warning. We may not have
much time. The United States needs a rational, integrated, and comprehensive plan
that will ensure an effective response. We also need a better-coordinated approach,
both domestically and globally. If IDSA’s recommendations are implemented, our
nation will be better prepared for both the next pandemic and for influenza out-
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breaks that occur every year. As Winston Churchill said: ‘‘It is not enough to say,
‘We are doing our best.’ You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary.’’
IDSA appreciates the opportunity to testify before the House Energy and Com-
merce Health Subcommittee today. We look forward to working with you in the com-
ing months to develop federal legislation needed to strengthen U.S. efforts to pre-
pare for the next influenza pandemic.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. FERGUSON. You are definitely in the right room. Mr.
Hosbach.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP HOSBACH
Mr. HOSBACH. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and
more importantly, for holding this critically important hearing.
Sanofi pasteur is committed to working with the Federal Govern-
ment to develop a safe and effective pandemic vaccine to protect
the American public. Today I would like to outline four necessary
steps to develop and administer a pandemic influenza vaccine.
Sanofi pasteur is the world’s largest influenza vaccine manufac-
turer. We produce vaccines against more than 20 diseases. World-
wide we distribute almost one billion doses of vaccine annually.
Our U.S. operations are located in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania where
influenza vaccine has been produced for more than 30 years. Ap-
proximately 95 percent of that influenza vaccine that is made in
Swiftwater is used exclusively in the United States.
In the past decade sanofi pasteur has steadily increased U.S. pro-
duction of influenza vaccine. Last year we produced 58 million
doses. We are in the final design stages of our influenza vaccine fa-
cility expansion and we also recently invested in a new expanded
filling and packaging facility. Both of these projects will signifi-
cantly expand our U.S. influenza vaccine production and capacity.
As most of you know, vaccines by their very nature are chal-
lenging to develop, produce, and distribute. We believe the exper-
tise of vaccine manufacturers, particularly those with a track
record in influenza vaccine production and distribution should be
utilized early in the planning process.
The enormous public health threat posed by a pandemic prompt-
ed sanofi pasteur to take specific steps for a comprehensive pan-
demic strategy, including the formation of a global working group
to examine preparedness, production, distribution, and communica-
tion issues. We have cooperated with HHS exchanging ideas on
how best to prepare for and respond to a pandemic.
In addition, we entered into several contracts with the Federal
Government. We received two H5N1 pandemic influenza vaccine
contracts, as mentioned by Dr. Fauci. In accordance with these
agreements, we delivered 8,000 investigational doses of H5N1 vac-
cine to NIH for the clinical trials that have already started. We
also produced two million H5N1 bulk doses at large scale.
Sanofi pasteur also received a contract to establish and maintain
flocks of egg-laying hens on a year-round basis. As you know, eggs
are utilized early in the stages of vaccine production, and prior to
this agreement, were only available on a seasonal basis. Finally,
sanofi pasteur was awarded a contract to speed development of a
cell culture influenza vaccine in the United States.
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Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the increased attention
pandemic planning is receiving from the government, industry,
international agencies, and key stakeholders. However, the failure
to address critical challenges could aversely affect our ability to re-
spond to a pandemic. I would like to outline four steps necessary
to develop and administer a pandemic influenza vaccine.
First, we need to steadily increase inter-pandemic immunization
rates. Manufacturers will produce additional vaccine to meet
predicatble demand. Steady and sustained increase in inter-pan-
demic demand will give manufacturers the confidence to continue
expansion plans and new companies an incentive to enter the mar-
ketplace. To achieve this all key stakeholders need to work to-
gether to encourage higher influenza immunization rates. As a Na-
tion, we have never immunized more than 85 million people in any
given year. We can and must do better.
Second, we need to ensure proper combination of private and
public sector distribution of a vaccine in a pandemic. While it will
be important to establish mechanisms for mass immunizations in
public clinics, private physicians’ offices will also play a key role in
a pandemic. During a typical influenza season, the private sector
distributes over 85 percent of the Nation’s supply. The private mar-
ket itself provides maximum flexibility in vaccine distribution.
Last year’s influenza vaccine shortage illustrated sanofi pasteur’s
unique expertise in shipping product to any U.S. location within 24
to 48 hours. We ship vaccines to any users in accordance with the
CDC’s recommendations and distribution plan. Our unprecedented
collaboration with the CDC underscores our commitment to Amer-
ica’s public health.
Third, vaccine liability protection is another critical issue in pan-
demic preparedness. A special compensation liability protection
program will need to be established similar to the 1976 Swine Flu
and 2002 small pox models. The pandemic liability program should
be distinct and separate from the existing Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program and should focus exclusively on a monovalent
influenza vaccine. Failure to offer liability protection could have
profound implications for the development, testing, and subsequent
licensure and administration of doses of vaccine. It is important to
address liability before a health emergency arises. We urge Con-
gress to establish liability protections as strong as those afforded
providers of small pox vaccine under the Homeland Security Act of
2002. Strong and effective vaccine liability provisions ensure that
manufacturers can bring a pandemic vaccine to market as quickly
as possible.
Finally, CDC must continue to build a pediatric vaccine stock-
pile. I think many of the members of the panel have already spo-
ken about that. Let me reiterate, when an influenza pandemic
strikes the United States, sanofi pasteur will have to shift per-
sonnel and other resources away from routine vaccine production
to optimize production of a monovalent pandemic influenza vaccine.
Congress has appropriated funds to establish stockpiles of routine
childhood vaccines to be used in case of a disruption in supply, but
most funds remain unused. And I won’t go into any further detail
because I think we have further details there.
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But finally, sanofi pasteur is committed to protecting America’s
public health in the fight against influenza through immunization.
We want to commend Congress and the administration for dedi-
cating time and resources to this critical area. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Phillip Hosbach follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP HOSBACH, VICE PRESIDENT, IMMUNIZATION POLICY
AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, SANOFI PASTEUR
On behalf of sanofi pasteur, thank you for the opportunity to testify today before
the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health. Sanofi pasteur is committed
to working with the federal government to develop a safe and effective vaccine to
protect the American public in the event of an influenza pandemic. Our common
goal is to provide sufficient vaccine for 300 million Americans within the first 12-
to 18-month period of a pandemic, and we welcome the chance to provide the com-
mittee with our perspective on this important public health issue.
Sanofi pasteur, the world’s largest influenza vaccine manufacturer, also manufac-
tures vaccines against more than 20 different diseases. Worldwide, we produce al-
most 1 billion doses of vaccines annually. The company, which employs more than
9,000 employees worldwide, is headquartered in Lyon, France. Sanofi pasteur’s US
operations are located in the Pocono Mountains in Swiftwater, Pa., at a site where
vaccine has been produced for more than 100 years. Influenza vaccine has been pro-
duced in this facility for more than 30 years and 95% of this vaccine is used exclu-
sively to supply the United States. Sanofi pasteur also has an influenza vaccine pro-
duction facility in France that supplies other markets.
During the past decade, sanofi pasteur has reliably and consistently increased
production of influenza vaccine in the US. Last year, we produced 58 million doses
for the US market. We continue to expand our vaccine manufacturing capacity in
Pennsylvania and have embarked on the largest infrastructure investment in the
company’s history, spending almost $80 million to build a new formulation and fill-
ing facility. We are also in the final design phases of our influenza vaccine facility
expansion, which will significantly increase our US production capabilities.
PANDEMIC OVERVIEW
An influenza pandemic is a global epidemic that has the potential for severe mor-
bidity and mortality.
Three influenza pandemics occurred during the 20th century: the 1918-1919 Span-
ish flu pandemic, the 1957 Asian flu pandemic and the 1968 Hong Kong flu pan-
demic. The Spanish flu pandemic was the most severe, causing over 500,000 deaths
in the US and an estimated 20 to 40 million deaths worldwide.
The prospect of a pandemic is taking on increasing urgency because of the emer-
gence of an H5N1 avian influenza strain in Southeast Asia 17 months ago. It con-
tinues to circulate and has the potential to mutate and become a human pandemic
strain. To date, it has infected at least 97 people and killed more than half of its
victims.1 This is a completely new strain and epidemiologists believe the American
population would be at risk if it spreads between humans.
Many experts believe that if this H5N1 virus sparks the next pandemic, it would
most closely resemble the 1918 pandemic in terms of morbidity and mortality.2
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the next pandemic is likely
to result in 1 to 2.3 million hospitalizations and 280,000 to 650,000 deaths in indus-
trialized nations alone. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
estimated that as many as 207,000 Americans could die and up to 734,000 could
be hospitalized during the next pandemic. Other estimates are even higher. Studies
have estimated the costs of an influenza pandemic in the US between $71 billion
and $166.5 billion. These estimates include only direct costs of medical care and in-
direct costs of lost productivity and mortality rates. Some experts have predicted
that a major pandemic could bring the global economy to a halt.3
Sanofi pasteur recognizes the urgency of adequate preparation for a pandemic
event and is taking steps to be ready.
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PROGRESS TO DATE
We believe the expertise of vaccine manufacturers, particularly those with a track
record in influenza vaccine production and distribution, should be utilized early in
the planning process. Vaccines, by their very nature, are challenging to develop,
produce and distribute. Manufacturers have a unique understanding of these chal-
lenges and can provide valuable process and policy input. Our knowledge and expe-
rience with the complexities of vaccine supply make industry an essential partner
in pandemic planning and policy formulation.
The enormous public health threat posed by a potential pandemic prompted sanofi
pasteur to re-examine our internal pandemic planning process. We have taken spe-
cific and deliberate steps toward a comprehensive pandemic strategy. We formed a
global working group to examine preparedness, development, communications and
legal issues. In the US, we have worked in cooperation with the US Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to exchange ideas on how best to prepare for
and respond to a pandemic influenza outbreak, and have provided significant input
into the initial draft of its pandemic plan.
We have moved forward with clinical research and vaccine production because of
important funding provided by Congress and the Administration. In May 2004,
sanofi pasteur entered into the first of four pandemic agreements with the US gov-
ernment. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) con-
tracted with us to produce an investigational influenza vaccine based on the cur-
rently circulating H5N1 avian influenza virus strain. On March 10, 2005, in accord-
ance with that agreement, sanofi pasteur delivered more than 8,000 investigational
doses, which currently are being used in NIH-conducted clinical trials.
In September 2004, the company was awarded a second contract by HHS to
produce two million bulk doses of an attenuated version of the same H5N1 avian
influenza virus strain of vaccine. This contract represents an important step in gain-
ing experience producing pandemic influenza vaccine on a large scale. This is crit-
ical because scale-up presents unique challenges in vaccine production. Part of our
agreement is to determine the stability of this vaccine, which is important for un-
derstanding our ability to establish an H5N1 reserve.
Sanofi pasteur subsequently entered into a third agreement with HHS to estab-
lish and maintain flocks of egg-laying hens and to maintain other essential supplies.
The goal is to ensure our ability to manufacture pandemic influenza vaccine at cur-
rent full capacity levels on a year-round basis. Until now, egg availability has ex-
isted only on a seasonal basis to support normal influenza vaccine production. The
agreement also calls for sanofi pasteur to manufacture, on an annual basis, inves-
tigational influenza vaccine of a candidate pandemic-like strain. Each year, HHS
will identify the strain to be used in the investigational lot and will provide the ref-
erence virus on which each investigational lot will be based. This will enable us to
gain experience working with various viral strains that might be similar to the next
pandemic strain.
Finally, in April 2005, sanofi pasteur was awarded a fourth contract from HHS.
This was to speed the development process for new cell culture influenza vaccines
in the US and to design a US-based cell culture influenza vaccine manufacturing
facility.
Required Action:
We are encouraged by the increased attention pandemic planning is receiving
from the US government, industry, international agencies and key stakeholders.
However, unresolved critical issues remain. The failure to address these challenges
could adversely affect our country’s ability to respond to a pandemic event.
I would like to briefly outline steps that should be taken to help the country bet-
ter prepare for a pandemic and minimize the effects should one occur.
A first step is to steadily increase interpandemic influenza immunization rates.
Manufacturers will respond to increased and predictable demand by producing addi-
tional vaccine to fulfill this demand.
This is important because our ability to produce and administer large quantities
of influenza vaccine during interpandemic periods will enable a more rapid response
during a pandemic. Increasing capacity in dedicated influenza vaccine production fa-
cilities and establishing an infrastructure that can deliver vaccine and immunize
large numbers of people in a short period of time is a key component of pandemic
preparedness.
To that end, Congress, industry and stakeholders need to work together to encour-
age higher influenza immunization rates in accordance with HHS’ Healthy People
2010 immunization goals. The objective is to immunize approximately 180 million
Americans. However, as a nation, we have never immunized more than 85 million
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people in any given year. This is unacceptable. A steady and sustained increase in
interpandemic demand would give current manufacturers the confidence to continue
expansion plans and new companies the incentive to enter the market.
Second, we need to ensure a proper combination of private and public sector dis-
tribution of vaccine in the event of a pandemic. We believe that while it will be im-
portant to establish mechanisms for mass immunizations and clinics, the private
physicians’ offices will continue to play a vital role as well. During a typical influ-
enza season, the private sector distributes more than 85% of the nation’s influenza
supply. The private market provides maximum flexibility in vaccine distribution and
allows us to reach large segments of the US population in their ‘‘medical homes.’’
This includes the elderly, who should not stand in long lines and may be more com-
fortable with their personal physicians.
Last year’s influenza vaccine shortage illustrated sanofi pasteur’s unique exper-
tise in processing and shipping product to virtually any location in the United
States within 24-48 hours. We shipped vaccines to end-users in accordance with the
CDC’s recommendations and distribution plan. Further, the unprecedented degree
of collaboration between sanofi pasteur and the CDC underscores our willingness to
work with public agencies to protect America’s public health. This year, sanofi pas-
teur has modified our ordering process to provide that, in the event of another
shortage, available vaccine reaches high-risk people first. All of our ‘‘pre-book’’ cus-
tomers are being asked to estimate what percentage of the vaccine they are request-
ing will be used for priority patients. The systems utilized to collect these data and
the ability to easily identify priority recipients, as specified by federal, state and
local governments, will be key in protecting the public health in the event of a pan-
demic. We also believe that there should be greater funding for coordinating commu-
nications between federal and state agencies and the private sector regarding vac-
cine allocation issues.
A third challenge is to continue to build pediatric stockpiles of all routinely rec-
ommended pediatric vaccines. When pandemic influenza strikes the United States,
sanofi pasteur will have to slow down routine production, filling, and packaging for
all other vaccines. We would have to shift personnel and other resources to optimize
production and release of a monovalent pandemic influenza vaccine. Thus, it is es-
sential that we resolve problems associated with the pediatric vaccine stockpile.
HHS has appropriated funds but they have not been spent.
You may have read The Washington Post article on April 17, 2005 entitled ‘‘Pedi-
atric Vaccine Stockpile at Risk.’’ It pointed out that only 13 million of the requested
41 million doses of pediatric vaccine have been stockpiled due to a Securities and
Exchange Commission rule that clarified standard accounting practices for a bill
and hold sale. As a result, what had been a 20-year routine practice of stockpiling
vaccines is no longer an option for sanofi pasteur. Over the last two years, we have
been actively engaged in discussions with the CDC to address the issue. We encour-
age the Committee to help resolve the issues that surround the establishment of
routine pediatric stockpiles in advance of a pandemic.
Pandemic influenza vaccine liability protection is another critical issue in pan-
demic preparedness. A special compensation and liability protection program will
need to be established similar to the 1976 swine flu and 2002 smallpox model. Li-
ability protection for companies is essential to ensure that manufacturers are able
to fully participate in the development and licensure of a pandemic vaccine. This
is of paramount importance. The new program should be completely distinct and
separate from the existing Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP). It should
focus exclusively on liability protection for a monovalent influenza pandemic vac-
cine, precisely the type of vaccine that will be produced in a pandemic event. The
failure to offer liability protection on a timely basis could have profound implications
for the actual testing and development of large-scale production of vaccine, leaving
the nation unprepared. It is important to address liability issues before a health
emergency arises. This ensures that pandemic vaccines will be developed, economic
costs will be mitigated, and the potential for needless and costly litigation will be
curtailed.
We strongly urge Congress to consider—and establish—liability protections that
are as strong as those afforded providers of smallpox vaccine under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Vaccine liability provisions ensure that we can bring a pan-
demic influenza vaccine to market as quickly as possible.
Sanofi pasteur is committed to protecting America’s public health in the fight
against influenza through vaccinations. We want to commend Congress and the Ad-
ministration for dedicating time and resources to this critical area. Thank you for
giving us the opportunity to express our views on this important issue.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you very much. Dr. Iacuzio.
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STATEMENT OF DOMINICK A. IACUZIO
Mr. IACUZIO. Mr. Chairman and the members of the sub-
committee, I am Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, Medical Director for
Tamiflu at Hoffmann-La Roche, a research-based pharmaceutical
company. Prior to joining Roche, I worked at the NIH National In-
stitute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases where I served as the
Respiratory Diseases Branch Principal Technical Advisor for the
Influenza Program. I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss the
role of antiviral drugs and pandemic influenza preparedness and
response, and I request that my full written testimony be sub-
mitted for the record.
As you have heard from the other witnesses today, pandemic in-
fluenza is one of our greatest public health threats. According to
the Department of Homeland Security, a potential consequence for
even a limited influenza pandemic could result in economic disrup-
tion, hospitalizations, and deaths far in excess of most terror attack
scenarios.
Efforts to prepare for the pandemic threat cannot rely on vac-
cines alone. It is widely recognized that antiviral drug stockpiling
is an important component of pandemic influenza preparedness.
The Infectious Diseases Society of America has recommended, as
you heard this morning, that the U.S. stockpile enough antiviral,
up to 50 percent of the U.S. population.
Roche’s Tamiflu is the leading prescription oral antiviral drug for
influenza. Tamiflu was approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration in 1999 for treatment of Type A and B influenza and in
2000 for influenza prophylaxis or prevention. Fortunately, Tamiflu
is well-tolerated with nausea and vomiting being most frequently
reported as the adverse events. The efficacy of Tamiflu against
Avian Influenza has been demonstrated by leading researchers and
animal studies, in vitro data, and practical experience during the
2003 Avian Influenza outbreak in the Netherlands of H7N7. Ac-
cording to the World Health Organization, they have recommended
use of Tamiflu to control the Avian Flu outbreaks in Asia.
Although the potential for resistance must be monitored care-
fully, no transmission of a Tamiflu-resistant virus in humans has
been detected to date. It is imperative that Tamiflu be stockpiled
in advance of a pandemic since inherent complexities in production
severely limit our capability, our ability, to rapidly meet large-
scale, unanticipated demand. The manufacturing process for
Tamiflu takes 8 to 12 months from raw materials to finished prod-
uct. The process involves many inputs and steps, including a
unique starting material and a potentially explosive production
step that can be carried out only in specialized and very costly fa-
cilities.
Historically, Roche has not produced the levels of Tamiflu re-
quired for global stockpiling. However, since 2003 we have in-
creased total Tamiflu production capacity nearly eight-fold. Most
importantly, early in our discussion HHS made several requests to
Roche, all of which have been fulfilled. First, Roche has developed
a U.S.-based supply chain. Second, Roche developed special U.S.
packaging for stockpiled Tamiflu in order to extend dating and ease
distribution and administration. Roche undertook these efforts in
good faith and at great economic risk.
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1 Department of Health and Human Services, Draft Pandemic Influenza Response and Pre-
paredness Plan, Core Document, 14 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/
pandemicplan/finalpandemiccore.pdf.
2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet: Information About Influenza
Pandemics (March 8, 2005).
Roche is also developing a synthetic process for manufacturing
the chemical used in the initial production step. This will ulti-
mately reduce reliance on natural sources. Roche has received and
is filing on schedule pandemic stockpile orders for Tamiflu from 25
countries worldwide. Discussions are underway for the U.S. Gov-
ernment to purchase significantly greater amounts of Tamiflu.
However, HHS stockpile purchases to date are sufficient to treat
less than 1 percent of the U.S. population. We have also received
a non-bonding letter of intent for HHS to purchase additional treat-
ments to cover under 2 percent of the population.
In contrast, countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Fin-
land, Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand are ordering enough
Tamiflu to cover between 20 and 40 percent of their populations.
Unfortunately, given the complexities I have described, the increas-
ing global demand, any government that does not stockpile suffi-
cient quantities of Tamiflu in advance cannot be assured of an ade-
quate supply at the outbreak of an influenza pandemic.
If I can leave you with three messages from my testimony today,
they are the following: first, there is a consensus by global health
authorities that Tamiflu is effective and an important tool in pan-
demic influenza preparedness and response; second, that other na-
tions are currently well ahead of the United States in Tamiflu
stockpiling; and finally, the U.S. has to make commitment now to
ensure a timely and adequate supply of Tamiflu. We at Roche want
to continue to work closely with the subcommittee and HHS to as-
sist the U.S. in ensuring pandemic preparedness. On behalf of
Roche, thank you for highlighting this critical issue, and I will be
pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dominick A. Iacuzio follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOMINICK A. IACUZIO, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, HOFFMANN-LA
ROCHE INC.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Dr. Dominick Iacuzio,
Medical Director at Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. (‘‘che’’), a research-based pharma-
ceutical company. Since joining Roche, I have been the medical officer responsible
for Tamiflu  (oseltamivir phosphate), the world’s first oral medication effective
against the type A and B strains of the influenza virus. Prior to joining Roche, I
worked at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Insti-
tutes of Health, where I served as the Respiratory Disease Branch’s principal tech-
nical advisor for the Influenza Program. I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss
with you the role of antiviral drugs in pandemic influenza preparedness and re-
sponse, and I commend the Subcommittee for its efforts to protect the American
people against this very real public health threat.
THE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA THREAT
Every year, seasonal influenza causes an average of 36,000 deaths and 114,000
hospitalizations.1 In addition to the annual influenza seasons, three influenza
pandemics took place during the 20th century. In 1918, approximately 500,000 peo-
ple died from the so-called ‘‘Spanish Flu,’’ and up to 50 million may have died world-
wide. The 1957-58 ‘‘Asian flu’’ killed 70,000 Americans, and the 1968-69 ‘‘Hong Kong
flu’’ caused over 34,000 deaths in this country.2
An influenza pandemic occurs when an existing influenza strain mutates. The
emergence of such a new viral strain, the lack of previous exposure and immunity
to the virus, and the lack of a vaccine that can protect against the new strain can
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ignite a global influenza epidemic, i.e., a pandemic. It has been 36 years since the
last influenza pandemic, thanks in large part to the development of influenza vac-
cinations, as well as methods to predict influenza strains and redesign vaccines an-
nually to include the strains predicted to affect the population in a given year.
However, it appears that the factors associated with a pandemic are now moving
into place. First, we have a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza circulating
widely in Asia. Second, this avian strain appears to be increasingly capable of caus-
ing deadly disease in humans and animals. In fact, the avian virus has been fatal
in approximately 60 percent of people infected by it.3 While efficient human-to-
human transmission of the virus—the final barrier to an influenza pandemic—has
yet to occur, it is possible—if not probable—that persons harboring both human and
avian influenza viruses could become ‘‘mixing vessels’’ from which a new virus
emerges that is easily transmitted among humans. Indeed, a recent World Health
Organization (WHO) assessment noted that new epidemiological findings in Asia in-
dicate that the virus may be becoming more capable of human-to-human trans-
mission.4
Make no mistake: should an influenza pandemic occur, the threat to the U.S. pub-
lic would be great. In its draft Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan
(Plan), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) recognizes an in-
fluenza pandemic as having ‘‘a greater potential to cause rapid increases in death
and illness than virtually any other natural health threat.5 Health experts estimate
that if the virus is passed efficiently between humans, avian flu could result in a
pandemic causing over 50 million deaths worldwide.6 Studies cited recently by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that, without vaccines
or drugs, a ‘‘medium level’’ pandemic would kill between 89,000 and 207,000 Ameri-
cans, and sicken another 20 to 47 million—causing up to 42 million outpatient visits
and 734,000 hospitalizations.7 In fact, according to the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, the potential consequences of even a limited influenza pandemic could result
in deaths, hospitalizations and economic disruption far in excess of most terror at-
tack scenarios.8 In addition to the human toll, the economic cost of such a pandemic
has been estimated at $71 to $167 billion.9 Without a doubt, planning for such a
global health crisis must be a major public health priority.
Both the HHS Plan and the WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan emphasize
that adequately addressing the threat of a pandemic influenza outbreak will require
availability of both an influenza vaccine and antiviral drugs.10 If available, vaccines,
which typically are administered before an outbreak of influenza, can provide an ef-
fective defense against developing seasonal or pandemic influenza, as well as in
slowing transmission among humans.
However, vaccines have important limitations. First, accurately predicting the
specific viral strain or strains that ultimately may cause an influenza pandemic can-
not be assured. Consequently, effective vaccines may not be available at the time
a pandemic outbreak is first detected. Second, the propensity of viruses to mutate
can lead to the rapid generation of new strains. Thus, there is a possibility that a
vaccine effective against the viral strain accountable for the outbreak may be impo-
tent against the virus’ mutated progeny. This is one reason why unique vaccines to
guard against seasonal influenza must be produced, licensed, and distributed each
year, and thus, cannot be stockpiled for use against multiple outbreaks. Finally,
given the pace of an outbreak of pandemic influenza, initial reliance on vaccines
may not be feasible. For example, the WHO estimates it will take six to nine
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17 Data collected from patients treated with Tamiflu , at its approved dose and for the ap-
proved treatment duration, demonstrate an overall incidence of resistant virus of only 0.4 per-
cent in adults and four percent in children aged one to 12. All of the resistant virus strains
were found unlikely to spread within a community, even under conditions of widespread
Tamiflu  use for both treatment and prevention of influenza. N. Roberts, Treatment of Influenza
Continued
months to develop a vaccine effective against the circulating pandemic virus
strain.11 Of course, producing and distributing the vaccine on a large scale also will
take considerable time, and a vaccine, once administered, may take several weeks
to trigger immunity, or require multiple administrations.
For all of these reasons, HHS and the WHO have recommended that efforts to
prepare for an influenza pandemic not rely on vaccines alone. As stated in a recent
WHO report, ‘‘[p]ending the availability of vaccines, antiviral agents will be the
principal medical intervention for reducing morbidity and mortality, which becomes
the most important priority once a pandemic is underway.12 Notably, certain
antiviral drugs can be used either to treat the flu or as a prophylactic to prevent
those at risk from becoming infected. Recently published models suggest that an in-
fluenza pandemic could be contained if 80 percent of those exposed to the virus used
targeted antiviral drugs prophylactically.13
Finally, antivirals have four additional characteristics that warrant their inclu-
sion in any influenza pandemic plan: (1) antivirals have a long shelf-life, permitting
them to be stockpiled for several years, and thus immediately available when an
outbreak occurs; (2) antiviral drugs begin to work immediately after they are admin-
istered; (3) certain antivirals work against multiple types of influenza; and (4) utili-
zation of antivirals does not interfere with immunologic response.
THE ROLE OF TAMIFLU  IN AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
Roche’s Tamiflu  (oseltamivir phosphate) is the leading prescription oral antiviral
drug. Tamiflu  was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1999
for the treatment of type A and B influenza. Specifically, Tamiflu , a
neuraminidase inhibitor, works by attacking the influenza virus and its ability to
replicate, rather than simply addressing influenza symptoms. Tamiflu  is indicated
for treatment of patients one year and older, and, if taken within forty-eight hours
of the onset of symptoms, can help patients recover from the flu faster. As a prophy-
lactic, an indication approved in 2000, Tamiflu  is labeled for use by adults and
adolescents 13 years of age and older, although data on children one year of age
and older have recently been submitted to FDA for review. Tamiflu  has a low like-
lihood of clinically significant drug interactions and is generally well-tolerated, with
nausea and vomiting being the most frequently reported adverse events. Tamiflu 
is available in both capsule and pediatric suspension form.
As CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding informed this Subcommittee in a November
2004 hearing, Tamiflu  ‘‘is the only antiviral drug known to be effective against
avian influenza.14 The efficacy of Tamiflu  against avian influenza has been dem-
onstrated in animal studies by leading researchers, in vitro data, and practical expe-
rience during an avian influenza outbreak in the Netherlands.15 Accordingly, the
WHO has recommended use of Tamiflu  in those potentially exposed to avian flu
in Asia.16 Additionally, while a possibility exists for an influenza virus to emerge
with decreased sensitivity to any antiviral drug, the Tamiflu -resistant viruses iso-
lated in humans to date do not appear to be effectively transmissible.17
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For the prevention of influenza in those 13 years or older, Tamiflu  is adminis-
tered following close contact with an infected individual who demonstrates char-
acteristic symptoms of influenza, and based on knowledge that influenza is circu-
lating in the area for 10 days, or up to six weeks for seasonal prophylaxis. The ap-
proved dose and duration of treatment—75mg twice daily for five days—is expected
to represent the minimum required for the management of an influenza pandemic.
To ensure Tamiflu  remains effective against the influenza virus, Roche does not
recommend strategies which may utilize lower doses or shorter duration of therapy
compared with the recommended dose.
ALTHOUGH ROCHE IS TAKING STEPS TO INCREASE TAMIFLU  PRODUCTION, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE CONTRACTUAL STOCKPILE COMMITMENTS TO ENSURE A RO-
BUST U.S. ANTIVIRAL DRUG SUPPLY
As noted, both HHS and the WHO include stockpiling of antiviral drugs as a cen-
tral component of their developing plans for influenza pandemic preparedness. Both
the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and the WHO have recently ac-
knowledged that Tamiflu , in particular, is uniquely suited to pandemic stockpiling,
for several reasons: (1) its efficacy against influenza types A and B; (2) the absence
of a known Tamiflu -resistant virus transmissible in humans; and (3) the product’s
five-year shelf life.
It is imperative that Tamiflu  be stockpiled in advance of the outbreak of a pan-
demic because inherent complexities in production severely limit capacity to rapidly
meet large-scale, unanticipated demand. The manufacturing process for Tamiflu  is
complex, and takes 8-12 months from raw materials to finished product. The process
involves many intermediate steps, including a unique starting material, and a po-
tentially explosive production step that can be carried out only in specialized and
costly facilities. Given these complexities, significant lead time is needed to increase
production capacity and build stockpiles of the quantity required for an influenza
pandemic.
Historically, Roche has produced enough Tamiflu  to meet the seasonal influenza
demand. For example, just over one million prescriptions for Tamiflu  were written
in 2003 in the United States, while preceding years averaged 600,000 to 700,000
prescriptions. In contrast, the IDSA has recommended that the government stock-
pile enough antiviral drugs to treat up to 50 percent of the U.S. population.18
Despite the obstacles I have described, the company doubled production capacity
at our European facility from 2003 to 2004, and we are doing so again during 2005.
Roche plans additional expansion of production capacity for Tamiflu  in 2006. Most
importantly, early in our discussions HHS made several requests to Roche, all of
which we have fulfilled. First, Roche has developed a U.S.-based supply chain. When
that supply chain is launched later this year, total Tamiflu  active pharmaceutical
ingredient and capsule production capacity will have increased globally by nearly
eight-fold over production capacity in 2003. Second, Roche developed special U.S.
packaging for stockpiled Tamiflu in order to extend dating and ease distribution and
administration. Roche undertook these efforts in good faith and at great economic
risk. Moreover, Roche is developing a synthetic process for manufacturing the chem-
ical used in the initial production step, which will ultimately reduce reliance on nat-
ural sources.
Roche has received and is filling—on schedule—pandemic stockpile orders for
Tamiflu  from 25 countries worldwide. Discussions are underway for the U.S. gov-
ernment to purchase for its stockpile significantly greater amounts of Tamiflu  for
this year and beyond. However, HHS stockpile purchases to date total approxi-
mately 2.3 million courses of treatment, or enough to treat less than one percent
of the U.S. population. We have also received a non-binding letter of intent for HHS
to purchase an additional three million courses of treatment, or enough to cover
under two percent of the population. In contrast, countries such as the United King-
dom, France, Finland, Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand are ordering enough
Tamiflu  to cover between 20 to 40 percent of their populations.
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Unfortunately, given the complexities I have described, any government that does
not stockpile sufficient quantities of Tamiflu  in advance cannot be assured an ade-
quate supply at the outbreak of an influenza pandemic. We are greatly concerned
that with the continually increasing global demand for Tamiflu , and in the ab-
sence of a long-term U.S. commitment to stockpile the product, U.S.-manufactured
Tamiflu  may have to be exported to countries with committed orders. While Roche
commends HHS for its efforts to date, we cannot emphasize enough the immediate
need for the United States government to make the contractual commitments nec-
essary to ensure that an adequate stockpile is developed to meet the looming pan-
demic threat.
Alerted to the pandemic threat, governments now have an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to attempt to minimize the catastrophic loss of life, debilitating illness, and
enormous economic costs that a pandemic could wreak on the United States and the
world. If I can leave you with three messages from my testimony today, they are
the following. First, there is a consensus by leading global health authorities that
Tamiflu  is effective and an important tool in pandemic preparedness and response.
Second, other nations are currently well ahead of the United States in Tamiflu 
stockpiling. Finally, there are important practical constraints on the production of
Tamiflu  that make immediate U.S. contractual commitments for future pandemic
supplies a necessity.
We at Roche want to continue to work closely with this Subcommittee, HHS, and
governments around the world to assist in ensuring our pandemic preparedness. On
behalf of Roche, thank you for highlighting the importance of this critical issue, and
I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you very much. Dr. Tripp.
STATEMENT OF RALPH A. TRIPP
Mr. TRIPP. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am here today to tell you about the emerging pandemic threat of
Avian Influenza and how scientists at the University of Georgia in
collaboration with Alnylam Pharmaceuticals in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts are developing novel and proven therapeutics to prevent
Avian Influenza virus and other important respiratory virus infec-
tions. My comments today echo those concerns of the CDC, World
Health Organization, and Institute of Medicine, and others about
the need for preparing for pandemic flu.
I am keenly aware of the threat that mankind faces by influenza
and other important respiratory viruses having worked at the Cen-
ter for Disease Control for 7 years in the Respiratory and Enteric
Viruses Branch before moving to the University of Georgia to be-
come the Georgia Research Alliance Eminent Scholar in vaccine de-
velopment, as well as the director of the Center for Disease Inter-
vention there. And I must reemphasize the imminent threat of an
influenza pandemic.
As we are all aware, pandemic flu spreads rapidly and during
the pandemics of 1957 and 1968, those viruses took less than 3 to
4 months to go from the site of origin in Southeast Asia to North
America and Europe. Clearly, the conditions are more favorable for
spread these days with the air travel possibilities so an outbreak
could occur in a matter of days around cities throughout the world.
Once a pandemic flu emerges, we probably won’t be able to prevent
the global spread, but if we are prepared with things such as
antivirals, it can significantly reduce its impact.
The current outbreak of flu in Asia known as H5N1 is thought
to have significantly heightened the risk of another flu pandemic
as reported by the World Health Organization. Since the emer-
gence of H5N1 in poultry in mid-December 2003, this strain has
devastated the poultry industry in nine different countries in
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
76
Southeast Asia. Clearly, it would have a similar impact if it came
to the United States.
There has also been numerous reports of human infection by this
strain, as has been described by the witnesses today. Scientists at
the University in Georgia, in collaboration with investigators at the
Center for Disease Control and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, recog-
nize that multiple approaches are going to be necessary to protect
the human population from the newly emerging virus strains such
as H5N1.
Vaccines are obviously the mainstay of prophylaxis against influ-
enza, but there are technical and safety issues that we have all
heard about that must be overcome. These include difficulty in pre-
dicting which strains of virus may emerge, difficulty in preparing
sufficient quantities of the vaccine to meet the global demand, and
clearly in storage and distribution of these vaccines.
Antivirals have been shown to be very effective in treating com-
mon influenza. However, as you have heard, H5N1, Avian Flu is
resistant to two of the most common drugs, rimantadine and
amantadine and now they is some evidence and literature that the
virus may be developing resistance to a newly developed drug
Tamiflu or oseltamivir. The evidence for viral resistance to
antiviral drugs indicates that more than one drug is going to be
necessary to combat emerging flu and new, novel approaches are
going to be necessary to enhance effectiveness of these drugs, as
well as to prevent viral resistance to the existing drugs.
In my laboratory at the University of Georgia we are working
with new, breakthrough technology with Alnylam Pharmaceuticals
called RNA interference. RNA interference is a natural process. It
occurs in all the cells of our body. The process is meted by activity
of short strands of RNA that silence host genes and control devel-
opment. We have been able to harness that power to actually gen-
erally RNA-interfering drugs that prevent respiratory virus infec-
tion, particularly for respiratory syncytial virus. And now we have
shown that with these same RNA interference drugs are useful in
preventing infection by highly pathogenic H5N1 and H7 strains of
flu.
We have also shown these RNA interference drugs are useful
both prophylactically and therapeutically to prevent respiratory
syncytial virus, and this is a virus that is the leading cause of se-
ries lower respiratory tract illness in infants and young children
worldwide for which there is no vaccine and treatments are limited.
So the studies from my laboratory at the University of Georgia
have shown the potential to create powerful therapeutics that meet
the demand for new drugs with higher potency, lower toxicity, and
having a much higher degree of specificity in that they only attack
the cells that are affected by the virus.
So given the pending threat of influenza, it is absolutely nec-
essary that our disease intervention strategies move beyond the
standard vaccine and into a new class of proven preventative and
therapeutic treatments. With RNA interference, the creation of a
safer and more accurate antiviral is certainly within reach and on
the horizon. These specific antiviral therapeutics can be developed
rapidly, they can produce the high levels, and they can be stock-
piled or stored as needed.
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So I am here today to urge the Members of Congress to bring
universities like the University of Georgia together with private
sector companies like Alnylam Pharmaceuticals to develop break-
through solutions to address the important human diseases like
pandemic flu and provide alternatives to antiviral drugs, certainly
which some have become resistant to.
Support for this new and proven technology will provide an un-
precedented means to control pandemic flu, as well as address
other important viral infections. And clearly, without support for
this type of a robust research program, we are destined to relive
the pandemics of the past. And in developing these RNA-inter-
fering drugs, we are developing new tools to address any emerging
infectious virus. And I would like to thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Ralph A. Tripp follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RALPH A. TRIPP, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DISEASE
INTERVENTION
SUMMARY
The World Health Organization (WHO) and influenza experts worldwide warn
that an influenza virus (flu) pandemic is inevitable and imminent and will likely
be caused by widespread distribution of an avian influenza virus, e.g. avian flu.
Vaccines are the mainstay of prophylaxis against influenza, but there is currently
no vaccine capable of protecting humans from infection with avian flu.Currently ap-
proved anti-viral drugs may be useful to treat pandemic flu but their effectiveness
is limited by development of resistance.
Novel and new anti-viral approaches are required to enhance the effectiveness of
existing anti-viral drugs, prevent viral resistance to existing drugs, and to provide
a strategy to combat avian flu and other important respiratory viral diseases.
The discovery of RNA interference, or RNAi has revolutionized our ability to offer
new, potent and specific viral disease intervention. RNAi is a natural biological
process that occurs in all of our cells. The process is mediated by the activity of
short strands of RNA that specifically silence the targeted gene of interest.
We have harnessed the power of RNAi to silence respiratory virus infection and
disease by targeting viral genes. We have shown that RNAi is very potent, specific,
and reactive for all strains of virus targeted.
RNAi is a new breakthrough solution to address pandemic flu that is on the hori-
zon. Support for this new and proven technology will provide an unprecedented
means to control pandemic flu and other important respiratory virus infections that
carry a high disease burden on mankind.
Pandemic Influenza (flu):
A pandemic is an epidemic that spreads rapidly around the world with high rates
of illness and death. While people are exposed to different strains of the flu virus
many times in their lives, about three or four times every century a radically dif-
ferent strain of flu causes a pandemic.
Such warnings by the World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control,
National Institutes of Health and Institute of Medice have been fueled by the per-
sistence of a highly virulent strain of avian influenza virus in Asia that experts fear
could trigger another influenza pandemic.
Influenza pandemics are not new. In the 20th century, mankind has faced three
influenza pandemics. The first was the devastating 1918 ‘‘Spanish Flu’’ pandemic,
as well as two less severe influenza pandemics in 1957 and 1968.
Key facts of pandemic flu:
Pandemic flu occurs every few decades and spreads rapidly to affect most coun-
tries and regions around the world. Unlike the ‘‘ordinary’’ flu that usually occurs
every winter, pandemic flu can occur at any time of year
Pandemic flu is much more serious than ‘‘ordinary’’ flu—as much as a quarter of
the population may be affected—maybe more.
A serious pandemic is also likely to cause many deaths, disrupt the daily life of
many people and cause intense pressure on health, poultry and other industries.
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What is pandemic flu caused by?
The emergence of a new flu virus which is markedly different from recently circu-
lating strains and to which few people have any immunity.
Strategies to protect against pandemic flu:
Vaccines are the mainstay of prophylaxis against influenza, but there are tech-
nical and safety issues that must be overcome, and problems in producing sufficient
vaccine to meet global requirements. There is no vaccine ready to protect against
pandemic flu.
Currently approved anti-viral drugs can be used to treat pandemic flu but their
effectiveness is limited by development of drug resistance.
The nature of the next pandemic flu: Avian Influenza:
WHO and influenza experts worldwide are concerned that the recent appearance
and widespread distribution of an avian influenza virus, influenza A/H5N1 (H5N1)
‘‘has the potential to ignite the next pandemic’’, World Health Organization, Decem-
ber 2004.
What is Avian Influenza?
Avian influenza is a contagious disease of birds and poultry caused by influenza
A viruses. All bird species are susceptible to infection, but domestic poultry flocks
are especially vulnerable. Infection can cause epidemics associated with severe ill-
ness, high death rates, and economic devastation.
Where does Avian Influenza occur?
Avian flu occurs worldwide. The current outbreak of highly pathogenic avian flu
(H5N1) began in Asia and has to date affected poultry in nine countries in Asia.
In three of these countries, H5N1 strain has also infected people.
How does Avian Influenza spread?
Avian flu is spread in poultry flocks either via respiratory secretions or contact
with contaminated droppings. People are usually infected through close contact with
infected birds or their feces. Person-to-person spread, so far appears to difficult.
Protecting the human population from Avian Influenza:
There is currently no vaccine capable of protecting humans from infection, and ef-
fectiveness of existing anti-virals is not well understood.
Why I am here today:
I am here today to tell you about the emerging pandemic threat from avian influ-
enza virus and how scientists at the University of Georgia are developing novel
therapeutics with Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Cambridge, MA to treat and prevent
avian influenza and other important respiratory viral infections.
My concerns echo those of the Centers for Disease Control, National Institutes of
Health, the World Health Organization, and Institute of Medicine which all warn
of the need for pandemic flu preparedness, particularly for avian influenza.
What is the potential impact of Avian Influenza?
The emergence of new influenza A virus subtypes have caused all three known
flu pandemics, all of which spread around the world within 1 year of being detected.
1918-19, ‘‘Spanish flu’’, [H1N1]: caused the highest number of known influenza
deaths: more than 500,000 people died in the United States, and up to 50 million
people may have died worldwide. Nearly half of those who died were young, healthy
adults. Influenza A (H1N1) viruses still circulate today after being introduced again
into the human population in the 1970s.
1957-58, ‘‘Asian flu,’’ [H2N2], caused about 70,000 deaths in the United States.
First identified in China in late February 1957, the Asian flu spread to the United
States by June 1957.
1968-69, ‘‘Hong Kong flu,’’ [H3N2), caused about 34,000 deaths in the United
States. This virus was first detected in Hong Kong in early 1968 and spread to the
United States later that year. Influenza A (H3N2) viruses still circulate today.
Historical patterns and influenza:
Influenza pandemics can be expected to occur, on average, three to four times
each century when new virus subtypes emerge and are readily transmitted from
person-to-person.
Pandemic flu spreads rapidly. During the pandemics of 1957 and 1968, the vi-
ruses took only 3-4 months to spread from southeast Asia—where they were first
identified—to Europe and North America.
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Today, conditions are far more favorable to the spread flu. With high population
density, and ease of air travel around the world, an outbreak could spread to vir-
tually every city in the world in a matter of a few days.
Influenza virus disease intervention strategies:
Multiple approaches will be required to protect the human population from newly
emerging influenza virus strains such as H5N1 and others.
Vaccines are the mainstay of prophylaxis against influenza, but there are tech-
nical and safety issues that must be overcome.
Anti-viral agents have been shown to be effective toward treating influenza
subtypes; however, avian flu (H5N1) is resistant to two common influenza drugs,
rimantadine and amantadine, but newly developed drugs such as Tamiflu and
Relenza appear to be somewhat effective.
The evidence for viral resistance to anti-viral agents indicates that more than one
drug will be necessary to combat influenza.
Novel new anti-viral approaches—RNA Interference (RNAi):
New anti-viral drugs are required to enhance the effectiveness of current drugs
and prevent drug resistance.
In my laboratory at the University of Georgia, we are working with new break-
through technology called RNA interference, or RNAi. RNAi is a natural biological
process that occurs in all of our cells to control development. RNAi is mediated by
the activity of short strands of RNA that specifically silence the targeted gene of
interest.
We have harnessed the power of RNAi to silence respiratory virus infection and
disease by targeting viral genes. We have shown that RNAi is very potent, specific,
and reactive for all strains of virus targeted. We have shown that RNAi prophylaxis
and therapeutic treatment can be used to effectively silence respiratory syncytial
virus (RSV) which is the leading cause of serious lower respiratory tract in infants
and young children worldwide.
RNAi has the potential to create powerful therapeutics that meet the demand for
new drugs with higher potency, lower toxicity, and have a high degree of specificity,
i.e. only attack their target and do so very efficiently.
RNAi and the pending threat of pandemic flu:
It is absolutely necessary that our disease intervention strategies move beyond
the standard vaccine and into a new class of proven preventative and therapeutic
treatments. With RNAi, the creation of a safer, more accurate and efficient anti-
viral treatment for pandemic influenza is closer in reach.
Specific anti-viral RNAi therapeutics can be developed rapidly, i.e. within several
months, produced at high levels, and stock piled or stored as needed.
RNAi is a new breakthrough solution to address pandemic flu that is on the hori-
zon. Support for this new and proven technology will provide an unprecedented
means to control pandemic flu and other important respiratory virus infections that
carry a high disease burden on mankind.
Clearly, without support for this robust research program that can prevent res-
piratory virus disease burden, and silence virus replication and spread, we are
doomed to relive the pandemics of the past. In developing the RNAi disease inter-
vention strategies, we are developing tools to respond to any novel virus that may
emerge.
Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you very much to all of you, and with that
we will begin some questioning. The Chair recognizes himself for
the purpose of some questions.
Dr. Iacuzio, Dr. Gerberding in the testimony in the first panel
talked about Tamiflu when I was asking her questions about
antivirals, which seemed to be at odds with some testimony that
she had given last November. And I know that, Dr. Pavia, you said
you had some disagreements with some things that Dr. Gerberding
said earlier today. Specifically about the effectiveness of Tamiflu
with some strains of the Avian Flu, Dr. Tripp just referenced that
as well. How does what Dr. Gerberding was saying square with
your knowledge—I mean, you make it—how does that square with
your understanding of the effectiveness of Tamiflu with regard to
various strains of the Avian Flu?
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Mr. IACUZIO. There is scientifically published literature that
oseltamivir, Tamiflu, has been tested in the lab against all known
subtypes of Type A influenza, including all Avian strains, N1
through the N9, which basically—you know, they cover all the Type
A viruses, and it is effective against all those in the laboratory.
In addition, we have talked with officials, Klaus Stohr at the
World Health Organization about the latest data that he is aware
of from the Asian outbreak of Avian Flu out there, and according
to the notes that I have is that no deaths from any individuals who
have taken Tamiflu within the first 48 hours have been reported
to his knowledge. So this is what the WHO is aware of as of this
point in time.
Mr. FERGUSON. I just want to make sure that there isn’t some
new data, new information since last November when Dr.
Gerberding testified in front of Congress. She said she believed
Tamiflu was highly effective for strains that were known. Is there
anything new in the last several months that would challenge that
notion?
Mr. IACUZIO. No, there really isn’t. There had been reports of in-
creased resistance reported in one paper in Japan, but the data
was from a study where children are one, underdosed; two, they
are not given the dose at the long enough duration; and three, the
isolates were isolated through a highly sophisticated laboratory
technology, which we don’t know what that means. I mean they
were basically laboratory curiosities. We don’t believe that these
are infectious strains.
Mr. FERGUSON. So given that the data that you have and pub-
lished studies that you cited——
Mr. IACUZIO. Right.
Mr. FERGUSON. [continuing] there seems to be a consensus that
Tamiflu is effective for Avian Flu, yet we have heard from GAO
and others that it seems to be inadequate, I guess, to put it mildly.
Our efforts to stockpile antivirals to prepare for this—what every-
one seems to think is an eventuality—seems to be not the most ag-
gressive course of action that we could be taking. You have been
in discussions—Roche has been in discussions with the U.S. Gov-
ernment for 2 years or so to negotiate the production of more
Tamiflu for stockpiling purposes. Obviously, negotiations that take
2 years or more, every day that is lost is precious time when addi-
tional antivirals could be being produced and stockpiled. Given
that, we are where we are.
If an order were placed tomorrow—we have heard World Health
Organization and others have recommended 25 to 50 percent of the
population should have the ability to be covered. You mentioned a
number of countries which have already placed orders or have
begun stockpiling orders to cover 20 to 40 percent of their popu-
lation. If the United States placed an order for Tamiflu tomorrow
to cover 25 percent of our population, perhaps on the conservative
side of what many of these other countries are doing, what would
be the timeline for production? How would that affect your produc-
tion capacity? What would be the timeline for your ability to
produce that? And is there any way, if that is not real fast, that
you would be able to make investments or to be able to streamline
that or advance that timeline any quicker?
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Mr. IACUZIO. Since we began the conversations with public
health officials in 2003, Roche globally has increased production ca-
pability eight-fold. Since locally we were—a year ago, February
2004 we were requested for considering a U.S. production facility.
Roche has, as I said in my statement, has taken that initiative and
that production facility we expect to up and running by the third
quarter of 2005, this year. With that increased capacity both glob-
ally and the U.S. we would be able to produce—because of existing
orders that already have been booked—about three million doses
this fiscal year, by the end of this year; 13 million doses that are
remaining for 2006; and by the end of 2007, another additional 70
million doses. So by the end of 2007 we should be able to provide
approximately enough for 25 percent of the U.S. population.
Mr. FERGUSON. That is your capacity? That is what you would
be able to do?
Mr. IACUZIO. If orders came in now because every day that goes
by additional countries are placing orders——
Mr. FERGUSON. What has been ordered—what has the United
States ordered thus far?
Mr. IACUZIO. Right now we have firm commitment—well, the
U.S. has purchased 2.3 million doses, and there is a non-binding
letter of agreement for an additional, I believe, three million doses.
Mr. FERGUSON. So we are talking about less than six million
doses——
Mr. IACUZIO. Right.
Mr. FERGUSON. [continuing] that the U.S. would be stockpiling?
Mr. IACUZIO. At this point in time.
Mr. FERGUSON. Is that enough?
Mr. IACUZIO. I think that is a question really for public health
officials.
Mr. FERGUSON. Dr. Pavia, is that enough?
Mr. PAVIA. It is clearly not enough. I think to find the right num-
ber using good epidemiologic techniques is something we haven’t
done yet——
Mr. FERGUSON. Yes, but we can all agree that——
Mr. PAVIA. [continuing] but the current amount——
Mr. FERGUSON. [continuing] this is imperfect—estimating what
we would need is an imperfect science, but I think something that
we could probably all agree on is that six million doses doesn’t
come close to being able to prepare us for what we all agree is the
eventuality of this catastrophe.
Mr. PAVIA. It is a painfully small amount to have to use.
Mr. FERGUSON. I am over my time. Mr. Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank all members of the panel.
Mr. Hosbach, I wanted to ask you about what incentives industry
needs to increase production capacity in the U.S. but I think you
pretty much answered that. I mean you said increase vaccination
rates for annual flus, get a public and private distribution system
in place, do vaccine liability protection, and four, CDC would have
to build the capacity to increase stockpiles. Is there anything you
would add to those four? Is there anything you want to elaborate
on that? Because, you know, how do we get—obviously there is not
enough manufacturing capacity out there, and you are in Pennsyl-
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vania and we thank you for that. But I wondered if there is any-
thing other than those four points that you would like to make on
this?
Mr. HOSBACH. Well, I would really probably like to emphasize
the need to get every American to understand the importance of in-
fluenza vaccine, being vaccinated. Increasing those inter-pandemic
immunization rates will continue to encourage us to expand, as I
had mentioned, others to enter the marketplace, and I think you
are already seeing some interest from other players. But I think
that it is important for several reasons: one, not only for our expan-
sion but that people get used to being immunized; they know who
to go to to get immunized, that this becomes a routine and part of
their every effort to protect themselves against flu. I think that will
help us prepare in the long run for a pandemic.
Mr. ALLEN. Second question, can you talk about how the regu-
latory process regarding vaccine development and production dif-
fers between the U.S. and the E.U.? And part of that question is
whether or not more could be done to harmonize the approval proc-
esses in the two continents—countries——
Mr. HOSBACH. I am not truly a regulatory expert, and I don’t
know the specific differences between the E.U. and the U.S., but
I do know that there are efforts to harmonize, that much of what
they do is similar, and I do know that there is a continuous dialog
between the FDA and European Union officials.
Mr. ALLEN. Just one more question for you. Could you elaborate
a little bit on the SEC issue? Dr. Gerberding referred to it. I think
you mentioned it in your testimony. We are up here trying to figure
out what that is all about.
Mr. HOSBACH. Well, you know, it comes from a staff accounting
bulletin, which our accounting firms and several accounting firms
have interpreted in one way wouldn’t allow us to participate or rec-
ognize the revenue from the stockpile, so that becomes an issue for
us because we would like to have our revenue match our activity.
Mr. ALLEN. So you would only recognize the revenue from the
vaccine when the vaccines were used? Is that the——
Mr. HOSBACH. That is correct. And I think this all stems from
some of the issues in other larger industries that have had some
accounting problems. And so I think that this is a very conserv-
ative interpretation, and certainly we need some assistance in
clarifying that or perhaps even modifying contracts with CDC that
might be able to get around the issue.
Mr. ALLEN. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Crosse, you testified that in-
sufficient hospital and health workforce capacity is an area of con-
cern. Could you give us your characterization of the adequacy of
our hospital and health workforce capacity to deal with the next
pandemic? And if you can and you think there are gaps—I am sure
there are gaps—could you point to specific provisions in the fiscal
2006 budget that are aimed at addressing those gaps?
Ms. CROSSE. I can’t give you numbers, but certainly healthcare
workforce shortages is a persisting problem. One concern that is es-
pecially problematic in a pandemic is that the healthcare workforce
would be a highly exposed population and they might themselves
become ill or have family members who were ill that they would
need to care for. So you might exacerbate any shortages. In this
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past winter’s vaccine shortages, healthcare workforce was not
among the priority groups for vaccination, so that would need to be
an issue that was considered if you had widespread outbreaks.
There are constant shortages in areas of the country of the nurs-
ing workforce. When we did earlier work on bioterrorism prepared-
ness, we found that many communities were planning on surge ca-
pacity by calling on their temporary nurse network, but multiple
hospitals were counting on the same nurses. And so I think that
the bioterrorism funding that has gone to increase hospital plan-
ning and preparedness for bioterrorism is helping them to work
through some of that planning and to sort through some of the
issues. It still doesn’t get the bodies there. And the mobile hospitals
that were mentioned that could be brought in to be deployed, if you
are having nationwide outbreaks, they are still going to have to be
staffed locally in all likelihood so that some of the emergency med-
ical care that might be available to be flown in if there was an out-
break in one area would not be available if you had a nationwide
pandemic. And so this is a continuing problem.
I can’t point to the specific provisions. That would be probably
better addressed to the department, but there has been funding
through HRSA for hospital preparedness under the bioterrorism
funding programs.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. The only comment I would add is—this
is just an anecdote. I don’t mean it as a matter of policy. My son-
in-law wants to go to nursing school; he has taken all the pre-
requisites. He can’t get into nursing school until the fall of 2006 in
Maine, and it has something to do with the number of slots avail-
able. Anyway, thank you all for your testimony. And, Mr. Chair-
man, I yield back.
Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. Allen, we would be delighted to have your
son-in-law in New Jersey if he would like to come to nursing
school. Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. I already asked him if he would want to come to
New Jersey, and he said he wanted to come to Ohio instead.
Dr. Crosse, I want to follow Mr. Allen’s question for a moment
and then a question for you, Dr. Iacuzio. Does the bioterrorism
funding in some sense, the increase in funding, mask or—maybe
mask is a good work—funding for other preparedness for a pan-
demic outbreak or general public health needs and infrastructure?
Ms. CROSSE. I am not sure what you mean by mask. Is it filling
a broader set of needs or do you mean that it——
Mr. BROWN. Or is it looking like it is filling a broader set of
needs but in some sense taking away from other public health
needs that we have seen?
Ms. CROSSE. I don’t think that we have done work recently
enough to be able to say how that has played out in the local com-
munities. There are some concerns, I think, that this money coming
in may be supplanting some of the funding that otherwise might
be provided. But I think it has been providing a broader set of pub-
lic health preparedness functions than would exist without that
funding. It has funded communication systems that are not just
used for bioterrorism but for all disease reporting. It has provided
some kinds of systems and infrastructure that otherwise might not
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be in place. I can’t speak really to what it has done in terms of
whether it has supplanted other funding.
Mr. BROWN. My concern is while CDC funding particularly has
not seen major increases in the last few years, unlike NIH which
deserved it also, and when there were increases I am not sure that
while we did do the right thing certainly for bioterrorism prepared-
ness and answering those issues and preparing local communities,
public health officials that we didn’t take away from the sort of the
workaday infrastructure building and whether it is an issue to like
health disparities or whether it is lead poisoning or whether it is
nutrition education or whether it is a whole host of issues. But that
is more a comment than a question.
Dr. Iacuzio, if I could, according to CDC flu viruses can become
resistant to antiviral treatments like Tamiflu. I have done a lot of
work on particularly international tuberculosis issues and seen
what MDR-TB has done in New York City was our first really hor-
rible experience I think a dozen plus years ago. But we have seen
what has happened if we don’t follow the DOTS treatment, if pa-
tients don’t follow the DOTS treatments pretty regularly and pretty
precisely, and we know how expensive it is and we know the cure
rate, particularly in the most common places for TB, but how the
cure rate is pretty difficult and not satisfying when drug resistance
occurs. But sticking more to Tamiflu, could you elaborate on the
potential and describe how, especially in a pandemic situation, pub-
lic health officials can best avoid the onset of drug resistance?
Mr. IACUZIO. I believe that the information that we have to date
indicates that Tamiflu is safe and effective and there is a low level
of resistance. And that has been in published studies. I guess the
only thing that I would add is that the data that we do see from
places like Japan where they are dosing at a lower dose than has
been recommended through the rest of the world and for a shorter
duration of time, that probably is the scenario for generating resist-
ance. And there have been a couple of papers that have been pub-
lished in Japan about increased resistance to antiviral drugs. And
it is the same with antibiotics; if you are going to treat, you need
to treat with enough antibiotic drug and you need to treat long
enough. And if you do the opposite, then you are creating a sce-
nario to generate resistance. I guess that is what I am trying to
say. So you need enough drugs in consistent dosing.
Mr. BROWN. Well, I guess this is fairly evident, but you need
enough drugs, you need a distribution mechanism to reach remote
areas, but to reach them with a large enough supply and with an
even-handed distribution and a consistent patient/nurse or pa-
tient—whatever the healthcare provider is—relationship that will
mean full compliance.
Mr. IACUZIO. Right. And that is why I believe that, you know,
discussions of just stockpiling need to go beyond just a big stockpile
but actually the whole distribution of how that drug gets out to the
individuals who need it.
Mr. BROWN. This is a bit off, but are people with less education
typically less likely to be compliant people in a developing world
who are not just more remote in terms of distance but less familiar
with the healthcare system, all of that? Those would be people like-
ly less compliant——
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Mr. IACUZIO. That is——
Mr. BROWN. [continuing] or do we know that?
Mr. IACUZIO. That is a good question that I really—I am not pre-
pared to answer that——
Mr. BROWN. Okay.
Mr. IACUZIO. [continuing] personally.
Mr. BROWN. Okay. Fair enough. All right. Thanks.
Mr. FERGUSON. We are going to do another round of questions if
that is all right. I don’t think it should take too long. The Chair
recognizes himself.
Dr. Hosbach, can you go through the steps and the timeline that
it takes for a company from the decision to start, say, an Avian Flu
vaccine and actually finishing production in as much detail as you
would like? Can you just walk us through from the decision to do
that to when it actually is produced and how much time that takes
as well?
Mr. HOSBACH. Well, overall, as you heard I think earlier, the
process itself will take about 6 months from start to getting doses
produced and started to get out the door. The initial steps really
are a collaboration with governments and other agencies in terms
of identifying that strain, as you indicated, but then getting the
reassortant strain that will grow in eggs and start practicing that
in our laboratories and also handling it within our manufacturing
facility to a point at which it becomes adapted to eggs. From that
point on we start producing the vaccine within the egg itself and
then activate the virus and harvest the virus from the eggs. I think
you will find it interesting that actually the manufacturing piece
of it is the smallest portion of the entire chain of production and
release. There are large number of release tests, quality standards
that need to be met. And actually the release testing those points
of quality to observe really take the longest part of the production
process. So it is not the actual making it in the eggs that takes
long; it is the steps that you have to go through to ensure that you
are making a safe and quality and effective product.
Mr. FERGUSON. Where do liability concerns fit into that process?
I mean you mentioned a coordinated effort with government at the
very beginning. How do liability concerns fit into that process and
how do they affect the timeline of being able to produce the prod-
uct?
Mr. HOSBACH. I think, you know, liability concerns enter in, es-
pecially when we are about to enter into something like clinical
trials. That is critically important because you are now starting to
introduce this into society and introduce this into human subjects.
So that becomes one facet of liability that is of concern. But, of
course, then once you are ready to release product into the general
population, then it is a huge concern because you are not just im-
munizing perhaps 85 million people; you are immunizing 300 mil-
lion people.
And I think that if you go back to the mid-’70’s, Congress then
thought it was important enough in that environment to provide
indemnification to companies and to physicians, et cetera. And I
think within the current environment that would especially be ap-
propriate. It would put companies in great peril given the un-
knowns about the actual properties of a new pandemic strain that
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is a total shift from things that we have utilized before. And given
the fact that we only have so few manufacturers, I think you would
be putting major assets in harm’s way; and not just assets of these
pharmaceutical companies, but assets to public health.
Mr. FERGUSON. I am told that, as you referenced in the 1970’s
with the Swine Flu, that indemnification was a major component
to being able to produce a product that was necessary. And as you
are leading to, would indemnification hasten that process at all?
Would it shorten the timeline to be able to get these products to
market?
Mr. HOSBACH. Yes, I think——
Mr. FERGUSON. And we are looking at a——
Mr. HOSBACH. [continuing] in the end-stages it would——
Mr. FERGUSON. And we are looking at a serious problem.
Mr. HOSBACH. In terms of filling and packaging and having the
material ready to release, I think that end part of the process could
be expedited.
Mr. FERGUSON. Okay. Mr. Brown, did you have any other ques-
tions?
Mr. BROWN. A fairly general question, but one that I have not
really been satisfied with the answers in the past just because I
don’t understand it particularly well. We all read about problems
with antibiotic resistance. We read about, you know, the way that
animals that ranchers and farmers and perhaps veterinarians treat
animals prophylactically, partly for growth hormones with anti-
biotics, partly to protect them prophylactically as the chickens or
the cattle are put in small areas. We read about problems obviously
with other kinds of antibiotic resistance, physicians over-pre-
scribing, patients demanding when they have a virus they want an
antibiotic. I wanted to ask the private sector people here but really
any of you to comment. What can Government do to encourage bet-
ter research and production, getting in the pipeline of antibiotics
and antivirals and anti-retrovirals and anti-parasitics?
Mr. PAVIA. Well, I will take that on since, as you know, IDSA has
been very involved with that. I think that there are several compo-
nents to it. One is the limitation of inappropriate use in animal
husbandry. And that has come up over and over again. FDA has
come up with a process for reviewing that. There is a possibility
that antivirals could be used to protect chicken flocks with poten-
tial disastrous effects on antiviral resistance if the supplies existed.
The other is education. And there have been efforts to educate
patients that have been moderately successful. Educating physi-
cians is another aspect of that. But I think the biggest problem is
that we need more agents. Whatever we do to prevent the emer-
gence of resistance or to slow it, it is inevitable. It is the nature
of the organisms that they mutate faster than we can develop new
drugs. And so we need new agents and we need to continue to do
the things that are necessary to have a full pipeline. And to do that
we have to understand the profit motives and what it takes to keep
a full pipeline.
Mr. TRIPP. I would agree with that. One of our goals is obviously
to develop these new breakthrough technologies with Alnylam
Pharmaceuticals on RNA interference. These drugs target the ac-
tual structural components of the viruses that are very conserv-
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ative amongst all strains. We have shown these drugs are very ef-
fective at targeting and preventing infection of all strains of RSV,
for example. And now we are looking at the H5 and H7 strains of
influenza. You know, having another tool in your tool belt is the
key to preventing resistance. And, of course, following protocol is
also important. But I would really recommend that there is more
of a linkage in bring private sector companies to the table with cur-
rent research efforts at universities such as I spoke about today.
Ms. CROSSE. I would just add that we examined this issue of an-
tibiotic resistance from the use of antibiotics in animal feed last
year and issued a report with recommendations to FDA to step up
its process of review and action on some of the antibiotics of con-
cern. They have taken many years, and we have urged that they
speed their process to try to slow down some of these problems
from occurring where there is good evidence that resistance is aris-
ing from the use among animal flocks. There are other countries
who have controls in place and have seen decreases in the preva-
lence of antibiotic resistance strains among their human popu-
lation.
Mr. FERGUSON. Just as we close I just want to thank all of our
panelists for being here today. There certainly seems to be a con-
sensus that there are serious problems down the road, and we take
your exaltations and your advice very seriously and we hope to be
taking actions as well. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Æ
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:46 Sep 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6011 21642.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
